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Though rare and unpredictable, earthquakes can and do cause catastrophic destruction 
when they impact unprepared and vulnerable communities. Extensive damage and failure of 
vulnerable buildings is a key factor which contributes to seismic-related disasters, making the 
proactive management of these buildings a necessity to reduce the risk of future disasters 
arising. The devastating Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 brought the urgency of this 
issue to national importance in New Zealand. The national earthquake-prone building 
framework came into effect in 2017, obligating authorities to identify existing buildings with 
the greatest risk of collapse in strong earthquakes and for building owners to strengthen or 
demolish these buildings within a designated period of time. Though this framework is unique 
to New Zealand, the challenge of managing the seismic risk of such buildings is common 
amongst all seismically-active countries. Therefore, looking outward to examine how other 
jurisdictions legally manage this challenge is useful for reflecting on the approaches taken in 
New Zealand and understand potential lessons which could be adopted. 
 
 This research compares the legal framework used to reduce the seismic risk of existing 
buildings in New Zealand with that of the similarly earthquake-prone countries of Japan and 
Italy. These legal frameworks are examined with a particular focus on the proactive goal of 
reducing risk and improving resilience, as is the goal of the international Sendai Framework 
for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. The Sendai Framework, which each of the case study 
countries have committed to and thus have obligations under, forms the legal basis of the need 
for states to reduce disaster risk in their jurisdictions. In particular, the states’ legal frameworks 
for existing building risk reduction are examined in the context of the Sendai priorities of 
understanding disaster risk, strengthening disaster risk governance, and investing in resilience.  
 
 While this research illustrates that the case study countries have each adopted more 
proactive risk reduction frameworks in recent years in anticipation of future earthquakes, the 
frameworks currently focus on a very narrow range of existing buildings and thus are not 
currently sufficient for promoting the long-term resilience of building stocks. In order to 
improve resilience, it is argued, legal frameworks need to include a broader range of buildings 
subject to seismic risk reduction obligations and also to broaden the focus on long-term 
monitoring of potential risk to buildings. 
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Despite contributing to only 8% of total global disasters, earthquakes caused one fifth 
of total direct economic losses and more deaths than any other natural hazard between 2000 
and 2019.1 Aside from tsunamis which are sometimes generated by powerful underwater 
ruptures, most harm and destruction experienced in earthquakes is the direct result of building 
failure.2 Buildings designed with insufficient structural resistance to withstand the force of 
earthquakes are considered extremely vulnerable to damage and even total structural collapse 
when subjected to extensive shaking. Although generally lasting for only a matter of seconds 
or minutes, a short time is all that is required for earthquakes to cause catastrophe when they 
impact structurally-vulnerable buildings. For instance, despite lasting a mere 30 seconds, the 
2010 Haiti Earthquake caused hundreds of thousands of buildings to collapse and produced a 
similar number of deaths.3 The following year, in New Zealand, less than 20 seconds of strong 
shaking devastated Christchurch in what was described by then-Prime Minister John Key as 
“New Zealand’s darkest day”.4 The force exerted on vulnerable existing built environments by 
these earthquakes, and many others around the world, serves as an example of the importance 
for better preparing buildings and societies to withstand the impact of earthquakes to prevent 
similar destruction in the future.  
 
Today, many countries enforce building codes with strong seismic design requirements 
for the construction of new buildings. Nonetheless, many buildings which exist today were 
constructed prior to the introduction of these seismic codes and therefore remain a significant 
risk in earthquakes. Mitigating the risk of these buildings can be difficult, especially as 
earthquakes are unpredictable and low-probability events. This can often result in people 
 
1 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction Human Cost of Disasters - An Overview of the Last 20 Years: 
2000-2019 (United Nations, United States, 2020) at 16.  
2 Shannon Abeling and others “Patterns of Earthquake-Related Mortality at a Whole-Country Level: New 
Zealand, 1840-2017” (2020) 36 Earthquake Spectra 138 at 138. 
3 David Randall “Earthquake in Haiti: Gone in 30 Seconds” (17 January 2010) The Independent 
<www.independent.co.uk>. 
4 “We May Be Witnessing New Zealand’s Darkest Day: PM Says 65 Killed in Quake” The Sydney Morning 
Herald (online ed, 22February 2011). 
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having a low associated risk perception.5 In fact, adequate preparedness remains relatively low 
for the impact of such rare and irregular events despite the potential destruction of earthquakes 
being well understood. Because risk perception is highly subjective, limited experiences with 
destructive earthquakes can lead to a general perception bias amongst individuals that such 
events are unlikely to impact them.6 This can result in a limited incentive to mitigate risk. 
Strong leadership and regulation is necessary to motivate people, particularly building owners, 
toward taking preventative and risk-adverse action to reduce the seismic vulnerability of 
existing buildings. 
 
With this in mind, all seismically-active countries face the shared enduring challenge 
of managing the risk presented by existing buildings to improve resilience. This research is an 
evaluation of New Zealand’s legal response to this challenge, and compares it to the response 
of both Italy and Japan. The main purpose of this comparative study is to examine the legal 
approaches for reducing the seismic risk of existing buildings and consider any potential 
alternative approaches to managing building safety in New Zealand. Understanding how other 
jurisdictions utilise the law to prepare existing buildings for the impact of future earthquakes 
provides valuable insight into the different functional approaches used to address this shared 
challenge. Although unique circumstances and solutions have been adopted in New Zealand 
under the “earthquake-prone building” framework, the challenge of managing the seismic risk 
of existing buildings is far from unique. Critical insight from international experiences exposes 
potential gaps in the current framework applied in New Zealand and highlights methods which 
may be adopted for potential improvement. The ultimate goal should be to build on experiences 
and enable continued growth, developing legal frameworks which improve the resilience of 
building stocks and thus society to potentially damaging earthquakes. 
 
This research is structured into three parts, each containing multiple chapters. The 
purpose of separating the work into three distinct parts is to clearly distinguish the content into 
core segments: background content, operational features of legal frameworks, and enforcement 
 
5 Yibin Ao and others “Impact of Earthquake Knowledge and Risk Perception on Earthquake Preparedness of 
Rural Residents” (2021) 107 Natural Hazards 1287 at 1290. 
6 Miles H Crawford and others “The Low-Likelihood Challenge: Risk Perception and the Use of Risk Modelling 
for Destructive Tsunami Policy Development in New Zealand Local Government” (2019) 23 Australasian 
Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies 3 at 7. 
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mechanisms for legal obligations. Part A – Frameworks for Reducing Existing Building Risk 
– introduces the reader to the theoretical background of disasters and hazard management. It 
also provides an overview of key concepts and general approaches to the management of 
existing buildings in the case study countries. Part B – Operational Features of Risk Reduction 
Frameworks – examines key features applied within legal frameworks to understand and 
manage the seismic risk of existing buildings in each of the countries. Part C - Key Mechanisms 
for Enforcing Legal Obligations – compares how relevant legal obligations are enforced against 
the owners of existing buildings, to ensure objectives for risk reduction are, in fact, achieved. 
 
The first chapter outlines the theoretical basis used for this research. The Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 is currently the leading international 
authority for the management of hazards and disasters. Adopted at the United Nations General 
Assembly in 2015, the Sendai Framework commits states to obligations under international 
law to pursue goals which reduce disaster risk in their communities.7 The chapter highlights 
three priority areas for action listed within the Sendai Framework and establishes them as the 
basis for which the comparative study is assessed against. These include Priority One, 
Understanding Disaster Risk; Priority Two, Strengthening Disaster Risk Governance to 
Manage Disaster Risk; and Priority Three, Investing in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) for 
Resilience. Today, DRR is the main objective when dealing with hazards and their potential 
impacts, indicating a shift from managing disasters to managing the driving risks which cause 
disasters. The objective of DRR is led by a clear distinguishment between hazards and the 
resulting impact of hazards. This chapter argues that the shift towards DRR has been headed 
by a change in perception about disasters, understanding them not as “natural” events but rather 
social phenomena caused by the existence of underlying physical, social, economic and 
environmental risks. By understanding disasters as social phenomena, it becomes possible to 
develop appropriate DRR strategies to minimise the potential for disasters to occur.    
 
With a relevant theoretical underpinning established, Chapter 2 then provides a general 
overview of the legal frameworks adopted in each of the case study countries to achieve risk 
reduction for existing buildings. A definition of ‘existing building’ is established for the 
purposes of this research, as a building considered to be seismically-vulnerable in relation to 
building codes enforced in the present day. Each of the case study countries applies a range of 
 
7 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 GA Res 69/283 (2015). 
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voluntary and mandatory obligations for addressing the seismic risk of existing buildings. 
These are outlined in the context of the minimum legal standard of seismic risk adopted by 
each country, with a primary focus on protecting the life safety of building users and the wider 
general public. This includes assessing individual buildings and strengthening those which are 
considered to pose a high risk of collapse in earthquakes. The last section of the chapter argues 
for a more active intervention by states to address the seismic risk of existing buildings, in 
accordance with the preventative nature of DRR. This is needed not only to protect public 
safety, but also to minimise the overall disruption to livelihoods and communities from 
earthquakes.  
 
Active approaches to the risk reduction of existing buildings generally involves 
authorities making assumptions about which specific buildings are likely to pose a significant 
threat of collapsing in earthquakes. Chapter 3 examines the way authorities identify existing 
buildings subject to risk reduction obligations, using building profiles. This typically involves 
physical characteristics such as the materials used to construct buildings and the year they were 
designed. Adopting these characteristics to identify existing buildings within risk reduction 
frameworks tend to focus on existing buildings with the greatest assumed seismic risk, which 
is argued to be a narrow focus on seismic risk and may lead to other at-risk buildings being 
overlooked within legal frameworks. “Priority buildings” provide a more holistic approach to 
understanding seismic risk, by considering the vulnerability of building occupants and the 
function of particular buildings. However, it is demonstrated that these buildings are targeted 
according to the aforementioned physical characteristics and the test is therefore also narrow 
in application. Finally, it is argued that the very limited inclusion of residential buildings within 
the risk reduction framework of New Zealand is counterproductive to improving resilience. 
 
Chapter 4 compares the use of seismic hazard zones within legal frameworks for 
existing building risk reduction. Seismic hazard zones define areas based on their presumed 
seismic activity and are primary features within the legal frameworks of New Zealand and 
Italy. In practice, this means different legal obligations exist for the owners of certain buildings 
according to the seismicity of particular regions. Challenges surround the application of these 
zones, including the influence they have over people’s perception of earthquakes and the need 
to engage with risk reduction measures. Seismic hazard is presented as seismic risk in New 
Zealand, which raises challenges in relation to the misuse of these terms. While seismic hazard 
zones can be useful for understanding where earthquakes are to be expected more or less 
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frequently, caution is required to appreciate the uncertainty and limitations surrounding the 
knowledge used to create these zones. The potential for strong shaking should not be 
underestimated in any region of the case study countries, no matter how small the probability 
is assumed to be. Japan provides an example where risk reduction obligations for existing 
buildings apply equally in all areas of the country and not by seismic hazard zones, unlike New 
Zealand and Italy. A prominent example of this is the Christchurch region which, until the 
2010/2011 Earthquake sequence, was located in a medium, not high, seismic zone. 
 
The use of seismic building assessments to understand the nature of seismic risk 
amongst individual existing buildings is explored in Chapter 5. These assessments are often 
used to determine the need for significant legal risk reduction obligations and so the measures 
in place to ensure consistency and accuracy in their application are explored. In addition, 
requirements to publicise the risk information obtained from these assessments is also 
discussed, as a means of promoting risk reduction. There is also a tendency for restricted use 
of seismic assessments within risk reduction frameworks. Opportunities where their 
application may be useful are therefore missed, such as during periodic building maintenance 
and following strong earthquakes where no damage has been observed but where the structure 
may have nonetheless weakened. It is argued that seismic assessments should be used more 
widely as a practical means of promoting seismic resilience. 
 
Chapter 6 examines the use of financial incentives provided to building owners for 
completing risk reduction. As a core feature of Priority 3 within the Sendai Framework, 
financial incentives not only help building owners to overcome often significant costs 
associated with seismic strengthening, but also work to encourage them to take action in the 
first place. It is argued that the New Zealand government still perceives costs associated with 
seismic risk reduction as unaffordable or burdensome in the short-term, rather than necessary 
long-term investments for the public good. Italy and Japan both offer a much wider range of 
financial incentives to existing building owners. This is compared to the much more limited 
range of incentives in New Zealand. It is also noted that access to financial incentives in New 
Zealand and Italy are restricted to areas with greater seismic hazard. It is argued that such 
restrictions delay the achievement of DRR and that incentives should be provided in all areas 
where existing building risk needs to be reduced, as is applied in Japan.  
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Chapter 7 examines the use of timeframes as a strategic planning tool used to enforce 
DRR obligations. Such timeframes are often used for establishing targets to be achieved within 
specific time periods, with statutory deadlines used in New Zealand to ensure building owners 
complete obligations by a certain date. The chapter argues that relying solely on regulation and 
the threat of formal sanctions is not the most efficient means of achieving risk reduction 
amongst existing building owners. Instead, focus should be placed on increasing the capacity 
for authorities to monitor and engage with building owners to assist with compliance. The use 
of compliance monitoring and a greater level of engagement between authorities and building 
owners is argued to be more proactive in attempts to achieve risk reduction within relevant 
timeframes. 
 
The final chapter draws attention to an intersection between the seismic risk of existing 
buildings, and legal duties of care owed by owners to protect public safety. Such duties in each 
case study country require building owners to take all appropriate action to ensure people are 
not harmed by their buildings. Although external to administrative risk reduction frameworks 
for existing buildings, these duties present an interesting dynamic in relation to the obligations 
of building owners. While not explicitly designed with seismic risk in mind, they have 
nonetheless come to play a significant role in shaping risk reduction behaviour and 
expectations. In particular, challenges have arisen in relation to the sharing of risk knowledge 
about buildings and ambiguity around what action building owners are expected to take to 
comply with their duty of care. Greater clarity from authorities on this matter is argued as 
necessary. In addition, there is an important consideration to be had in relation to fulfilling 
these duties while operating within relevant timeframes allocated for building owners to 
remediate risk. This is particularly relevant within the context of statutory deadlines in New 
Zealand. It is argued that a duty of care may require building owners to take actionable 
measures to reduce risk from as soon as they become aware of risk, notwithstanding the official 
timeframe they have to carry out seismic strengthening or demolition.  
 
 The research ends much how it begins, advancing a call for a more active intervention 
to better understand and reduce seismic risk in line with the priority areas of the Sendai 
Framework. In recognition of the advancements made in recent years to more actively reduce 
the seismic risk of existing buildings, there remains much which can and should be done in 
order to enable long-term resilience. Legal frameworks today are largely designed to address 
existing buildings considered to pose the greatest threat to life safety in earthquakes, without 
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providing a structure for addressing potential risk from other buildings which may nonetheless 
also pose a risk. In fact, this research demonstrates that legal frameworks to reduce the seismic 
risk of existing buildings is largely static, addressing risk for a single moment in time. Because 
risk is fluid and constantly changing, it is important for legal frameworks to provide flexibility 
in order to improve resilience.  
 
 Improving seismic resilience requires a collective effort, which becomes directly 
challenged when individual owners are provided the option to abstain from engaging in risk-
adverse behaviour. Providing for the long-term resilience of existing buildings therefore 
ultimately requires a fundamental shift in the way building ownership and associated 
responsibilities are legally understood. As knowledge about seismic risk grows, the legal duty 
of states to manage and reduce this arguably provides increasingly less room for ignorance and 
turning a blind eye to the nature of such risk. Though the occurrence of earthquakes may be 
rare, the need to be prepared is evident and building owners should therefore be expected to 
incorporate this into the long-term management for buildings. Not only is this important to 
reduce harm and damage to persons and individual buildings, but also to minimise disruptions 




Siems argues good comparative law starts not with a legal topic, “but with a functional 
question”.8 Beginning from a functional question is intended to free the researcher from any 
preconceived notions of how law is or should operate, and instead focuses on practical social 
issues common between jurisdictions. In this sense, the most simplistic purpose of functional 
comparative law is to compare the differences and similarities of legal solutions applied to 
shared problems.9 A criticism of functional comparative law is that it over-assumes the 
similarity of social problems across legal systems.10 In response to this, it is suggested that a 
clear distinguishment should be made to identify the intended function of a particular legal 
 
8 Mathias Siems Comparative Law (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018) at 16. 
9 Uwe Kischel Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019) at 8. 
10 Christopher Whytock “Legal Origins, Functionalism, and the Future of Comparative Law” (2009) 2009 
Brigham Young University Law Review 1879 at 1886. 
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method and the consequence of whether this method has achieved its intended function.11 This 
is logical since it considers the exact goals of jurisdictions in addressing particular issues, while 
also evaluating the success rate of the applied methods.  
 
A quintessential element of comparison is not simply identifying the differences and 
similarities between legal solutions, but also investigating the logic behind why jurisdictions 
choose to adopt their particular approaches.12 Such analysis raises challenges related to an 
awareness of inter-jurisdictional diversity, such as cultural, social, economic and political 
orders. There is a general tendency for functionalism to be impartial with different legal 
solutions, by disconnecting from particular meanings within legal systems and instead focusing 
on the relevant social issue. This is highlighted as a shortcoming of functionalism’s ability to 
appropriately consider these quasi-legal factors. However, it is also noted that adequately 
representing all factors of contextual importance would be an entirely unrealistic standard for 
a comparative study to be capable of.13 It is therefore necessary to strike a sensible balance 
between detachment of preconceived or biased legal norms and an appreciation for the deeper 
social characteristics that underpin the legal structures of each jurisdiction. This can, in part, 
be mitigated by examining jurisdictions that possess shared aspects of legal culture, as will be 
highlighted below.14   
 
The purpose of this research is to examine the legal approaches taken by different 
countries to reducing the risk existing buildings from earthquakes. The functional question 
posed therefore asks how existing buildings are regulated to improve seismic resilience. It does 
not seek to propose superior legal solutions, but to illustrate a diversity of solutions for a 
common – and urgent – social problem. Buildings constructed before the enactment of modern 
building codes are assumed to have a greater potential of failure in large earthquakes, 
heightening the potential for disaster. From here, it is recognised that individual jurisdictions 
have different intentions and desired outcomes for addressing this challenge, which influence 
respective solutions. While this paper seeks to distinguish particular objectives of jurisdictions, 
 
11 At 1890. 
12 At 1890. 
13 At 1903. 
14 George Mousourakis Perspectives on Comparative Law and Jurisprudence (Pearson Education, Australia, 
2006) at 54. 
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limitations related to the non-legal characteristics that influence legal systems are recognised 
in advance as inevitable. A concerted effort is made to detail the most important factors related 
to legal culture and allude to known limitations where relevant.  
 
a. Why Italy and Japan? 
 
As noted in the introduction, the decision was ultimately made to compare New Zealand 
with Italy and Japan. Several different options were initially considered for undertaking the 
comparative study, specifically an in-depth dual case study and a broader multi-country 
analysis. Three countries were considered to be an appropriate compromise, influenced by the 
length of this research and the potential to provide a detailed analysis. Two countries would 
have provided a narrow diversity of legal approaches to compare, while four or more countries 
was considered too many for a thorough analysis given the overall time constraints of this 
research project. In determining which jurisdictions to compare, consideration was given to 
those which share similarities with New Zealand in relation to the seismic risk of existing 
buildings. This includes seismic hazard and built environment, as well as the development level 
of each country.  
 
Making a determination about the jurisdictions to use for the case study analysis in this 
research was influenced by their seismic hazard profiles and the national development levels, 
including economic and institutional capacity. The original intention was that this project 
would benefit from field research within the studied countries, including arrangements to visit 
the Graduate School of Disaster Resilience and Governance at the University of Hyogo in 
Japan. However, this became unavailable shortly into the initial stages of research as a result 
of COVID-19 travel restrictions. The resulting approach was therefore a desktop comparative 
study, which was then triangulated with interviews conducted over Zoom with professionals 
in earthquake engineering. Plans had been made to conduct Zoom interviews with 
professionals from both Italy and Japan, though ultimately only interviews with Italian 
professionals went ahead. Arrangements made with the Japanese professionals for interviews 
could not ultimately be carried through with as they did not respond to email requests for such. 
Despite this, the substantive number of published sources about the legal framework in Japan 
makes the author confident with the standard of analysis completed about Japan. While 
extensive research was still able to be conducted, the travel restrictions did provide less of a 
research foundation for the international jurisdictions as was originally imagined. 
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b. Seismic Hazard Profiles 
 
New Zealand, Italy and Japan each demonstrate high levels of regular seismic hazard 
activity and share similarities in their built environments.15 In these countries, powerful 
earthquakes are expected in the future and all have experienced multiple past earthquake-
related disasters. Focusing on countries with high seismicity and experience of destructive 
earthquakes provides an opportunity to assess legal approaches which have a similar urgency 
in the need to address the risk of vulnerable existing buildings. It would not have been 
appropriate, for instance, to compare countries with no seismic risk, as the functional question 
in this research is directly focused on earthquakes. Each of the case study countries share a 
high susceptibility to frequent earthquakes, albeit of different strengths.  
 
Earthquakes are typically understood according to their magnitude (Mw), with those of 
larger magnitude releasing more power than those of smaller magnitude.16 An increase of 1 
Mw represents an increase in the energy released by approximately 32 times.17 For instance, an 
earthquake of Mw 6.0 produces approximately 32 times more energy than an earthquake of Mw 
5.0, while an earthquake of Mw 7.0 produces approximately 1,000 times more energy. 
Thousands of earthquakes occur each day, though most have such a small magnitude that they 
are not noticed by humans. Earthquakes of Mw of 5.0 or greater are typically felt widely by 
humans and have the greatest potential for causing damage to vulnerable structures. 
 
Each of the case study countries generally experience many earthquakes of Mw 5.0 or 
greater every year. Japan and New Zealand are located along the “Pacific Rim”, which reaches 
across both sides of the Pacific Ocean and is the most seismically-active region in the world.18 
 
15 Maxx Dilley and others Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis (The World Bank, Washington DC, 
2005) at 43. 
16 There are many different ways to measure the magnitude of earthquakes. The most common measurement, 
especially for larger earthquakes, is the use of moment magnitude (Mw). Mw measures the amount of power 
released at the epicentre of earthquakes. For more detail on earthquake magnitudes, see: “Moment Magnitude, 
Richter Scale – What Are the Different Magnitude Scales, and Why Are There So Many?” United States 
Geological Survey <www.usgs.gov>. 
17 “Magnitude/Intensity” Pacific Northwest Seismic Network <www.pnsn.org>. 
18 Yong-Xian Zhang and others “Earthquakes and Multi-Hazards around the Pacific Rim, Vol. 1: Introduction” 
(2017) 174 Pure and Applied Geophysics 2195 at 2195. 
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Japan records the greatest number of large earthquakes of the three countries. Despite 
accounting for approximately 0.25 percent of the world’s total landmass, the country has 
recorded more than 20 percent of global earthquakes registering above Mw 6.0 since modern 
records began.19 This includes various major earthquakes including the infamous Mw 9.0 event 
experienced on March 11, 2011, which is one of the largest ever measured by humans.20 In 
fact, there is an increasing understanding that similar-magnitude earthquakes may also be 
possible off the east coast of the North Island in New Zealand.21 The largest earthquake 
recorded by humans in New Zealand was Mw 8.2 in the Wairarapa region in 1855, which 
caused the vertical uplift of approximately 5,000km2 of land (or five times the size of 
Auckland).22 Though events of this magnitude are rare, more than 15 earthquakes of Mw 7.0 or 
greater have been recorded in New Zealand since the beginning of the 20th century, totalling 
more than one per decade. Only two major earthquakes of Mw 7.0 or greater have been recorded 
in Italy since the beginning of the 20th century.23 Nevertheless, damaging earthquakes have 
occurred in Italy on average every five years since the mid-20th century, with eleven registering 
at Mw 6.0 or greater.24  
 
While each of the case study countries are susceptible to powerful earthquakes, a more 
accurate measurement of potential impact on humans comes not from Mw but from ground 
shaking. The ground shaking produced by earthquakes depends on multiple variables which 
interact with Mw, including depth and soil type. For instance, earthquakes which rupture deep 
within the Earth are likely to produce weaker overall ground shaking than earthquakes which 
rupture closer to the surface.25 The proximity of earthquakes to human societies also 
significantly influence potential ground shaking, with more severe shaking expected nearer to 
an earthquakes’ epicentre. For instance, the 2009 Dusky Sound Earthquake (Mw 7.8) ruptured 
 
19 Aya Osada, Tayayuki Teramoto and Toshio Okoshi “Progress Report of Seismic Evaluation and Retrofit of Old 
Buildings Along the Specific Emergency Transportation Roads in Tokyo” (paper presented to 17th US-Japan-
New Zealand Workshop on the Improvement of Structural Engineering and Resilience, 2018) at 2-3-1. 
20 “20 Largest Earthquakes in the World” United States Geological Survey <www.usgs.gov>. 
21 Crawford and others, above n 6, at 3. 
22 “Where Were New Zealand’s Largest Earthquakes?” (24 November 2016) GNS Science <www.gns.cri.nz>. 
23 “A Timeline of Major Earthquakes to Hit Italy” (24 August 2016) The Guardian <www.theguardian.com>. 
24 Marco Donà, and others “Mechanics-Based Fragility Curves for Italian Residential URM Buildings” (2020) 19 
Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering 3099 at 3099. 
25 “Shaking Intensity” GeoNet <www.geonet.org>. 
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in the largely isolated New Zealand region of Fiordland and caused relatively little damage, 
despite its power. In comparison, the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake (Mw 6.2) ruptured within 
the city boundaries. This close proximity, alongside a shallow depth of approximately 5km, 
caused significantly greater ground shaking than the 2009 event despite being of substantially 
lesser magnitude. Indeed, severe ground shaking has recently also caused significant harm and 
damage from smaller magnitude earthquakes in both Italy and Japan. In 2018, an earthquake 
of Mw 5.6 in Osaka, Japan, caused multiple deaths and damaged thousands of buildings.26 In 
2016, an earthquake of Mw 6.2 similarly caused severe shaking and led to hundreds of deaths 
and severe damage to thousands of buildings in central Italy.27 
 
The vulnerability of the built environment in the communities where these earthquakes 
have occurred or may occur is ultimately a significant factor in determining the outcome of 
harm and damage. As imaginable, most of the buildings which have been severely damaged or 
collapsed in past earthquakes were not designed in accordance with appropriate seismic design 
standards. While the building stocks of the three case study countries are different in nature, 
they share many similarities in relation to seismic vulnerability. Sufficient seismic building 
regulations were not implemented until the late 20th century, meaning many buildings which 
exist today were constructed in the absence of, or with inadequate, construction techniques 
which help structures better resist the force of earthquakes (see Chapter 3). A large number of 
these buildings in Italy and Japan were constructed between the 1950s and 1970s, as part of 
reconstruction from the Second World War.28 A significant portion of buildings designed prior 
to modern seismic codes also exist in New Zealand.29 Many of these buildings have no 
information about their seismic capacity. As a result, much understanding of seismic risk 
amongst these buildings is purely assumed (see Chapter 3). This challenge is true for each of 
the case study countries, with a shared need to urgently attain such knowledge in light of high 
seismic threat. In New Zealand and Italy, this includes a noteworthy amount of heritage 
 
26 Cabinet Office Japan White Paper on Disaster Management in Japan 2019 (Government of Japan, 2019) at 14. 
27 See: Silvia Mazzoni and others “2016-2017 Central Italy Earthquake Sequence: Seismic Retrofit Policy and 
Effectiveness” (2018) 34 Earthquake Spectra 1671. 
28 Indera Syahrul and others “Incentives for the Conservation of Traditional Settlements: Residents’ Perception 
in Ainokura and Kawagoe, Japan” (2015) 13 Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change 301 at 302. 
29 Martin Jenkins Indicative CBA Model for Earthquake Prone Building Review: Summary of Methodology and 
Results (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, September 2012) at 7. 
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buildings, although many heritage buildings in Italy are substantially older than those in New 
Zealand.  
 
Given the age of most heritage buildings, most completely lack sufficient seismic 
resistance. In Italy, more than half of all existing buildings are believed to have heritage value.30 
Both Italy and New Zealand have laws which strongly favour the conservation of heritage 
buildings, which inadvertently adds an extra layer of complexity to the challenge of seismic 
risk reduction when aiming to also preserve these buildings.31 In comparison, Japan has less 
heritage buildings as building conservation protections were particularly relaxed, until the end 
of the 20th century.32 Compared with many Western societies which generally tend to favour 
conserving heritage through material objects such as buildings, Japan has very few historic 
buildings owing to a more regenerative and non-material approach to heritage conservation.33  
 
 In addition to the actual structural vulnerability of buildings in these countries, it is also 
significant that growing population density increases the potential impact of earthquakes when 
they do occur in or near populated areas. On the whole, more people in Japan and Italy are 
exposed to earthquakes than are in New Zealand, which is reflected by the relatively few large 
earthquakes directly impacting populated areas despite their moderately frequent occurrence 
on average. For instance, the population density of New Zealand as of 2018 was estimated to 
be 19 people per km2 of land, compared to 203 people per km2 in Italy and 347 people per km2 
in Japan.34 This is certainly a significant factor as to why there has been a greater number of 
earthquakes which have produced devastating effects in Japan and Italy compared to New 
Zealand. On the other hand, a greater concentration of people in fewer areas also creates its 
 
30 Verso un Piano Nazionale per la Messa in Sicurezza delle Abitazioni e Dei Territori dal Rischio Sismico e 
Idrogeologico (CR 401) Congiglio Nazionale Ingegneri (Rome, January 2013) (translation: Towards a 
National Plan for the Safety of Homes and Territories from Seismic and Hydrogeological Risk (CR 401) 
National Council of Engineers) at 49. 
31 Alessandra Bellicoso “Italian Anti-Seismic Legislation and Building Restoration” (2011) 35 International 
Journal for Housing Science 137 at 140. 
32 Eisuke Nishikawa “Development in Earthquake Countermeasures for Heritage Buildings in Japan” (2017) 8 
Archeomatica 34 at 36. 
33 See: Seung-jin Chung and Chang-sung Kim “The Development of Attitudes to Historic Conservation – From 
Eurocentrism to Cultural Diversity” (2010) 12 Architectural Research 25. 
34 “Population Density” The World Bank <www.data.worldbank.org>. 
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own risks. The potential impact of earthquakes on such communities, if unprepared, may be 
significantly greater. This is true in all of the case study countries, where major urban centres 
in each are particularly vulnerable to the occurrence of strong earthquakes in the near future. 
When combined with structurally-vulnerable built environments, this produces a prime 
environment for disaster. 
 
c. National Development Level  
 
In addition to the seismic hazard profile of each country, the level of national 
development was also a significant factor when selecting comparator countries. Relatively 
similar circumstances were considered necessary to ensure an accurate and relevant study, 
including the governance capacity and economic strength of states to implement and enforce 
risk reduction measures. For instance, while New Zealand and Haiti are both seismically-active 
countries, there are marked differences in relation to their national wealth and institutional 
governance capacity to, for example, enforce strict seismic building standards. Given these 
circumstances, comparing the approach to seismic risk reduction between these countries 
would have been inherently problematic. For this reason, countries which share relatively 
similar standards of development to New Zealand were desired, such as Italy and Japan.  
 
New Zealand, Italy and Japan are also considered wealthy economies by global 
standards and are all members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). It is therefore reasonable to assume the three are in a strong position to implement 
and invest in risk reduction, relative to poorer countries. High up-front financial costs are 
commonly perceived as a barrier to implementing such measures, especially in relation to 
seismic strengthening of existing buildings where the cost of seismic strengthening may appear 
significant.35 In addition, the greater development of a country is also likely to be a factor in a 
state’s capacity to enforce with building codes, compared to low and middle-income 
countries.36 Seismic building standards in New Zealand, Italy and Japan are often considered 
 
35 Xijun Yao and others “Public-Private Partnership for Earthquake Mitigation Involving Retrofitting and 
Insurance” (2017) 23 Technological and Economic Development of Economy 810 at 811. 
36 Mary Picard Effective Law and Regulation for Disaster Risk Reduction: A Multi-Country Report (International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and United Nations Development Programme, New York, 
2014) at 45. 
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amongst the most advanced in the world and often used as examples for building excellence. 
This shared assumed capacity to implement and enforce regulations for the built environment, 































Frameworks for Reducing Existing Building Risk 
 
Part A of this research serves as an introduction to the key components used for the 
comparative study in the latter parts of the thesis. It is separated into two Chapters, including a 
theoretical background and an overview of the legal approaches taken to reduce existing 
building risk. In order to understand the approaches taken to reducing the seismic risk of 
existing buildings, it is first necessary to recognise the exact purpose for seeking such an 
outcome.  
 
Chapter 1 familiarises the reader with the concept of DRR and argues for a necessary 
change in perception of what constitutes a disaster, including the clear distinction between 
hazards and their associated impacts. DRR has become the foremost objective for the 
management of disasters around the world. This represents a shift away from managing 
disasters by aiming to minimise losses through a focus on response, and instead towards a more 
prevention-focused management and reduction of the risks that lead to disasters. This approach 
is at the centre of the primary international agreement for disaster management, the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. The Sendai Framework was universally 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015 and has since been accepted into 
disaster management practices of the three case study countries. It serves as the functional basis 
for research analysis throughout this thesis, with legal approaches to existing building risk 
reduction examined in relation to the objectives and priorities of the Sendai Framework itself.  
 
Chapter 2 of this research provides an overview of these legal approaches for risk 
reduction within the case study countries. Importantly, it provides an explanation for what is 
meant by the term ‘existing building’, within the scope of this research. Applying this 
definition, typical legal strategies to encourage or require existing building risk reduction are 
discussed, including seismic strengthening obligations when a building owner wishes to 
change the primary use or undertake major alterations of their building. Each of the case study 
countries apply a separate minimum standard of acceptable seismic risk for existing buildings 
and, consequently, adopt a variety of mandatory and voluntary obligations to drive building 
owners towards achieving the relevant standard. A better understanding of seismic risk posed 
by existing buildings and the policy objective of disaster risk reduction, as well as influence 
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from previously-experienced seismic disasters, has seen governments of the case study 
countries take increasingly active legal intervention towards the reduction of existing building 
risk. Such a trend is necessary to adequately prepare for earthquakes and minimise the risk of 





























Chapter 1  
The Intersection of Disaster Management and Law 
 
Disasters are no longer excuses or non-legal gaps; they are social phenomena that must be 
legally approached through our normal legal system, rather than as exceptions. 
Kristian Lauta37 
 
Significant transformation has been made in recent years to focus on disaster prevention 
rather than simply disaster response. As a result, the main focus of disaster management has 
shifted from managing disasters and reducing losses, to managing and reducing the driving 
risks which create disasters themselves.38 Each disaster is unique and offers its own 
complexities. As Kelman suggests, the “scale of a disaster is defined by its impacts”.39 These 
impacts are often understood through quantifiable factors, such as the scale of death and injury, 
physical and material damage, and economic losses.40 The threshold for what constitutes a 
disaster ultimately differs based on cultural and social attitudes towards concepts such as 
misfortune, liability, and expectations around security.41 In simple terms, a disaster may be 
understood as “a situation requiring outside support for coping”.42 Such an interpretation 
suggests that a disaster involves a significant disruption to a society and which subsequently 
requires external support to recover. Indeed, long-term impacts and recovery are intrinsic 
characteristic of disasters.43 The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) 
provides a more detailed definition of a disaster, being:44 
 
A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due to hazardous 
events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, leading to one or 
more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental losses and impacts. 
 
 
37 Kristian Lauta Disaster Law (Routledge, Oxon, 2015) at 144. 
38 “New Zealand Strong on Sendai Framework (20 June 2015) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction 
<www.undrr.org>. 
39 Ilan Kelman (ed) Disaster by Choice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020) at 45. 
40 John Hopkins “The First Victim – Administrative Law and Natural Disasters” (2016) 1 NZLR 189 at 199. 
41 Frank Furedi “The Changing Meaning of Disaster” (2007) 39 Area (London 1969) 482 at 486. 
42 Above n 39, at 15. 
43 Above n 40, at 199. 
44 “Disaster” (2021) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction <www.undrr.org/terminology>. 
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While this interpretation also includes the ideas of disruption and loss, arguably the 
most important aspect of the definition is the acknowledgement of “hazardous events 
interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity”. The explicit separation of 
hazards from the resulting impacts on affected communities or societies establishes the disaster 
itself as a result of human-caused factors, namely exposure, vulnerability and capacity. This 
socialised interpretation of disasters forms the basis for DRR. DRR is the main policy objective 
of disaster risk management and has become the leading international approach to preventing 
future disasters.45 By focusing on the drivers of the conditions which allow hazards to create 
the disruption and losses necessary for a disaster, planning and prevention measures can 
motivate the reduction of such disaster risks. This socialised perception of disasters has thus 
increased the focus of DRR, subsequently resulting in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction to coordinate this desired objective. 
 
1.1 The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 
 
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (referred to hereafter 
as the ‘Sendai Framework’) is the leading international authority for the adoption and 
implementation of DRR practices amongst states. The Sendai Framework promotes the concept 
of DRR as an operable instrument for the international community to draw upon, building on 
decades of work by the international community to better manage and prevent disasters from 
occurring.46 It succeeded the previous Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA), which 
sought to substantially reduce disaster losses.47 Although successful for increasing public 
awareness and creating widespread political commitment to reducing disasters, the HFA 
ultimately failed in its goal to prevent a rise in disaster losses.48 It was noted that exposure to 
hazards had increased at a far greater pace than vulnerability had decreased, leading to an 
increased number of persons and communities affected by disasters.49 Instead of focusing 
 
45 “Disaster Risk Reduction” (2021) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction 
<www.undrr.org/terminology>. 
46 International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction GA Res 42/169 (1987) at 129. 
47 United Nations Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities 
to Disasters (22 January 2005) at [11]. 
48 More than 1.5 billion people were affected by disasters between 2005 and 2015, including more than 144 million 
displaced persons, see: Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, above n 7, at [3]. 
49 At [4]. 
 20 
purely on reducing losses from disasters, the Sendai Framework seeks to minimise the 
occurrence of disasters by reducing the driving forces which significantly increase the potential 
for disasters in the first instance.50 As mentioned in the previous section, this signals a shift 
“from managing disasters to managing risk [and] from focusing on disasters to focusing on 
risk”.51 
 
At its core, the Sendai Framework is designed to promote sustainable development by 
providing a framework for States to implement and follow more risk-adverse practices to avoid 
disasters.52 The framework aims to achieve a substantial reduction in both disaster risk and 
disaster losses around the world by the year 2030, and includes seven tangible targets against 
which the progress of states is measured.53 The international agreement is not designed to 
dictate specific risk reduction policies and strategies, but rather to help guide states on how to 
adopt and integrate risk reduction measures on a national and local level.54 In this sense, the 
importance of the Sendai Framework can be understood as an interpretative tool and 
“methodological roadmap” to promote coherence for DRR planning around the world.55   
 
By adopting the Sendai Framework and committing to a reduction in disaster risk, the 
Sendai Framework plays an important role in driving the behaviour of states under international 
law. Reducing disaster risk is understood as a legal duty, which states have a “primary” 
responsibility to implement.56 Indeed, commitments to risk reduction under the Sendai 
Framework are derived from international human rights law, including treaties such as the 
 
50 At [16]. 
51 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction Reading the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2015-2030 (Geneva, 2015) at [31]. 
52 The Sendai Framework is part of a broader international framework to promote risk reduction and sustainable 
development, alongside the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement and the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals, see: Emmanuel Raju and Karen da Costa “Governance in Sendai: A Way Ahead?” (2018) 27 Disaster 
Prevention and Management 278. 
53 Above n 7, at [16], [18]. 
54 Above n 51, at [60]. 
55 Eloísa Dutari and Cássius Chai “Disaster Risk Governance and Coherence: The Case of Incentives for Private 
Business to Foster Disaster Resilience and Sustainability” in K Samuel, M Aronsson-Storrier and K Bookmiller 
(eds) The Cambridge Handbook of Disaster Risk Reduction and International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2019) 275 at 279. 
56 Above n 51, at [89]. 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR).57 Implementing measures to reduce disaster risk is therefore not 
simply a desirable outcome, but one which states have legal obligations and commitments to 
achieving. The Sendai Framework is therefore designed as an authoritative instrument to both 
guide states toward DRR and to identify the overall progress made.  
 
1.2 Understanding Disasters as Social Phenomena 
 
Disasters are the result of a community or society failing to anticipate or adequately 
prepare for the potential impacts of hazards.58 In this sense, disasters are not natural but instead 
social phenomena. When referring to disasters that transpire in the aftermath of natural hazards, 
there is a general tendency among professionals, media, and the public alike to describe them 
as ‘natural disasters’. The phrase ‘natural disaster’ is itself a misnomer, as there is nothing 
natural about disasters. Although hazards and disasters are interconnected, they are in fact 
separate concepts. From a basic understanding, hazards may be understood as “something that 
is dangerous and likely to cause damage”.59 In law, hazards are generally understood as 
resulting from either human origin, such as war and technological failure, or natural causes, 
such as volcanic eruptions and earthquakes, and they often correlate to potential or actual harm 
to people and/or property.60 The dangerousness of a hazard therefore comes not from its 
existence but rather its intersection with human society.61  
 
When a hazard occurs within a human community or society, the readiness of the 
affected area to expect and endure the hazard will determine whether or not a disaster 
subsequently arises. For instance, recent earthquakes in Kobe (1995, Mw 6.9), L’Aquila (2009, 
Mw 6.3) and Christchurch (2011, Mw 6.2) are each examples of earthquakes resulting in disaster 
with significant human, physical and socioeconomic losses. The reason for these losses was 
failure amongst a significant amount of seismically-vulnerable buildings and infrastructure, 
which resulted in extensive displacement and disruption to the impacted communities. These 
 
57 Above n 51, at [91]. 
58 Tim Dixon Curbing Catastrophe: Natural Hazards and Risk Reduction in the Modern World (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2017) at 36. 
59  “Hazard” (2021) Cambridge Dictionary <www.dictionary.cambridge.org>. 
60 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, s 4. 
61 Kelman, above n 39, at 40. 
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hazards led to disaster not because of the earthquakes themselves, but because the affected 
areas were unable to cope with the impacts of the earthquakes. While the occurrence of 
earthquakes may not be avoidable, the death, damage and disruption to society which they 
often bring is.  
 
Distinguishing the hazard from the disaster in order to understand the latter as a 
socially-constructed, and therefore avoidable occurrence, has direct implications on legal 
approaches to disasters.62 Perhaps the greatest implication is that disasters may no longer be 
understood as inevitable. Disasters have largely been understood throughout much of history 
to be what Quarantelli describes as “Acts of God” or “Acts of Nature”.63 When understood as 
an Act of God, a disaster is the result of supernatural or divine forces entirely disconnected 
from human beings, therefore invoking powerlessness in the ability to prevent them.64 Around 
the age of enlightenment, with the experience of increasing secularism in many nations – at 
least in Western society – this perception shifted toward the concept of disasters being Acts of 
Nature.65 Rather than extraordinary events sent by God, these phenomena were the result of 
natural environmental processes, such as the movement of plate tectonics causing movement 
of land.  
 
The underlying assumption for these two perceptions of disasters was that they were 
either completely unavoidable (Acts of God), or were processes where some losses might have 
been minimised but were ultimately accepted as something which societies had to endure from 
time to time (Acts of Nature). As Quarantelli states, “if disasters are Acts of God, then a 
fatalistic attitude is proper [and] if disasters are Acts of Nature, then attempting engineering 
solutions is appropriate”.66 Today, owing to the distinguishment between disaster and hazard, 
disasters are broadly understood not as acts of God or nature but as social phenomena which 
 
62 Lauta, above n 37, at 142. 
63 Enrico Quarantelli “What Should We Study? Questions and Suggestions for Researchers about the Concept of 
Disasters” (1987) 5 International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 7 at 8.  
64 Many legal systems still recognise “Acts of God” today as a defence for liability in relation to natural hazards, 
see: Graham G Dodds “‘This Was No Act of God:’ Disaster, Causality, and Politics” (2015) 6 RHCPP 44. 
65 Above n 63, at 9. 
66 Enrico Quarantelli “Disaster Planning, Emergency Management and Civil Protection: The Historical 
Development and Current Characteristics of Organised Efforts to Prevent and to Respond to Disasters” 
(Preliminary Paper no.301, University of Delaware Disaster Research Center, 2000) at 5. 
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result from a lack of preparedness against hazards. Importantly, this socialised understanding 
breaks the longstanding perception that disasters are inevitable and that engineering and 
technology-based solutions alone are the answer to minimising their occurrence. Disasters thus 
go from inevitable events associated with hazards, to avoidable occurrences when sufficient 
preparation and planning is undertaken in advance. 
 
Distinguishing hazards from disasters also helps to re-frame the perception of a disaster 
as a process, rather than as an event.67 It is inappropriate to characterise a disaster as an event 
because, as previously mentioned, disasters are phenomena which require long-term support 
and recovery. The event, often conflated with the disaster itself, is in fact the hazard and, in 
some instances, the emergency period used to respond to the hazard. An emergency is a 
situation which requires an urgent response, either in anticipation of a hazard (i.e. alerts for 
floods or storms) or in the immediate aftermath (i.e. search and rescue operations). As Hopkins 
suggests, “the fact that many disasters are also emergencies (or evolve from an emergency 
situation) should not blind us to the conceptual difference between the two terms”.68 A hazard 
may or may not lead to an emergency, which then may or may not ultimately lead to disaster. 
Though some hazards may immediately have such significant impacts that a disaster may 
appear obvious, such as the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake or the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, the 
disaster ultimately relates to the long-term consequences and recovery from emergency 
situations.69 This distinction is important both conceptually and legally, as there is a general 
tendency for governments to rely upon emergency law when coping with disasters.70 By 
reconceptualising disasters – from hazardous events to social phenomena – it arguably becomes 
easier to plan in a way that envisages preventing disasters themselves. Indeed, Matthewman 
argues that “event-based thinking avoids structures and processes leaving systems 
unchallenged”.71 This socialised understanding of disasters is a crucial element for 
contemporary disaster management planning around the world. 
 
67 Michael D Cooper “Seven Dimensions of Disaster: The Sendai Framework and the Social Construction of 
Catastrophe” in K Samuel, M Aronsson-Storrier and K Nakjavani Bookmiller (eds) The Cambridge Handbook 
of Disaster Risk Reduction and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2019) 36. 
68 Hopkins, above n 40, at 192. 
69 At 199. 
70 Lauta, above n 37, at 143. 
71 Steve Matthewman Disasters, Risks and Revelation: Making Sense of Our Times (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 
Basingstoke, 2015) at 136. 
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1.3 The Emergence of Disaster Risk Reduction 
 
The fundamental purpose of understanding disasters separately from hazards is to 
strategise how to reduce the underlying risks which make communities and societies 
susceptible to the impacts of hazards in the first place. Concentrating on underlying disaster 
risk allows greater focus to be placed on reducing the overall impacts and disruption caused by 
hazards, therefore minimising the potential for disaster. Managing disaster risk signals a shift 
in emphasis from disaster response to disaster prevention, guided by the socialised 
understanding of disasters.  As stated by the United Nations (UN) in 1994 at the first World 
Conference on Natural Disasters, “disaster response alone is not sufficient as it yields 
temporary results at a very high cost… [while] prevention contributes to lasting improvement 
in safety”.72 This requires greater energy and resource to be applied for addressing the driving 
forces of disasters, rather than responding to the consequences of hazards when they occur. It 
is this idea which DRR is premised upon and which forms the main principle of this research.  
 
DRR is the desired objective of disaster risk management, and aims to both reduce 
existing and prevent new disaster risk within society.73 Disaster risk may be understood as the 
existing susceptibilities of any given community or society which may cause or exacerbate the 
potential for disaster. The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) 
defines disaster risk as “the potential [for disaster] which could occur to a system, society or a 
community in a specific period of time, determined probabilistically as a function of hazard, 
exposure, vulnerability and capacity”.74 This definition clearly sets out disaster risk as an 
intersection between hazards and the concepts of exposure, vulnerability and capacity. 
Although exposure, vulnerability and capacity are conceptually distinguished, both exposure 
and capacity can be generally understood themselves as functions of vulnerability.75 Indeed, 
disaster risk in this research is understood broadly as the product of hazard and vulnerability.  
 
72 United Nations Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World: Guidelines for Natural Disaster 
Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction (23 – 27 May 1994, 
Yokohama, Japan) at 4. 
73 Above n 45. 
74 “Disaster Risk” (2021) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction <www.undrr.org/terminology>. 
75 Alexander Fekete and Burrell Montz “Vulnerability: An Introduction” in S Fuchs and T Thaler (eds) 
Vulnerability and Resilience to Natural Hazards (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018) 14 at 21. 
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The concept of vulnerability within disaster management discourse is widely debated 
and is the subject of extensive research.76 While such arguments are beyond the scope of the 
current research, it is nonetheless important to define vulnerability in the context of this study. 
Generally speaking, vulnerability relates to the susceptibility of individuals, groups, assets 
and/or systems to the impacts of hazards.77 As Wisner suggests, vulnerability is “the 
characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, 
cope with, and resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard”.78 While vulnerability is 
often thought of in relation to the fragility of physical assets, such as buildings and 
infrastructure, it also relates to the susceptibility of both people and systems in relation to their 
power to resist hazardous impacts. Vulnerability is therefore inherently political and constantly 
evolving depending on existing power imbalances both within and between communities.79 
This research is specifically focused on existing buildings. Therefore, vulnerability should be 
understood both as the physical fragility of these buildings and the susceptibility of 
communities owing to decisions about risk reduction obligations for them.  
 
The goal of reducing these vulnerabilities is directly connected to the objective of 
enhancing the resilience of communities and societies against hazards. In the context of DRR, 
resilience “aims at a reduction of vulnerability by planning how to absorb shocks and minimise 
the impact of possible catastrophic events so that society can preserve its normal way of 
functioning”.80 Much like vulnerability, the term itself is widely debated in DRM discourse.81 
The official definition adopted by the United Nations understands resilience as the ability to 
“resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a 
 
76 For further discussion on vulnerability, see: Sven Fuchs and Thomas Thaler (eds) Vulnerability and Resilience 
to Natural Hazards (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018) 14. 
77 “Vulnerability” (2021) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction <www.undrr.org/terminology>. 
78 Ben Wisner At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters (2nd ed, Routledge, New York, 
2004) at 11. 
79 Therese O’Donnell “Vulnerability and the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Protection of 
Persons in the Event of Disasters” (2019) 68 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 573 at 575. 
80 Alexia Herwig and Marta Simocini “Underpinning the Role of Law in Disaster Resilience: An Introduction” in 
Law and the Management of Disasters (online ed, Routledge, 2017) 1 at 5. 
81 See: Alexia Herwig and Marta Simoncini (eds) Law and the Management of Disasters (online ed, Routledge, 
2017); Siri Wiig and Babette Fahlbruch (eds) Exploring Resilience: A Scientific Journey from Practice to 
Theory (Springer, 2018). 
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timely and efficient manner”.82 Despite being adopted by the international community as an 
objective of DRR, the ambiguity surrounding the concept of resilience has caused some to 
criticise the term as an “empty signifier” and effectively meaningless, with no clear definition 
or measurability.83 Indeed, the UN definition of resilience is incredibly vague and arguably 
lacks clarity to be a truly operable objective of DRR.84 However, Kimber argues that the 
concept of resilience is deliberately ambiguous, at least in part, to serve as a “driving force” 
for all States to coalesce around for the goal of creating “stronger and more robust” 
communities.85 Kimber notes that resilience emerged in disaster management discourse in the 
late 20th century as a “positive replacement” to vulnerability; whereas vulnerability indicates a 
fixed susceptibility difficult to emerge from, resilience inversely suggests the potential to 
overcome and improve.86 In this sense, resilience in DRR should not be understood as an 
optimal state of being but as a way to encourage strategic planning in communities to adapt 
and become more risk-adverse to hazards in the long-term. Failure to learn from previous 
disasters and adopt strategies to improve resilience against hazards arguably ignores the 
existence of underlying vulnerabilities and, therefore, does little to reduce disaster risk itself.87  
 
It is a common perception that reducing disaster risk and improving resilience 
exclusively involves hard engineering and technological solutions.88 This notion directly links 
into the perception of disasters as “Acts of Nature”, as discussed above. While such measures 
are of course important for achieving DRR, so too is the use of soft non-physical measures, 
such as law and policy.89 As Herwig and Simoncini argue, “law is an authoritative instrument 
for social steering”.90 Reducing disaster risk depends not simply on developing technology 
 
82 “Resilience” (2021) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction <www.undrr.org/terminology>. 
83 Juergen Weichselgartner and Illan Kelman “Geographies of Resilience: Challenges and Opportunities of a 
Descriptive Concept” (2015) 39 Progress in Human Geography 249 at 249. 
84 Leah Kimber “Resilience from the United Nations Standpoint: The Challenges of Vagueness” in S Wiig and B 
Fahlbruch (eds) Exploring Resilience: A Scientific Journey from Practice to Theory (Springer, 2018) 89 at 93. 
85 At 93. 
86 At 93. 
87 Christopher Emrich and Graham Tobin “Resilience: An Introduction” in Vulnerability and Resilience to Natural 
Hazards (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018) 124 at 127. 
88 Roshani Palliyaguru, Dilanthi Amaratunga and David Baldry “Constructing a Holistic Approach to Disaster 
Risk Reduction: The Significance of Focusing on Vulnerability Reduction” (2013) 38 Disasters 45 at 52. 
89 At 52. 
90 Herwig and Simoncini, above n 80, at 3. 
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which can better resist the impacts of hazards, but also on assessing and changing behaviours 
and practices which ultimately create vulnerabilities in the first place. Law is a necessary 
component of this, as it helps to institutionalise clear expectations and duties to prevent the 
creation of new risk, reduce existing risk, and thereby improve resilience. As the core focus of 
this research is on reducing the risk for existing buildings in relation to earthquakes, law is 
essential for factors such as identifying potential risks and controlling building safety. 
Engineering and technological solutions are essential to, for instance, seismically strengthen 
existing buildings, but the requirement for and implementation of these measures is ultimately 
controlled by legal means.91 In fact, a reliance on technology alone is not appropriate for 
resilience. The New Zealand Seismic Risk Working Group recently highlighted this, noting 
that “any implication that buildings can be designed to be ‘earthquake-proof’ should be avoided 
as a solution for resilience” and resilience should instead “reflect a broader set of controls and 
acceptance, under given circumstances, of effects that can be managed over a limited 
timeframe”.92 Guidance for practical and functional ways in which the seismic risk of existing 
buildings can be managed and reduced to improve resilience against earthquakes can be found 
within the Sendai Framework.  
  
A final note should be mentioned that the term disaster risk is used interchangeably 
with seismic risk throughout this research. Seismic risk is merely used to describe disaster risk 
which is specific to the potential impact of earthquakes. It is recognised that the Sendai 
Framework encourages a “multi-hazard” approach to risk reduction, to appreciate the complex 
and often interconnected nature of hazardous impacts.93 However, given the primary focus in 
this research is on existing buildings and the associated impact of earthquakes, seismic risk is 





91 Sven Fuchs, Tim Frazier and Laura Siebeneck “Physical Vulnerability” in S Fuchs and T Thaler (eds) 
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1.4 Priority Areas of the Sendai Framework 
 
As mentioned, the Sendai Framework highlights four key priority areas which require 
specific attention. It is the principal responsibility of states to ensure these priority areas are 
implemented within risk reduction frameworks.94 They include 1) Understanding disaster risk; 
2) Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk; 3) Investing in disaster risk 
reduction for resilience; and 4) Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to 
“Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.95 These priority areas are 
understood as essential for directing and focusing states to successfully achieve the goal of the 
Sendai Framework, to prevent new, and reduce existing, disaster risk and thus improve 
resilience.96 Analysis of legal frameworks within this research is therefore completed with 
consideration of the extent to which they incorporate these priority areas. As this research is 
focused primarily upon the use of proactive and preventative action, only the first three priority 
areas listed in the Sendai Framework are considered.  
 
1.4.1 Understanding disaster risk 
 
Achieving a substantial reduction in disaster risk demands a sound comprehension of 
the presence, extent, and drivers of disaster risk itself.97 For this reason, understanding disaster 
risk is perhaps the quintessential requirement for achieving risk reduction. The 2019 Global 
Assessment Report on DRR, commissioned by the UNDRR, highlights the importance of 
understanding disaster risk, noting: 
 
The ability to make a strong case for [providing] the evidence base for risk-informed 
development hinges on having access to risk information and knowledge. This entry point also 
encompasses public education and awareness campaigns to build a common understanding of 
why mainstreaming is important, and to secure the buy in of policymakers and other 
stakeholders to mobilise the resources and capacities needed. 
 
 
94 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, above n 51, at [16]. 
95 Above n 7, at [20]. 
96 Above n 51, at [30]. 
97 At [47]. 
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Understanding disaster risk is important not only for decision-makers in their ability to 
implement and require appropriate risk reduction measures, but also for the general public to 
have an awareness of disaster risk and what is expected from them. As the Sendai Framework 
outlines, DRR is an “all-of-society” effort and therefore requires buy-in from all stakeholders 
through the utilisation of appropriate knowledge, information, and education.98 The measures 
applied within legal frameworks to understand the seismic risk presented by existing buildings 
is critical not only for establishing appropriate DRR measures, but also for ensuring that 
building owners and the general public alike have a sound awareness of the risk. Cooper argues 
the priority of developing a greater understanding disaster risk is the direct result of disasters 
coming to be perceived as social phenomena, and therefore the focus on reducing risk instead 
of simply losses.99 In addition, Cooper suggests that an increased understanding of disaster risk 
raises fresh challenges in how the law should respond to this knowledge accordingly.100 These 
ideas are explored throughout the course of this study. 
 
1.4.2 Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk 
 
Strong disaster risk governance is necessary to establish “clear vision, plans, 
competence, guidance and coordination” of risk reduction duties, in order to foster compliance 
and collaboration amongst and between states.101 Based upon observations from the HFA, the 
Sendai Framework identifies a lack of strong risk-based regulation as a contributing driver of 
disaster risk.102 Strengthening disaster risk governance includes the establishment of clear roles 
and responsibilities for everyone in pursuit of achieving DRR, primarily through law, 
regulation, and policy.103 Making explicit the obligations and responsibilities of all is crucial 
for engaging everyone in DRR and for providing a degree of certainty in relation to what is 
expected from them. As Mythen suggests, the goal of more risk-based governance is not to 
create “perfect safety”, but instead to “seek to reduce levels of risk via probability assessment, 
 
98 Above n 7, at [19(d)]. 
99 Cooper, above n 67, at 51. 
100 At 51. 
101 Above n 7, at [26]. 
102 Dutari and Chai, above n 55, at 281. 
103 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction: 
2019 (Geneva, 2019) at 335. 
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regulation and effective [risk] communication to the public and other stakeholders”.104 
Strengthening disaster risk governance aims to integrate risk-adverse behaviour and practices 
within institutions and as part of normal operations. This shift away from reactionary measures, 
which has historically dominated disaster management, and toward prevention-based 
approaches, is an essential component of DRR.105 
 
1.4.3 Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience 
 
Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience relies on the institutionalisation of 
strong disaster risk governance.106 Whereas the latter aims to establish clear and cohesive risk 
reduction responsibilities within states, investing in resilience puts these roles and 
responsibilities into action. It is noted that the Sendai Framework is “not a suitable instrument” 
for deciding specific investments which must or should be made, owing to social, economic, 
cultural, and environmental differences between states.107 The framework instead aims to 
simply highlight the importance of making relevant investments better promote practices and 
behaviour which contribute to resilience. Relevant investments may include financial and 
logistical resources, as well as mechanisms which aim to promote, encourage and support risk 
reduction practices within the private sector.108 The extent of the investment made ultimately 
depends upon the capacity of each state to do so. As the Sendai Framework identifies states as 
having a primary duty to promote and oversee risk reduction, it is important that states take a 
strong leadership role in establishing investments within their individual capacity.109 As noted 
in the methodology, the three case study countries in this research are well-positioned to make 
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Today, the primary objective of disaster management is not to simply manage disasters 
and associated losses, but to manage and reduce the underlying risks which allow disasters to 
transpire. Rather than conflating disasters with hazardous events, a clear distinction is made 
between hazards and the impacts hazards have on communities or society owing to multiple 
variations of vulnerability. By understanding disasters as the intersection between hazards and 
the inability of societies to cope with the impacts of such hazards, it becomes possible to target 
the driving risks and thus aim to reduce the overall occurrence of disasters themselves. Indeed, 
the focus on reducing disaster risk makes it clear that while hazards such as earthquakes may 
be natural, disasters are very much social phenomena.  
  
The socialised perception of disasters has been critical for the establishment of the 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. A continued rise in disaster losses 
across recent decades, despite global efforts to prevent such losses, inspired the revised global 
commitment to reduce and manage existing disaster risk, prevent the creation of new disaster 
risk, and improve resilience against hazards. The Sendai Framework emphasises the need for 
preventive action to prepare for the impact of hazards, and guides states to implement 
frameworks for DRR to achieve this. In particular, the Sendai Framework highlights priority 
areas which require considerable focus to achieve risk reduction, three of which are the focus 
of this research. This includes making greater efforts to understand and identify disaster risk in 
communities, strengthening disaster risk governance to make coherent and comprehensive risk 
reduction frameworks, and investing significantly more in preventative risk reduction measures 
to decrease reactiveness and increase hazard resilience. Commitments made under the Sendai 
Framework to reduce disaster risk are inextricably tied to international human rights law. 
States, therefore, have a legal duty to work towards achieving this outcome. The Sendai 
Framework provides states with a structure to implement such measures, to institutionalise risk 








Chapter 2  
Applying Law to Risk Management Frameworks for Existing Buildings 
 
In spite of massive resources put into their prevention, disasters continue to cause extended 
[loss, disruption and suffering to] communities and societies. We are still largely unprepared to 
face events that we have seen occurring repeatedly for decades and in some cases for centuries, 
such as… earthquakes… 
 
Bruna De Marchi110 
 
Earthquakes, while often unhazardous when they occur in remote or unpopulated 
regions of the world, can be incredibly destructive when they come into contact with vulnerable 
communities and, in particular, vulnerable building stocks. Securing buildings to resist the 
force of earthquakes is one of the most effective ways to reduce risk and improve the resilience 
of communities located in locations prone to seismicity. While tough modern construction 
methods are used in many parts of the world to increase the seismic resistance of new buildings, 
a significant challenge remains to secure older, more vulnerable existing buildings. Reducing 
the risk of such buildings is critical for establishing a culture of disaster risk reduction and 
prevention. 
 
This chapter is intended to provide a broad overview of the regulatory approaches 
applied to reduce the seismic risk of existing buildings in each case study country. Before 
undertaking a comparative analysis of different methods, it is first useful to have an 
understanding of the general strategies adopted to identify existing building risk and 
subsequent action to prepare for earthquakes. Although the legal approaches of each country 
differ quite significantly in function, there are many formal similarities. This section first 
defines the concept of ‘existing’ buildings for the purposes of seismic risk as examined in this 
research, distinguishing them from what would otherwise be considered ‘new’ buildings. From 
there, typical legal methods to address the seismic risk of existing buildings are examined, 
including a combination of mandatory and voluntary strengthening obligations. It is 
demonstrated that there has been a significant shift by governments in recent decades from 
 
110 Bruna De Marchi “Risk Governance and the Integration of Different Types of Knowledge” in U F Paleo (ed) 
Risk Governance: the Articulation of Hazard, Politics and Ecology (Springer, New York, 2015) 149 at 159. 
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passive approaches toward more active interventions to address the risk posed by existing 
buildings. This shift aligns with a more DRR-oriented strategy and is critical for achieving the 
expected outcome of the Sendai Framework. 
 
2.1 What is an Existing Building? 
 
An existing building may generally be understood as a building which has received a 
code compliance notice and is therefore legally permitted to be used and occupied.111 In this 
context, existing buildings encompass all those which have been constructed and are currently 
in use. When defining an existing building through a lens of seismic risk management, the term 
is typically used to define buildings constructed prior to modern legal building codes for 
seismic design.112 Existing buildings are therefore generally believed to be potentially more 
vulnerable to earthquakes owing to their construction with insufficient structural resistance to 
withstand earthquakes. This is in comparison to new buildings, which are generally thought to 
have greater seismic resistance as a result of modern and supposedly more robust seismic 
construction standards and technology.  
 
Observations of damage from earthquakes around the world often indicate that 
buildings designed according to contemporary seismic design standards ultimately perform 
better in earthquakes and suffer less damage or destruction than do older existing buildings.113 
Legal building codes are periodically revised according to new information and engineering 
methods, including revisions to earthquake resistance designs. The purpose of these revisions, 
in theory, is to improve the robustness and safety of buildings against earthquakes using the 
latest available seismic knowledge and engineering practices. Ultimately, the prevalence of 
existing buildings designed and constructed prior to these modern building codes creates the 
 
111 New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering Technical Guidelines for Engineering Assessments, Part A: 
Assessment Objectives and Principles (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, July 2017) at A1-
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113 See: Olga Filippova, Yu Xiao, Michael Rehm and Jason Ingham “Economic Effects of Regulating the Seismic 
Strengthening of Older Buildings” (2018) 46 Building and Research Information 711 at 712; Thomas Moullier 
and Keiko Sakoda Building Regulation for Resilience: Converting Disaster Experience into a Safer Built 
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particularly difficult challenge of needing to improve their seismic resistance and thus reduce 
their likelihood of failure when subjected to strong, potentially damage-inducing shaking. This 
is achieved primarily through the practice of seismic strengthening or retrofitting methods, 
which involves reinforcing existing buildings to a higher design standard. Yet, while seismic 
building codes have typically improved over time to create more structurally-robust buildings, 
the discipline of earthquake engineering itself remains young.  
 
Requirements for building standards to consider resistance to earthquakes in their 
design and construction were not widely introduced within the case study countries until the 
early 20th century. Requirements for buildings to withstand collapse in earthquakes were not 
introduced until much further into the century. Many buildings designed prior to or within this 
period of time, which remain in use today, were therefore constructed in the complete absence 
of sufficient seismic design regulations. In addition, many buildings were also designed 
according to seismic regulations which are now considered to be flawed or outdated, based on 
new information about earthquakes and practices of seismic engineering. Generally insufficient 
data and historic records of these buildings means there are significant gaps in knowledge about 
the exact nature of their seismic vulnerability. It is these existing buildings which are of 
particular concern and where most effort is therefore placed on identifying and remediating the 
associated risks they present. As is discussed in Chapter 3, frameworks designed to reduce the 
risk of these existing buildings require administrative decisions to be made about the type of 
buildings targeted for risk reduction measures in relation to acceptable standards of risk within 
relevant countries. 
 
Understanding the vulnerability of existing buildings in relation to the seismic design 
regulations utilised when they were constructed fundamentally implies that, eventually, all 
buildings will be understood as “existing buildings” and considered to have a greater 
vulnerability than newer buildings. Seismic standards are often reactively changed or revised 
in the aftermath of damaging earthquakes, and improper implementation or enforcement of 
these standards in building design can significantly impact their overall effectiveness.114 As 
more knowledge about seismic hazards and seismic engineering practices is generated, the 
overall perception of risk in relation to buildings will also evolve. This is a crucial consideration 
 
114 Above n 112, at 103. 
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when seeking to understand how to increase resilience in relation to the Sendai Framework 
(see Chapter 5).  
 
2.2 Defining a Minimum Legal Standard of Seismic Risk 
 
The requirement to reduce the seismic risk of existing buildings inherently requires a 
minimum legal standard of risk to be established which existing buildings should comply with. 
Seismic strengthening involves adapting and reinforcing buildings to provide them with a 
greater probable capacity to withstand the force of earthquakes. Each building is different and 
possesses a different likely capacity to withstand seismic forces, with numerous improvement 
methods available. While many new buildings today are designed to resist a higher level of 
both destruction and damage, improving existing buildings to similar standards can be 
extremely costly, difficult, and, for some older buildings, sometimes impossible to do without 
completely altering the architectural configuration of the building. A minimum standard is 
therefore typically imposed as the desired threshold for existing buildings to meet. The exact 
standard varies depending on the legal seismic standards and risk reduction objectives of 
individual countries. In each of the case study countries, the minimum legal standard expected 
for existing buildings is focused on protecting life safety. Buildings designed to now-
inadequate seismic standards may endanger the life of building users or passersby as a result 
of external materials falling from above or through the collapse of a buildings’ structure.115 
Securing these features of existing buildings is therefore a priority when strengthening or 
retrofitting. It should be noted that a higher threshold is typically applied to buildings which 
are considered important to the functioning of a society, such as hospitals, schools and 
buildings used for emergency management operations.116 
 
The required life safety threshold required varies between each country and is expressed 
differently according to the building standards imposed. In New Zealand, the minimum life 
safety standard for existing buildings is one third of the minimum standard required for a 
building designed on the same site after 1 July 2017, according to the current building code.117 
This standard is provided as an ‘earthquake rating’ in the form of a percentage value relative 
 
115 Above n 111, at A3-1. 
116 At A10-4. 
117 At A1-5. 
 36 
to the new building standard (%NBS).118 A rating of 34%NBS is the minimum legal threshold 
for life safety, and buildings which fall below 34%NBS are considered “earthquake-prone” and 
targeted for seismic strengthening (see Chapter 2.2.1). The threshold for this value differs 
around the country to reflect the presumed seismicity of each region, meaning that buildings 
with 34%NBS in a high seismic area like Wellington are designed to withstand greater ground 
shaking than those with 34%NBS in a low seismic area like Auckland (see Chapter 4). Existing 
buildings falling beneath this standard are considered to have a high probability of collapse in 
strong earthquakes and therefore present a legally unacceptable life safety risk.119  
 
Japan also expresses the life safety standard for existing buildings in numerical form. 
The minimum safety standard for existing buildings is expressed as a structural seismic 
resistant capacity index (Is) of 0.6.120 The Is of a building is designed to be a measurement of 
its capacity to withstand earthquakes, with consideration to factors such as structural strength 
and potential deteriorations as a result of aging.121 Much how buildings in New Zealand which 
have an earthquake rating lower than 34%NBS are assumed to have the greatest probability of 
collapse, buildings with an Is of less than 0.6 in Japan are also considered to have the greatest 
risk of collapse. It is these buildings which are actively targeted for risk reduction measures. 
 
In comparison to New Zealand and Japan, there is no apparent required life safety 
standard applied to all existing buildings in Italy. Existing buildings used for essential purposes 
(i.e. hospitals, schools, government buildings) are expected to have a minimum of 60 percent 
of the minimum standard required for new constructions, according to the latest seismic 
standards.122 As for all other existing buildings, however, there does not appear to be a clearly 
expressed minimum life safety standard which building owners are required to strengthen to, 
largely owing to the absence of legal obligations to complete such strengthening (see Chapter 
2.3). There are, however, separate lettered risk classes to represent the potential life safety risk 
of existing buildings, from A+ to F. Buildings with a risk class of B or above equates to 60 
percent or greater of the current seismic building code, while buildings with a risk class of E 
 
118 Building Act 2004, s133AC. 
119 Above n 111, at A3-9. 
120 Thomas Moullier and Keiko Sakoda Building Regulation for Resilience: Converting Disaster Experience into 
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 37 
or F represent less than 30 percent.123 In fact, a similar lettered risk classification exists in New 
Zealand ranging from A+ to E, though in practice it is the %NBS earthquake rating which is 
primarily used to communicate the probable seismic risk of existing buildings.124 
 
Of course, measuring life safety according to the probability of building collapse 
assumes structural failure is the only life safety consideration, and fails to consider other 
possible causes of injury or death in earthquakes. For instance, many of the deaths and injuries 
reported in the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake in Japan were the result of non-structural building 
features, such as dislodged ceiling boards.125 Although some of these risks could be addressed 
through improved application of relevant legal health and safety obligations, a lack of overall 
clarity around what is expected or considered sufficient in relation to improving the non-
structural safety of buildings remains largely unclear (see Chapter 8).126  
 
Protecting persons from harm is ultimately only one of many considerations in risk 
reduction. Factors such as building damage and long-term usability following earthquakes, 
both of which significantly impact the level of disruption from earthquakes, are largely 
overlooked in current seismic risk reduction frameworks for existing buildings. Of the case 
study countries, only Japan considers damage limitation requirements in the seismic 
strengthening and retrofitting of existing buildings. Alongside a minimum life safety standard 
to prevent structural collapse, existing buildings in Japan are expected to avoid damage in 
earthquakes which register up to an Upper 5 on the Japanese Shindo Scale.127 Shindo Upper 5 
earthquakes can be expected to occur in Japan approximately every 30-50 years.128 An 
earthquake of Shindo Upper 5 is described by the Japan Meteorological Agency as “hard to 
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move [and] walking is difficult without holding onto something stable”.129 As these 
earthquakes are generally expected to occur potentially multiple times within a building’s 
lifetime, the requirement to minimise damage is designed to minimise disruption and losses 
anticipated on a relatively frequent basis. This represents the only consideration to damage 
limitation of buildings between the three countries. 
 
2.2.1 The focus on earthquake-prone buildings in New Zealand 
 
New Zealand takes a unique approach from the other case study countries in the risk 
reduction of existing buildings, by focusing on buildings which are considered to be 
‘earthquake-prone’. An earthquake-prone building (EPB), defined below, is a building which 
is considered to have the highest probable chance of suffering structural collapse during an 
earthquake of any existing buildings in New Zealand.130 Under the seismic risk reduction 
framework for existing buildings (hereon referred to as the EPB framework), local authorities 
are required to apply guidance from central government to identify buildings considered 
“potentially earthquake-prone” and require building owners to supply a seismic assessment 
report to confirm whether or not their building is in fact earthquake-prone and requires 
subsequent strengthening work. The concept of an EPB is strictly legal, meaning other existing 
buildings which may still pose a notable seismic risk are not captured within risk reduction 
obligations (see Chapter 3).131 Unlike in Japan and Italy, where remediation of seismic risk is 
primarily understood according to the building code used in construction, New Zealand’s focus 
on the legal concept of EPBs provides a far narrower range of existing buildings subject to risk 
reduction.  
 
The Building Act provides a definition for an EPB, noting that a building is considered 
earthquake-prone if:132  
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(a) the building or part will have its ultimate capacity exceeded in a moderate earthquake; and 
(b) if the building or part were to collapse, the collapse would be likely to cause — 
(i) injury or death to persons in or near the building or on any other property; or 
(ii) damage to any other property. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the functional purpose of targeting EPBs is entirely 
to protect life safety. Ultimate capacity simply refers to a buildings’ probable ability to 
maintain structural resistance against seismic forces, which is likely to result in building 
collapse when exceeded.133 The threshold for an EPB is that a building’s ultimate capacity will 
be surpassed in the event of a “moderate earthquake”. This is a notable threshold as this type 
of earthquake is “not really likely to occur”.134 Rather, a moderate earthquake as imagined in 
the EPB definition refers to an artificial standard of shaking produced from an earthquake.135 
“Moderate earthquake” is defined in separate regulation as:136 
 
an earthquake that would generate shaking at the site of the building that is of the same duration as, 
but that is one-third as strong as, the earthquake shaking (determined by normal measures of 
acceleration, velocity, and displacement) that would be used to design a new building at that site if 
it were designed on 1 July 2017. 
 
This legal definition of shaking significantly differs from the approach taken in Japan 
and Italy, where the seismic risk of existing buildings is measured against actual expected 
levels of shaking. For instance, as mentioned, strengthened existing buildings in Japan are 
expected at minimum to remain undamaged and withstand structural collapse in earthquakes 
registering at Shindo Upper 5 and Upper 6 to 7, respectively.137 Earthquakes of Shindo Upper 
6 to 7 roughly translate into those which are expected to occur approximately once every 500 
years, similar to the minimum standard applied to existing building seismic risk in Italy and 
New Zealand. However, the “moderate earthquake”, as defined in New Zealand law, is unlikely 
to occur. As earthquakes with lower shaking intensities do not generally last for the same 
 
133 Building (Specified Systems, Change the Use, and Earthquake-Prone Buildings) Regulations 2005, s 7. 
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duration as larger and more powerful earthquakes, shaking for the same duration but one-third 
the strength of that used for the design of new constructions is considered incredibly rare.138  
 
Whether or not a building is earthquake-prone has become inextricably linked to its 
earthquake rating, principally those with a rating of 33%NBS or less as discussed in the 
previous section. Since it is impossible to predict exactly how individual buildings will perform 
in earthquakes, earthquake ratings are designed to provide an approximate estimation of risk 
rather than a precise measurement.139 Though the %NBS standard was designed to 
communicate seismic risk in a simplistic form, Ferner notes one of the observed impacts of its 
association with EPBs is the conflation between earthquake rating and a building’s safety.140 
Many people consider that buildings not deemed earthquake-prone (i.e. 34%NBS or above) are 
safe, despite many still presenting a less-than-trivial seismic risk. Owing to a general lack of 
public awareness that EPBs concern risk to life safety only, many people have also expressed 
misplaced expectations that buildings not considered earthquake-prone will or should be 
undamaged and able to be reoccupied immediately following earthquakes.141 These examples 
demonstrate just a few of the consequences of applying a legal definition to existing buildings 
in need of seismic risk reduction measures.  
 
2.3 Imposing Legal Obligations on Building Owners to Reduce Seismic Risk 
 
There has been a substantial shift over recent decades in the way governments have 
managed the seismic risk of existing buildings, increasingly moving toward a framework of 
more active legal intervention. The seismic capacity of existing buildings has generally been 
managed through passive measures, including requirements for seismic strengthening when 
building owners make alterations or change the use of their buildings. With increasing 
commitments to manage and reduce disaster risk, fueled by recent experiences of destruction 
caused by earthquakes, it has become obvious that passive measures alone are not enough to 
substantially reduce the seismic risk of existing buildings in a prompt manner as required by 
 
138 University of Canterbury v Insurance Council of New Zealand Inc, above n 134, at [19]. 
139 Engineering New Zealand Revised Version of C5 – Talking About %NBS (10 October 2019) at 2. 
140 Helen Ferner “A Seismic Building Rating System – The New Zealand Experience” (paper presented to 17th 
US-Japan-NZ Workshop on the Improvement of Structural Engineering and Resilience, 2018) at 3-3-6. 
141 At 3-3-5. 
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the Sendai Framework. Each of the case study countries have adopted legal frameworks which 
aim to incentivise and mandate obligations for existing building owners to take appropriate 
action to address seismic risk. It should be mentioned at the outset that this research is interested 
in the national legal frameworks applied to reduce existing building risk, given the need for 
clear coordination of DRR on a state-level. 
 
Such legal approaches taken to reduce the seismic risk of existing buildings follow 
familiar procedural characteristics in each case study country, yet their practical 
implementation in each legal system differs quite significantly. The general risk reduction 
structure applied consists of a three-step pattern: identifying relevant existing buildings 
considered likely to pose a significant risk in earthquakes; undertake seismic assessments on 
these buildings to confirm their likely seismic resistance; and finally, remediate the risk either 
through strengthening and retrofitting methods, or in some instances with demolition. Such a 
process allows for authorities and building owners alike to actually understand the seismic risk 
presented by existing buildings and thus target existing buildings according to those which are 
in greatest need of strengthening or retrofitting. While this general procedure is standard 
between each of the case study countries, how these measures are applied within legal 
frameworks differs significantly.  
 
2.3.1 Change of building use and major alterations 
 
As building codes have evolved, the need to address the seismic risk of existing 
buildings has also grown. Often building owners will choose to demolish and replace older 
existing buildings with new constructions over time. This subsequently reduces the risk posed 
by these particular buildings. However, it is also a reality that many older buildings are kept in 
use and not replaced with new constructions. Historically, passive legal approaches have been 
relied upon to reduce the seismic risk of existing buildings. These passive approaches have 
largely depended upon requiring building owners to undertake a seismic assessment and, if 
necessary, seismic strengthening, under two primary scenarios. This includes when building 
owners seek to either change the use of their building(s), or when they wish to make major 
alterations which could impact the buildings’ structural capacity. These requirements are often 




Change of use or alteration “trigger” requirements exist in each of the three case study 
countries as a way of passively managing seismic risk. A change in use of an existing building 
may increase the potential risk of the building, depending on its intended use. For instance, 
converting an office space into a residential dwelling changes the building’s primary use from 
a place where people work to a place where people sleep, thus leading to a change in dynamic 
of the seismic risk for building occupants.142 In New Zealand, a seismic assessment must be 
completed to confirm whether or not a building is earthquake-prone before any planned change 
of use or substantial alterations can proceed, with strengthening required for subsequent 
EPBs.143 A similar obligation exists in both Italy and Japan, requiring a seismic assessment to 
be undertaken when building owners plan to change the use or make significant alterations to 
their buildings, which would likely impact the overall seismic capacity of buildings.144 In each 
case study country, including Japan, authorities are also able to require a seismic assessment 
from building owners if they have reason to suspect the building poses a particular risk, such 
as evident deteriorations or construction issues. While these measures are useful to improve 
the seismic resistance of existing buildings when changes are sought, their passive dependency 
on building owners to willingly complete such changes make them a drawn-out method for 
achieving risk reduction. 
 
2.3.2 Mandatory and voluntary-based legal obligations 
 
In an effort to achieve timelier seismic risk reduction of existing buildings, broader 
legal duties have recently been established which represent a more active intervention than 
relying on passive legal requirements. The implementation of such obligations in each case 
study country may be distinguished through the use of mandatory or voluntary enforcement. 
For instance, New Zealand imposes mandatory obligations to reduce risk. These require 
territorial authorities (TAs) to identify buildings which are potentially earthquake-prone, and 
the owners of such buildings to subsequently undertake a seismic assessment and, for buildings 
 
142 “Change of Use, Alterations and Extension of Life” (17 March 2017) Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment <www.building.govt.nz>. 
143 Building (Specified Systems, Change the Use, and Earthquake-Prone Buildings) Regulations, s 5-11. 
144 See: NTC 2008. Norme tecniche per le costruzioni. D.M. Ministero Infrastrutture e Trasporti 14 gennaio 2008, 
G.U.R.I. 4 Fabbraio 2008, Roma (translation: Technical Standards for Constructions. D.M. Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Transport, 14 January 2008 (G.U.R.I. 4 February 2008, Rome) at [8.3]; “既存建築物関連
業務” The Building Center of Japan <www.bcj.or.jp> (translation: “Existing Building-Related Business”). 
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which are in fact earthquake-prone, complete seismic strengthening or demolition. Japan and 
Italy stop short of imposing mandatory seismic strengthening obligations on building owners, 
instead relying primarily upon voluntary compliance through the use of various incentives to 
encourage risk reduction. In fact, the extent of mandatory obligations applied in New Zealand 
is unique relative to the other countries. On the one hand, mandatory legal obligations have the 
benefit of mandating compliance and therefore increasing the likelihood that action will be 
taken swiftly, relative to voluntary compliance. On the other hand, voluntary-based obligations 
have the benefit of being more flexible and accommodating to new risk information as it 
emerges.145 
 
The decision in New Zealand to impose compulsory obligations to reduce the risk of 
existing buildings was a direct result of recommendations made by the 2012 Royal 
Commission report into the Canterbury Earthquakes, which investigated the causes of 
extensive building failure experienced in the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake (Mw 6.2).146 The 
national mandatory framework (referred to in this research as the EPB framework) came into 
force on 1 July 2017. Prior to this national framework, TAs set their own individual policies 
for reducing the risk of existing buildings. Under the context of urgency in the aftermath of the 
disaster in Christchurch, the national EPB framework was seen as a necessary response to the 
untimeliness and generally low enforcement standard for risk reduction of EPBs under the de-
centralised system.147 The national EPB framework establishes deadlines of varying lengths 
throughout New Zealand for TAs to identify EPBs within their jurisdictions, and for EPB 
owners thereafter to either strengthen or demolish their building(s).148 As previously mentioned 
the framework itself is focused only a specific subset of existing buildings legally understood 
to be “earthquake-prone”, which represent existing buildings assumed to have the greatest 
seismic vulnerability.  
 
Much like New Zealand in the wake of the Christchurch Earthquake, Japan similarly 
established a national risk reduction framework for existing buildings in the aftermath of a 
 
145 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, above n 51, at [128]. 
146 Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission Volume 4: Earthquake-Prone Buildings (Wellington, released 7 
December 2012). 
147 (12 February 2014) 696 NZPD 15912. 
148 Building Act, subpart 6A. 
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seismic disaster. In 1995, the port city of Kobe was struck by a Mw 6.9 earthquake which, 
owing to widespread seismic vulnerability of existing buildings, led to the death of thousands 
and caused extensive devastation to the region.149 Shortly after the earthquake, the government 
of Japan sought to address the risk posed by existing buildings by implementing the Act on 
Promotion of Seismic Repair of Buildings (APSRB).150 The APSRB established a coordinated 
national framework for managing and reducing seismically-vulnerable buildings across the 
country. It imposes administrative duties for government and building owners alike, including 
for central and local government to assist risk reduction through the provision of funds and 
dissemination of relevant knowledge, and for building owners to strive to make reasonable 
efforts to improve the seismic safety of their buildings where necessary.151 The Act requires 
central government to develop a “Basic Policy” and for local governments to create “Basic 
Plans” to guide the seismic risk reduction of existing buildings across Japan, including 
numerical targets and goals for the amount of buildings to be assessed and strengthened over 
time.152 These plans are updated periodically to reflect actual rates of risk reduction and to 
accommodate any new information. Similar to New Zealand, the framework requires local 
authorities to actively identify the owners of existing buildings assumed to pose the greatest 
risk, and to both encourage and provide directions to complete seismic assessments. 
Amendments were made to the APSRB in 2013, following the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake (Mw 
9.0). For the first time, mandatory seismic assessments were required to be completed by the 
owners of certain “large-scale” buildings within a 24-month period, to confirm their seismic 
resistance (see Chapter 3.2.2).153 However, there ultimately exists no mandatory legal duty 
under the APSRB for building owners to complete seismic strengthening, as there is in New 
Zealand. 
 
Italy has a much less formally-structured national framework than Japan or New 
Zealand, although it does follow a similar voluntary and incentive-based approach to Japan. 
Much like the other countries, Italy has been very reactive in implementing seismic 
 
149 Moullier and Sakoda, above n 120, at 6. 
150 The 1995 Kobe Earthquake is one of the most destructive experienced in Japanese history, with more than 
100,000 buildings destroyed and 6,000 people killed.  
151 Act on Promotion of Seismic Repair of Buildings (Act No. 123 of 1995), art 3. 
152 Article 4. 
153 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism White Paper on Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism in Japan, 2014 (Government of Japan, 2014) at 236. 
 45 
strengthening plans for existing buildings in the aftermath of deadly and destructive 
earthquakes. The most significant national effort began with the issuance in 2003 of the 
Ordinance of the President of the Council of Ministers n. 3274 (OPCM 3274), following the 
2002 Molise Earthquake (Mw 5.8). The earthquake resulted in the death of 27 children 
following the collapse of their primary school, which inspired a sense of collective urgency to 
ensure a similar tragedy did not occur again.154 OPCM 3274 required the owners of “strategic 
and relevant” existing buildings (e.g. hospitals, schools, and emergency buildings) to complete 
a seismic assessment within a five-year period.155 It also established a government fund of 
approximately €200 million (NZ$230 million) for any necessary strengthening work, with 
most funding provided to schools.156 Although many building owners completed these 
assessments, the initial five-year period was subsequently extended beyond 2012 largely owing 
to a lack of thorough enforcement of the order.157 Six years later, following the 2009 L’Aquila 
Earthquake which killed hundreds and caused extensive building damage, further legal reforms 
were made. While much of this was centred on revisions to the national seismic code (NTC 
2008), the National Plan for Seismic Risk Prevention was established and provided additional 
government funding to continue the work of assessing and strengthening existing buildings of 
strategic importance.158 Aside from this funding, no coherent national legal structure was 
implemented to ensure efficient and effective remediation of all existing buildings in the same 
way New Zealand and Japan did.159 In fact, the most recent national efforts to reduce the 
seismic risk of all other existing buildings across Italy are based upon a tax incentive scheme 
known as Sismabonus, which allows building owners to claim tax deductions from expenses 
for completing seismic strengthening (see Chapter 6).160 While this broadens the potential for 
 
154 Mazzoni and others, above n 27, at 1676. 
155 Ordinanza del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 20 marzo 2003 n.3274, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica 
Italiana No. 105, Rome. (translation: Ordinance of the President of the Council of Ministers. 20 March 2003, 
n.3274. Official Gazette of the Italian Republic, No. 105, Rome). 
156 Mauro Dolce “The Italian National Seismic Prevention Program” (paper presented to 15th World Conference 
on Earthquake Engineering, 2012) at 6. 
157 Above n 122. 
158 Susanna Paleari “Natural Disasters in Italy: Do We Invest Enough in Risk Prevention and Mitigation?” (2018) 
75 International Journal of Environmental Studies 673 at 679. 
159 A lack of strategic governance for the risk reduction of existing buildings in Italy is obvious. For instance, only 
23% of projects financed in 2012 under the National Plan had been completed as of 2018. At 679. 
160 Consenza and others, above n 123. 
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seismic strengthening, it nonetheless relies entirely on incentivising owners to take action 
without a legal requirement to do so.  
 
It is clear that the frameworks applied in each of the case study countries represent 
starkly different approaches to reducing the seismic risk of existing buildings. New Zealand 
and Italy can be assessed as sitting at opposite ends of the spectrum, with compulsory 
regulatory obligations and voluntary incentive-based models, respectively. The Japanese 
framework represents a combination of these two models. While no mandatory strengthening 
obligations exist for building owners, a clear strategic plan nonetheless exists under the APSRB 
for the long-term risk reduction of existing buildings. Each of these approaches have their own 
advantages and disadvantages for reducing seismic risk and improving resilience against 
earthquakes, which are explored throughout this research. 
 
2.4 Adopting A More Active Approach to Achieve Seismic Risk Reduction  
 
Ultimately, prolonging or ignoring the existence of risk promotes a culture of reaction 
to earthquakes rather than prevention before they occur. As observed by the UNDRR, “every 
disaster has had an enormous impact on enhancing awareness and safety… but if catastrophic 
failure is the most reliable driver of change, it is clearly not a sufficiently proactive mindset”.161 
Inspired by seismic catastrophe, each of the case study countries have sought to adopt more 
active legal approaches to reducing the risk of existing buildings. As mentioned previously in 
this chapter, New Zealand introduced its national EPB framework with mandatory 
strengthening obligations following the devastating Christchurch Earthquake. Similarly, Japan 
and Italy also adopted their more active incentive-based frameworks to achieve risk reduction 
following seismic disasters which occurred in Kobe (1995) and Molise (2003), respectively. 
Designing frameworks which actively intervene to reduce the seismic risk of existing buildings 
is important for improving resilience and avoiding the need for reactive responses when, not 
if, future earthquakes occur. Not only are these active approaches more in-line with the risk 
reduction objectives outlined in the Sendai Framework, they are also ultimately more cost-
effective strategies, both financially and in relation to the potential societal disruption from 
future earthquakes.  
 
 
161 Above n 103, at 166. 
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The observed trend toward more active national frameworks to address the seismic risk 
of existing buildings is the result of previous passive approaches often proving too slow for 
successfully identifying and reducing seismic risk. As mentioned, relying solely on legal 
requirements for completing seismic assessments and strengthening work when building 
owners choose to make significant alterations or change the use of their building(s) may take 
an excessively long period of time to be achieved, or economic circumstances may cause 
building owners to refrain from engaging in such action completely. Both of these prospects 
leave the potential seismic risk of existing buildings both unknown and unaddressed.162 Such 
an outcome is unacceptable as it prolongs the existing vulnerability of communities and 
societies to the impact of earthquakes, contrary to the Sendai Framework’s objectives of better 
understanding reducing disaster risk. In addition, it has been observed that as the efficiency of 
professional responses to hazards has improved, peoples’ reliance on external support and 
perception that “risk prevention [is] someone else’s business” tends to grow.163 With a 
generally low risk perception held by many for rare events like earthquakes, the case for more 
active legal interventions by authorities to reduce risk grows stronger.  
 
Proactively investing to reduce the seismic risk of existing buildings, rather than 
responding after earthquakes as they occur, is a wise economic investment for long-term 
resilience. It is estimated that for every US$1 (NZ$1.40) invested in preventative risk reduction 
measures, as much as US$15 (NZ$21) may be saved from what would otherwise be ultimately 
spent on disaster response and recovery operations.164 Passive approaches to risk reduction are 
often preferred due to generally lower upfront financial costs. However, the inevitability of 
earthquakes means these costs will almost certainly be borne in the future if underlying risk is 
not promptly and effectively reduced. For instance, approximately €180 billion (NZ$300 
billion) has been spent by the Italian government on earthquake response, recovery and 
reconstruction costs in the past 50 years alone, averaging approximately €3.6 billion (NZ$6 
billion) per year.165 For context, a national report commissioned by the Italian government 
estimated in 2019 that it would cost approximately €93 billion (NZ$158 billion) to strengthen 
 
162 New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering Assessment and Improvement of the Structural Performance 
of Buildings in Earthquakes (NZSEE Study Group on Earthquake Risk Buildings, June 2006) at [2.6]. 
163 De Marchi, above n 110, at 159. 
164  “Funding” (2021) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction <www.undrr.org>. 
165 Marco Donà and others “Mechanics-Based Fragility Curves for Italian Residential URM Buildings” (2020) 
Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering 3099 at 3100. 
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the seismic capacity of all residential homes across Italy.166 Similar to Italy, hundreds of 
billions of dollars have been spent in response to earthquakes in both Japan and New Zealand 
across recent decades, with costs from the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake alone estimated to 
have totaled one-fifth of New Zealand’s gross domestic product at the time (NZ$40 billion).167 
In fact, a 2012 report estimated the approximate cost for strengthening EPBs in New Zealand 
under the current framework to be around $NZ3.6 billion, or 9% of the total cost of the damage 
from the Christchurch Earthquake. The case for active risk reduction efforts and investments 
now is reflected by the cyclical occurrence of earthquakes, albeit statistically infrequently, 
which cause significant and extensive damage and disruption to communities.  
 
While insurance can be an important component of minimising economic losses in 
earthquakes, it is not a sufficient tool in and of itself for reducing risk. Insurance is an important 
component of resilience, though it does not ultimately incentivise preventative action such as 
seismic strengthening. In many parts of the world, including Japan and Italy, coverage of 
earthquake insurance is particularly low or even nonexistent.168 Low coverage in Japan, for 
instance, is attributed to limited availability and being “prohibitively expensive”.169 In New 
Zealand, earthquake insurance coverage is particularly high owing to the existence of a national 
government-backed mandatory scheme.170 For instance, an extremely high rate of damage was 
covered by insurance in the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake, especially relative to damage from 
recent earthquakes in both Italy and Japan.171 Yet, in the aftermath of the Christchurch 
Earthquake, New Zealand’s national disaster insurance fund was entirely depleted, making it 
unreliable to cover losses from earthquakes anticipated to occur in the future, including in the 
 
166 Paleari, above n 158, at 680. 
167 Olga Filippova and Ilan Noy “Earthquake-Strengthening Policy for Commercial Buildings in Small-Town 
New Zealand” (2020) 44 Disasters 179 at 179. 
168 Olga Filippova and others “Economic Effects of Regulating the Seismic Strengthening of Older Buildings” 
(2018) 46 Building and Research Information 711 at 721. 
169 Opus International Consultants Economic Benefits of Code Compliant Non-Structural Elements in New 
Zealand (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 21 March 2017) at 12. 
170 Above n 168, at 721. 
171 Approximately 80% of damages from the Canterbury Earthquakes were insured, compared to a rate of 17% in 
the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake in Japan and 14% in the 2009 L’Aquila Earthquake in Italy, see: Frederic 
Marquis and others “Understanding Post-Earthquake Decisions on Multi-Storey Concrete Buildings in 
Christchurch, New Zealand” (2015) 15 Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering 731 at 745. 
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Wellington region.172 Indeed, overall trends indicate a steady decline in private earthquake 
insurance and an increasing tendency for governments to cover economic losses through ex-
post aid and support throughout the world.173 As Filippova and others argue, the decreasing 
private insurance market for earthquakes, and growing trend of post-earthquake government 
welfare, makes it increasingly necessary and urgent to invest in preventive measures to increase 
the resilience of existing building stocks.174 Of course, long-term economic investments are 
only one consideration for the need to take more active approaches to reduce the seismic risk 
of existing buildings.  
 
As mentioned, failure to swiftly improve the seismic capacity of existing buildings 
prolongs the vulnerabilities of individuals and communities at large. This includes not only the 
potential for physical harm to people, but also disruptions to lives, livelihoods, and social 
systems themselves. Actively seeking to reduce seismic risk therefore places people and 
communities at the heart of risk reduction, to protect them from these outcomes. As Mythen 
argues, “in a risk sensitive culture in which public tolerance for harm is low, the pressure on 
the State to act becomes greater”.175 For instance, in the 1995 Kobe Earthquake approximately 
6,437 people were killed primarily as a result of the more than 100,000 buildings which 
collapsed.176 Progress which was subsequently made to strengthen existing buildings was 
demonstrated in the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake, whereby most building damage and almost all 
of the more than 15,000 deaths were caused by the subsequent tsunami event and not by the 
earthquake itself.177 Still, large earthquakes which are anticipated to impact heavily populated 
Japanese areas in the near future, such as Tokyo, make efforts to reduce existing building risk 
an ongoing and urgent task.178 The same can be said for both Italy and New Zealand, where 
 
172 Above n 168, at 722. 
173 Dwight Jaffee and Thomas Russell “The Welfare Economics of Catastrophe Losses and Insurance” (2013) 38 
The Geneva Papers 469 at 470. 
174 Above n 168, at 722. 
175 Above n 104, at 49. 
176 Moullier and Sakoda, above n 120, at 6. 
177 See: Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery Making Schools Resilient at Scale: The Case of 
Japan (The World Bank, Washington DC, 2016) at 24; Shinji Nakahara and Masao Ichikawa “Mortality in 
the 2011 Tsunami in Japan” (2013) 23 Journal of Epidemiology 70 at 70. 
178 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism White Paper on Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism in Japan, 2013 (Government of Japan, 2013) at 236.  
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large earthquakes are anticipated in heavily-populated areas on well-known fault lines, 
including New Zealand’s capital city of Wellington. Deaths, like financial losses, are easily 
quantifiable in earthquakes. However, reducing the seismic risk of existing buildings is also 
important to protect against often harder-to-quantify factors in earthquakes, such as the 
immediate and long-term impact on livelihoods, social and psychological effects, or 
exacerbated inequalities and vulnerabilities of certain groups due to damage and disruptions. 
Consideration of these factors is therefore necessary when considering the importance of 
reducing seismic risk and improving the resilience of communities against earthquakes. 
 
2.5 Summary  
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the legal frameworks used by the case study 
countries to address the seismic risk posed by vulnerable existing buildings. Buildings which 
are presumed to have low seismic resistance against the force of earthquakes, primarily owing 
to insufficient seismic design regulations at the time of their construction, pose a significant 
threat to life safety. To understand and address this risk, passive legal duties exist which require 
building owners to complete seismic assessments and strengthening if they wish to carry out 
major alterations or change the use of their buildings. However, these depend on building 
owners to make decisions to engage in such action, which are often too slow as experienced by 
the devastation of past earthquakes. Each of the case study countries have therefore recently 
adopted a range of different approaches to increase the speed and efficiency at which existing 
building risk is reduced.  
 
Each country appears to take functionally-similar yet practically-different legal 
approaches. High-risk “earthquake-prone buildings” are the target of authorities in New 
Zealand, with building owners required to complete mandatory seismic assessment and 
strengthening obligations. Japan and Italy, on the other hand, have adopted more voluntary and 
incentive-based approaches for existing building owners. Japan stops short of mandatory 
strengthening obligations, but adopts a structured framework which includes particular targets 
for achieving risk reduction amongst existing buildings. In comparison, Italy relies largely on 
existing building risk reduction through a purely incentive-based approach. Ultimately, leading 
a more active intervention for the risk reduction of existing buildings aligns with the objectives 
of the Sendai Framework. Investing in preventative risk reduction measures for existing 
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buildings is not only more cost-effective in the long-term, but is also necessary to increase the 

































Operational Features of Risk Reduction Frameworks 
 
The purpose of Part B is to examine specific operational features applied within the risk 
reduction frameworks of the case study countries. With a general overview of existing building 
management provided in Chapter 2, the chapters within Part B focus upon three particularly 
significant features of legal frameworks which aid efforts to reduce seismic risk. This includes 
the extent to which, and to whom, risk reduction obligations apply. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the typologies applied by authorities to identify the existing 
buildings which are subject to assessment and strengthening obligations, highlighting potential 
gaps in seismic risk knowledge for buildings not included. Chapter 4 explores the use of 
seismic hazard zones as a method got implementing risk reduction measures for building 
owners according to the perceived seismicity of the particular location where buildings are 
located. Chapter 5 examines the use of seismic building assessments for understanding the 
nature of seismic risk posed by particular buildings, which help to inform potential 
strengthening responsibilities for building owners. 
 
The case study countries each apply these operation features to varied extents within 
their respective risk reduction frameworks. Given they have direct implications for the degree 
of knowledge about disaster risk and for the ability to improve resilience, they are noteworthy 











Chapter 3  
Typologies Applied to Identify Existing Buildings for Risk Reduction 
 
The acceptance that man cannot control everything raises operational considerations about 
when to develop resilience… Resilience can be accomplished passively in the time following a 
crisis, or it can be developed proactively before a crisis occurs by improving the system’s 
capacity to deal with complex situations. 
Julie-Maude Normandin et al.179 
 
 
To identify existing buildings in need of risk reduction within legal frameworks, 
decisions need to be made about the exact types of buildings which are subject to relevant 
obligations. There appears to be a particularly narrow focus on identifying buildings which are 
assumed to pose the highest risk to life safety in strong earthquakes. While it is important to 
target these buildings to improve public safety, it is also important that the scope of existing 
buildings targeted for risk reduction obligations is not too restricted in its understanding of risk. 
Legal frameworks to reduce the seismic risk of existing buildings need to strike an appropriate 
balance between identifying all existing buildings which pose a significant seismic risk and 
being adaptable to new risk information as it arises. This is an important consideration for 
developing long-term resilience to earthquakes and the narrow range of existing buildings 
illustrates that current legal frameworks are not designed to achieve such an outcome. 
 
This chapter examines the typologies applied to identify seismic risk of existing 
buildings in each of the case study countries and, importantly, gaps which emerge as a result. 
Physical characteristics of buildings are most commonly used to assume the seismic risk of 
existing buildings, including the construction materials and the year which buildings were 
designed. Certain construction materials indicate an inherent physical vulnerability to 
earthquakes and are therefore assumed to have a substantial risk of collapse. In addition, the 
year a building was designed implies the seismic building regulations in effect at the time of a 
buildings’ design – if any – and is a useful indicator of potential structural resistance to 
 
179 Julie-Maude Normandin and others “The Definition of Urban Resilience: A Transformation Path towards 
Collaborative Urban Risk Governance” in G Brunetta and others (eds) Urban Resilience for Risk and Adaption 
Governance (Springer International Publishing, 2019) 9 at 11. 
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earthquakes. A more holistic approach to understanding seismic risk is adopted through the 
application of priority buildings, which include buildings of crucial importance for society, 
such as hospitals and schools. Yet, while this considers seismic risk from the perspective of 
building function and occupants, it is argued that the exact priority buildings targeted for risk 
reduction are too narrow as they are a secondary consideration to the described physical 
characteristics used to identify existing buildings. Finally, it is noted that most residential 
buildings are excluded from the EPB framework in New Zealand, in complete contrast to risk 
reduction efforts in both Japan and Italy. The argument is made that such an oversight does 
nothing to improve resilience in New Zealand and should be reconsidered as part of risk 
reduction obligations.  
 
3.1 The Type of Existing Buildings targeted for Seismic Risk Reduction 
 
Since not all existing buildings pose the same risk, typologies are often developed for 
legal frameworks to help identify those which require risk reduction. These typologies are 
designed to categorise existing buildings presumed most likely to fall beneath minimum legal 
standards of seismic resistance, as discussed in the previous chapter. Authorities therefore 
apply these typologies to identify and locate the buildings most likely to pose the greatest life 
safety risk. Relevant building owners are targeted thereafter to confirm and, if necessary, 
remediate seismic risk.  
 
In New Zealand, TAs are tasked with identifying existing buildings most likely to be 
potentially earthquake-prone, with an earthquake rating of less than 34%NBS. To aid this 
process, the EPB methodology outlines three building profile categories which TAs are 
required to treat as potentially earthquake-prone. The owners of buildings which fit these 
profiles are then required to provide TAs with a seismic assessment to confirm whether or not 
they are earthquake-prone. The building profiles are: Category A, Unreinforced Masonry 
(URM) Buildings; Category B, pre-1976 (non-URM) buildings of three or more storeys or 
greater than 12 metres in height; and Category C, pre-1935 (non-URM) buildings of 1-2 
storeys.180 As can be seen, New Zealand focuses exclusively on seismic risk according to the 
physical characteristics of construction material and design year of existing buildings.  
 
180 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment EPB Methodology: The Methodology to Identify 
Earthquake-Prone Buildings (version 1, Wellington, 3 July 2017) at 1.2.1. 
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Japan follows a similar methodology, actively targeting buildings according to the 
design year of buildings. All existing buildings designed prior to the year 1981 are assumed to 
have insufficient seismic resistance and are the primary area of focus for risk reduction. This 
reflects the year the national building standard law (BSL) was introduced, which is considered 
to include the minimum requirements for the seismic resistance of existing buildings.181 In 
addition, residential homes which were designed prior to the year 2000 are also considered to 
be particularly vulnerable to strong shaking and have also been targeted for risk reduction since 
an amendment to the framework in 2002. 
 
In contrast to New Zealand and Japan, Italy appears to apply a less prescriptive 
methodology for identifying existing buildings for risk reduction. This reflects the 
comparatively less active intervention of authorities identifying and requiring seismic 
assessments from building owners. Indeed, the majority of Italy’s existing building stock was 
constructed prior to the introduction of a national seismic building code and is therefore 
considered to pose a high risk in earthquakes.182  
 
3.2 Associating Seismic Risk to the Physical Characteristics of Buildings 
 
There is a danger of leaving significant gaps in understanding seismic risk if the 
typologies applied to identify existing buildings within risk reduction frameworks are too 
narrow. Physical building characteristics help to provide a generalised understanding of 
existing buildings likely to pose a significant risk in earthquakes, however each building is 
different and it is therefore ultimately impossible to know for certain how they will perform in 
particular earthquakes. Experiences of building failure in past earthquakes and the particular 
construction regulations used to design particular buildings tell only part of the story and do 
not represent all seismic risk.  
 
Relative caution should be exercised when developing risk reduction obligations in 
response to observations of existing building damage from individual events. For instance, the 
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Royal Commission into the Canterbury Earthquakes noted that the observations of building 
failure in Christchurch is not necessarily applicable for understanding seismic risk of existing 
buildings in other regions of New Zealand, citing differences in soil conditions and ground 
motion characteristics between individual earthquakes.183 Indeed, this was observed between 
the high concentration of building failure amongst unreinforced masonry buildings in the 
Canterbury Earthquakes, and amongst later-designed, high-rise buildings in Wellington during 
the 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake. Identifying seismic risk amongst existing buildings according 
to physical characteristics such as design years and construction materials reflects knowledge 
of risk at a particular moment in time. The inherent uncertainty about how individual existing 
buildings will perform in different earthquakes increases the importance of minimising 
assumptions about seismic risk by expanding, not restricting, the scope of existing buildings 
targeted within risk reduction frameworks.  
 
3.2.1 Construction materials associated with the risk of building failure 
 
Where existing buildings are targeted for risk reduction according to construction 
materials, it appears to be largely reactive according to the experience of building damage from 
previous earthquakes. On the one hand, it is important to learn from previous experiences of 
building failure in earthquakes to address the risk of buildings which are known to pose a high 
risk, such as unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings. On the other hand, casting too narrow a 
net for the existing buildings subject to risk reduction obligations can lead to issues when 
newly-understood seismic risk becomes known, such as that posed by hollow core floors. 
 
3.2.1.1 The long-understood danger of unreinforced masonry 
 
Buildings constructed with URM have long been known to be particularly susceptible 
to collapse from earthquakes. Extensive building failure amongst URM buildings has been 
observed in many past earthquakes, including more recently in Kobe (1995), L’Aquila (2009) 
and Christchurch (2011). Each experience has re-emphasised the importance of reducing the 
 
183 Above n 146, at 208. 
 57 
risk posed by these buildings.184 URM buildings include those constructed of masonry 
materials (i.e. brick, stone, or block) with little or no existing support or reinforcement.185 As 
a result, these buildings are only designed to withstand vertical forces (i.e. gravity) and are 
therefore especially susceptible to the impact of horizontal forces, such as seismic waves.186 
The construction of URM buildings largely ceased in the case study countries throughout the 
20th century with the introduction of stricter seismic design standards. Construction with URM 
largely ceased in Japan and New Zealand following two devastating earthquakes, the 1923 
Great Kanto Earthquake in Japan (Mw 7.9) and the 1931 Hawkes Bay Earthquake in New 
Zealand (Mw 7.8).187 Construction was not ceased in Italy until much later into the century.188 
As a result, varying numbers of URM buildings remain today in each of the countries.  
 
New Zealand is the only case study country which actively targets URM buildings, with 
the EPB methodology requiring such buildings to be treated as potentially earthquake-prone.189 
While the explicit focus on URM buildings is largely shaped by the poor performance of these 
buildings in the Canterbury Earthquakes, it is also a continuation of existing approaches to 
targeting seismic building risk in New Zealand.190 In fact, URM buildings were the sole focus 
of seismic risk amongst existing buildings until the 2004 Building Act subsequently expanded 
the definition of an EPB.191 Approximately 3,500 URM buildings were estimated to exist in 
New Zealand as of 2012, accounting for less than 2% of the country’s total building stock 
(excluding standalone residential homes).192 Most of these are believed to be used for 
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commercial, industrial, or community purposes, including shops and churches.193 In 
comparison, it is believed that more than 60% of the entire Italian building stock today consists 
of buildings constructed with URM.194 While authorities in Italy do not actively target existing 
buildings according to particular building profiles, as is the case in New Zealand and Japan, 
the sheer prevalence of URM buildings in the Italian building stock nonetheless makes them a 
primary focus of risk reduction amongst existing buildings. At the other end of the spectrum, 
there are a very small number of URM buildings remaining in Japan today, the majority of 
which are largely unoccupied historic sites and monuments.195 Japan does not explicitly target 
existing buildings according to construction materials. However, any existing URM buildings 
would likely be captured by authorities focused on pre-1981 buildings regardless. 
 
Despite the low number of occupied URM buildings believed to remain in Japan today, 
there is nonetheless a particular focus on reducing the risk of unreinforced concrete block walls 
across the country. Efforts to reduce the risk of these URM walls is comparable to that of URM 
buildings and parts of URM buildings in New Zealand. Concrete block walls are common in 
Japan, used primarily as perimeter walls around properties or as non-bearing walls within 
existing buildings (i.e. walls which support themselves only, and not the structure of a 
building).196 The need to reduce their seismic risk became a major area of focus particularly 
following the 1978 Miyagi Earthquake (Mw 7.4), where approximately 15,000 walls collapsed 
and caused two thirds of total deaths.197 The revised building code implemented in 1981 
included requirements for these walls to be secured including a reduction in their height. It 
became evident in the 2018 Osaka Earthquake (Mw 5.6), however, that the strengthening of 
these walls had largely been neglected when two people were killed by collapsing walls, 
including a 9-year-old girl outside her school.198 A range of measures were passed in response, 
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including a requirement for all concrete block walls at public schools across Japan to be 
assessed. In addition, an amendment to the APSRB required seismic assessments to be 
completed on all such walls located along emergency evacuation routes, with an associated 
grant to assist with removing any unsafe walls.199  
 
The response is reminiscent of an emergency order issued in New Zealand shortly after 
the 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake (Mw 7.8). Parts of URM buildings located along busy traffic 
routes within four local government jurisdictions were required to be quickly assessed and 
remediated (see Chapter 7).200 The order came into effect approximately four months before 
the EPB framework, and was designed to reduce the risk of these buildings urgently in a period 
where the heightened threat of aftershocks had the potential to cause further damage.201 This 
order, as with the measures taken to reduce the risk of unreinforced concrete block walls in 
Japan, demonstrates how reactive responses are still relied upon following earthquakes despite 
the risk of these structures being well-understood. A lack of determination to address the risk 
in a prompt manner unnecessarily prolongs its existence and, as a result, involves reactive 
responses. The 2017 Order demonstrates the ability to remediate risk when urgency is applied 
to do so and, although URM buildings and parts of URM buildings in New Zealand are 
captured within the EPB framework, the length of time allocated for their risk reduction 
remains long relative to the urgent risk they pose (see Chapter 7). The Royal Commission into 
the Canterbury Earthquakes recommended that all URM buildings across New Zealand be 
identified and assessed within a two-year period, similar to that allocated within the 2017 
Order.202 As it currently stands, the EPB framework allows between 2.5 and 15 years for URM 
buildings to be identified for seismic assessment, and a further 7.5 to 35 years for 
remediation.203 Given the relatively small number of remaining URM buildings in New 
Zealand and the well-known danger they pose, there remains the potential for this risk to be 
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left unresolved by the time the next strong earthquake occurs near a populated centre. Such 
would once again require a reactive, not proactive, response. 
 
3.2.1.2 Reacting to the danger of hollow core floor buildings 
 
The prolonged effort to reduce the risk of URM buildings points to the wider challenge 
of responding to risks about particular buildings swiftly when and if new knowledge emerges, 
rather than the historically-typical approach of reacting in the aftermath of earthquakes. 
Addressing risk promptly and efficiently, rather than allowing it to remain unaddressed for 
years at a time, is important to ensure the success of prevention-based approaches to risk 
reduction. This is especially relevant for the recently understood danger of hollow core floors, 
which exist in many buildings across New Zealand. Despite some damage occurring in the 
2011 Christchurch Earthquake, the danger of hollow core floor buildings in New Zealand was 
made especially prominent after the 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake when several multi-storied 
buildings suffered significant damage, many of which were relatively new.204 In fact, the 
Kaikōura Earthquake neatly illustrates how not all earthquakes are likely to result in the same 
type of building damage. Much of the building damage sustained in the 2010/2011 Canterbury 
Earthquakes affected URM buildings. In contrast, ground shaking motions produced by the 
2016 Kaikōura event meant that mid-rise multi-storey buildings sustained the most damage.  
 
The use of hollow core concrete floors in buildings across New Zealand is extensive. 
Their existence in other earthquake-prone countries is not particularly common, making it 
somewhat “New Zealand’s problem”.205 Generally speaking, hollow core floors are pre-set 
concrete floors which are designed to “reduce weight without any significant loss of strength 
of stiffness” in buildings.206 Those designed prior to 2006 are presumed to be of potentially 
high seismic risk.207 However, as is discussed in the following section, many were constructed 
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from the 1980s onward and are therefore not captured within the EPB framework. Technical 
guidelines have since been created to assist engineers when completing seismic assessments of 
hollow core concrete buildings. However, these have not yet been incorporated into the EPB 
framework and, in fact, seismic strengthening options for these buildings are still largely 
experimental, leaving current remediation options particularly limited.208 Of particular interest 
is that, while more research has been completed in recent years to better understand the seismic 
risk presented by these floors, their potential seismic weakness has been known since at least 
the early 2000s.209 The growing understanding of this risk highlights the importance of 
ensuring flexibility in the methodologies used to identify existing buildings to understand 
seismic risk and the need to better understand this risk to take appropriate preventative 
measures rather than reacting to earthquakes themselves. 
 
3.2.2 Using the design year of buildings to assume seismic risk 
 
The year a building was designed is also a useful indicator of its likely seismic risk. As 
mentioned, the design year of buildings relates to the building code in force at the time of 
construction. Based on this, assumptions are made about the seismic resistance a building is 
likely to have according to the seismic standards used within its design. Design years are 
therefore useful for categorising the potential seismic risk of buildings on a broad scale. Since 
legal frameworks are primarily concerned with life safety risk, design years are typically 
applied to capture buildings most at risk of structural collapse. Generally speaking, the most 
crucial factor considered when determining the relevant design year for identifying existing 
building risk is the requirement of building ductility within design standards. Ductility simply 
refers to ability of a building’s structure to absorb horizontal forces (i.e. seismic waves), which 
therefore increases likely resistance against structural collapse.210 Requirements for ductility 
were largely omitted from seismic building standards in each case study country until the late 
20th century, with vertical forces (i.e. gravity) the primary design consideration in construction. 
As previously mentioned, relevant design standards were introduced in New Zealand and Japan 
in 1976 and 1981, respectively. As a result, only buildings designed prior to these dates in each 
respective country are actively targeted by authorities for seismic risk reduction. In Italy, most 
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existing buildings are not actively targeted by authorities for risk reduction. Nevertheless, 
buildings constructed prior to the first national seismic code in 1974 are generally assumed to 
have no structural resistance to earthquakes, while many designed thereafter between the 1970s 
and 1990s are assumed to have been constructed with insufficient structural resistance.211  
 
By focusing on identifying existing buildings designed prior to these years, it is clear 
that risk reduction frameworks for existing buildings are primarily intended to remediate only 
buildings with absolute worst potential risk. As a result, two assumptions in particular are made 
about buildings constructed after these design years: first, that the seismic design code used for 
construction provides sufficient structural resistance to earthquakes and, second, that these 
later-designed buildings were in fact designed properly in accordance with the design 
standards. Because these are broad assumptions, it is important that the design years used to 
target buildings within legal frameworks are not so narrow that they are ignorant to potential 
risk from later-designed buildings.  
 
The EPB framework in New Zealand adopts a particularly narrow focus in relation to 
the type of buildings targeted for risk reduction. As mentioned, the EPB methodology requires 
TAs to treat pre-1976 buildings of three or more storeys or greater than 12 metres in height 
(Category B), and pre-1935 buildings of 1-2 storeys (Category C), as potentially earthquake-
prone.212 This means that only buildings designed prior to 1976 are targeted for seismic risk 
reduction in New Zealand. This is a result of the legal definition provided to an EPB, which 
relates to buildings with an earthquake rating of less than 34%NBS (refer to Chapter 2). 
According to the NZSEE, buildings considered most likely to be potentially earthquake-prone 
are believed to have been primarily designed prior to the 1976 seismic code.213 Two gaps arise 
through the focus on buildings only which fit these profiles. 
 
The first is in relation to Category C buildings. These buildings represent those which 
were constructed before the New Zealand’s first national seismic code was introduced 
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following the devastating 1931 Napier Earthquake of 1931 (Mw 7.8).214 Category C buildings 
are targeted for remediation within regions of high and medium seismic hazard, but not those 
of low hazard (see Chapter 4). By omitting these buildings from risk reduction obligations in 
these areas, the ability to more thoroughly understand the risk presented by these buildings is 
extremely limited. This is problematic, considering these buildings would be treated by 
authorities as potentially earthquake-prone if not for their existence in low hazard areas (where, 
as is discussed in Chapter 4, there is still the potential for strong shaking). There is no other 
rationale to target Category C buildings exclusively within high and medium seismic hazard 
areas other than it being an intentional attempt to limit the number of buildings captured by the 
EPB framework, and therefore limit the number of building owners subject to mandatory 
strengthening obligations. 
 
Additionally, the EPB framework assumes the threat of EPBs comes solely from pre-
1976 buildings and ignores the need to assess the potential risk of later-designed buildings. 
Again, this is a probabilistic assumption as the existence of EPBs amongst post-1976 buildings, 
in fact, “cannot be discounted entirely”.215 There are no legal requirements for later-designed 
buildings to be seismically assessed, however, leaving an extremely limited opportunity to 
understand and reduce potential risk amongst such buildings. As many as 50,000 existing 
buildings designed after 1976 are estimated to be potentially “earthquake-vulnerable”.216 
Unlike EPBs, which have an earthquake rating of less than 34%NBS, earthquake-vulnerable 
buildings include those with an earthquake rating of between 34-66%NBS. Although outside 
the legal definition of “earthquake-prone”, these buildings still pose a “medium” risk of 
collapse in a moderate earthquake approximately 5-10 times greater than buildings designed 
after 1 July 2017.217 In fact, though seismic strengthening is not legally required for earthquake-
vulnerable buildings in New Zealand, the de facto policy of many public agencies in recent 
years has seen existing buildings rated below 67%NBS deemed unsafe for continued 
occupation, including Parliament’s Bowen House in central Wellington.218 There is a clear 
need to better understand this seismic risk in order to make progress toward reducing it and 
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improving resilience. However, efforts to understand this risk is hindered by the exclusive 
focus on targeting pre-1976 existing buildings. 
 
It worthwhile noting the original draft of the EPB framework was intended to require 
seismic assessments for all multi-storey buildings designed prior to the enactment of the current 
building regulations, in March 2005.219 Such a requirement would have provided greater 
certainty about the seismic risk amongst buildings which are omitted from the framework. 
Although the policy objective of identifying EPBs aligns with this pre-1976 focus, having a 
more accurate understanding of seismic risk amongst a broader range of the building stock 
would better position New Zealand to improve overall seismic resilience. This is especially 
relevant given no seismic assessment information exists for tens of thousands of post-1976 
buildings in New Zealand.220 
 
While Japan similarly targets only existing buildings designed prior to 1981, the 
standard of seismic resistance required in the 1981 code appears to be greater than that of the 
1976 New Zealand code (see Chapter 2). In fact, the 1981 BSL is considered somewhat of a 
gold standard for existing building seismic safety in Japan and buildings which comply with 
the code are considered to have a “low possibility” of failure or collapse.221 The Kobe 
Earthquake of 1995 (Mw 6.9) was the first major test of effectiveness for the 1981 BSL. Of the 
more than 100,000 damaged or collapsed buildings, approximately 97% were believed to have 
been constructed prior to the building code.222 Observations of building damage from 
subsequent earthquakes has also been primarily concentrated amongst pre-1981 buildings, 
including the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake (Mw 9.0) and the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake (Mw 
7.3).223 It should also be noted that this building damage has been observed across multiple 
earthquakes in Japan. Much fewer strong earthquakes have impacted urban centres in New 
Zealand in recent history and the discrepancy in building damage between the 2011 
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Christchurch event and 2016 Kaikōura event demonstrate that seismic risk is not limited to 
buildings designed prior to 1976. Furthermore, a significant difference between the focus on 
pre-1981 buildings in Japan and potentially earthquake-prone buildings in New Zealand is the 
assumed probability of collapse in strong earthquakes. As mentioned, buildings designed 
according to the 1981 BSL in Japan are considered to have a low risk of collapse, while 
buildings recognised as earthquake-prone in New Zealand are considered to have a high 
potential of collapse.224 It therefore appears that the buildings targeted within the Japanese 
framework is similar to if New Zealand targeted both earthquake-prone and earthquake-
vulnerable buildings.  
 
As mentioned previously, an assumption made restricting legal obligations to buildings 
designed prior to a particular year is that later-designed buildings were constructed in 
accordance with relevant seismic regulations of the time. Experiences in the case study 
countries indicate that a more thorough understanding of seismic risk amongst later-designed 
buildings, which are assumed to better withstand collapse in strong earthquakes, would be 
beneficial. Although the assurance of complete safety in earthquakes is not attainable, a greater 
awareness of the potential risk of these existing buildings would nonetheless help to understand 
which buildings require the most attention and effort to increase seismic resilience. In the 
Canterbury Earthquakes, observations indicated the majority of building damage was 
concentrated amongst pre-1976 buildings.225 However, this also ignores the wider context that 
115 of the 185 deaths in the 2011 earthquake were the result of one building collapse: the six-
storey CTV building, constructed in the mid-1980s. The Christchurch experience, and other 
earthquakes around the world for that matter, illustrates that tragedy requires merely one 
building to fail. The CTV building, alongside the many mid-rise buildings damaged in the 2016 
Kaikōura earthquake, was constructed after 1976 and therefore would have been outside the 
scope of obligations under the EPB framework. It also demonstrates the potential consequence 
of assuming post-1976 were, in fact, designed with appropriate seismic resistance according to 
relevant building codes of the time. Experience over the previous decade highlights the failure 
for the seismic risk posed by many modern built existing buildings to be applied within 
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regulatory practice. Targeting a broader range of existing buildings would not only help capture 
other potentially earthquake-prone buildings, but also to more comprehensively understand the 
seismic risk of earthquake-vulnerable buildings across the country. Such knowledge would 
better enable resilience to be improved across the nation’s existing building stock. 
 
3.3 Priority Buildings Represent a More Holistic Approach to Identifying Seismic Risk 
 
Though construction materials and the design year of buildings can signify potential 
physical vulnerabilities of buildings, a more holistic approach to understanding the seismic risk 
of existing buildings includes consideration to factors such as function and occupancy. Such 
an approach to identifying the seismic risk of existing buildings considers risk according to the 
vulnerability of building users and/or the social importance of particular buildings themselves. 
Existing buildings identified according to these characteristics may be generally referred to as 
“priority buildings”. Although the exact types of buildings considered to have priority status 
and the terminology used to define them varies between each country, the phrase ‘priority 
building’ is used in this research to broadly describe existing buildings which are explicitly 
identified as such within legal frameworks for the purpose of being subject to risk reduction 
obligations. Priority buildings in the case study countries share typical characteristics, 
including those which serve an essential societal purpose and whose failure would be 
particularly disruptive to society were they to be unusable after earthquakes (i.e. hospitals and 
buildings used by emergency services), as well as buildings which are occupied by particularly 
vulnerable groups of people (i.e. schools).  
  
Each of the case study countries prioritise existing buildings which largely serve a key 
function in emergency management and which have failed in past earthquakes, though Japan 
includes a broader range of existing buildings to include large facilities commonly-used by the 
general public. Hospitals, schools, and buildings required in emergency situations, such as 
shelters, emergency management centres, or stations for emergency services, are all considered 
priority buildings within the legal frameworks for risk reduction of existing buildings in each 
case study country.226 In Italy, priority buildings (referred to as “strategic” and “relevant” 
buildings) appear to be primarily associated to those deemed critical for emergencies, with a 
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particular focus on schools following the collapse of a primary school in San Giuliano during 
the 2002 Molise Earthquake (see Chapter 2).227  
 
A slightly broader understanding is given to priority buildings in both New Zealand 
and Japan, similarly based on experiences of building failure. For instance, dangerous parts of 
certain URM buildings are considered priority buildings within the EPB framework in New 
Zealand, owing to the significant deaths and injuries suffered in the 2011 Christchurch 
Earthquake.228 Parts of URM buildings considered to be priority buildings include those which 
could fall in an earthquake onto a road or thoroughfare with “sufficient vehicle or pedestrian 
traffic to warrant prioritising”, rather than all URM buildings in general.229 These are identified 
by TAs through a public consultation process under the Local Government Act.230 
 
In Japan, amendments to the APSRB made in response to the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake 
prioritised the risk reduction of specific “large-scale” buildings across the country. Relevant 
priority buildings include large buildings used by unspecified numbers of people (i.e. hotels, 
department stores, and various public recreation facilities), as well as large buildings used by 
groups of people likely to need special assistance to evacuate (i.e. aged care homes).231 Many 
of these buildings sustained extensive damage primarily to non-structural elements in the 2011 
earthquake and left many unsafe to occupy, including those which were designed to be used as 
emergency shelters.232 The prioritisation of buildings such as large stores, public facilities and 
aged care homes represents a more holistic view to seismic risk than the definition of priority 
buildings applied within Italy and NZ, beyond primarily emergency-related buildings. 
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While priority buildings offer an opportunity to approach seismic risk reduction 
holistically, the extent to which they are subject to risk reduction obligations appears to 
ultimately be restricted in New Zealand and Japan. Indeed, the identification of seismic risk 
amongst these buildings according to their priority status is secondary to the pre-determined 
physical characteristics used to target existing buildings within risk reduction frameworks. For 
instance, TAs in New Zealand are required to first identify whether a building meets an 
appropriate description of a priority building under the Building Act, before proceeding to then 
apply the building profile categories within the EPB methodology to identify whether or not 
the building is “potentially earthquake-prone”.233 If the building is not considered potentially 
earthquake-prone as per the EPB methodology, the building is not legally subject to risk 
reduction obligations. Similarly, in Japan, only relevant large-scale buildings which were 
constructed prior to 1981 are considered priority buildings within the scope of obligations 
under the APSRB. The result of these restrictions for identifying priority buildings is that 
seismic risk is less understood for those buildings which were designed later than the design 
years applied within relevant frameworks. Because Italy does not apply a particular 
methodology to identify existing buildings for risk reduction, priority buildings do not appear 
to be restricted by any particular design year or construction material. As argued in the previous 
section, the design years applied within New Zealand and Japan do not necessarily capture all 
seismic risk amongst existing buildings. Given the stated importance of priority buildings 
compared to other existing buildings, it is unsuitable to identify the potential seismic risk of 
only some buildings and not all.  
  
The limitation of identifying seismic risk amongst priority buildings is further 
exacerbated in New Zealand, with a restriction of priority buildings to areas of medium and 
high seismic hazard (see Chapter 4). As a result, buildings located in areas of low seismic 
hazard, which would otherwise be treated as priority buildings, are subject to the same risk 
reduction obligations as all other buildings identified by authorities as potentially earthquake-
prone. In practice this means that hospitals, schools, and other such buildings defined as 
priority buildings within the Building Act, are treated with the same urgency in low seismic 
hazard areas as are other existing buildings. Although they are still subjected to mandatory 
strengthening obligations, they have multiple decades for this to be completed. Priority 
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buildings in Italy, which were subject to seismic assessment requirements under the 2003 
Ordinance, also only applied to buildings located within the highest two hazard zones. 
However, it should be noted that seismic strengthening for these buildings was not legally 
compulsory as it is in New Zealand. The focus on priority buildings in high hazard zones in 
Italy was a deliberate decision by the government to prioritise resources and state-funding 
according to perceived earthquake threat. Conversely, the EPB framework in New Zealand 
imposes risk reduction obligations on buildings across the entire country.  It would therefore 
be more appropriate for the recognition of priority buildings to apply in all regions. 
 
3.4 Residential Homes 
 
Perhaps the most notable exclusion from the risk reduction framework for existing 
buildings in New Zealand is residential homes. Indeed, the statutory definition of an EPB 
excludes buildings “used wholly or mainly for residential purposes”.234 An exception applies 
for buildings of two or more storeys in height used as hostels and boardinghomes, or buildings 
which contain three or more residential units, which are both included within the EPB 
definition. Of the 1.8 million private residential buildings in New Zealand, most are detached 
homes constructed with wooden structures.235 Approximately 47 percent of existing homes 
were constructed prior to 1980 and so unlikely to have been designed with sufficient seismic 
design standards.236 With the exception of some multi-storey buildings, the majority of homes 
in New Zealand are not targeted for obligations to reduce seismic risk.  
 
This is in complete contrast to Italy and Japan, where seismic strengthening or 
retrofitting is strongly encouraged amongst residential homes. In Italy, almost 90 percent of 
residential buildings are believed to be made of masonry and reinforced concrete materials.237 
Of these buildings, 90 percent of those constructed with masonry and 55% of those constructed 
 
234 Building Act, s 133AA(2).  
235 Statistics New Zealand Housing in Aotearoa: 2020 (New Zealand Government, 2020) at 17. 
236 Notably, the number of residential buildings constructed prior to 1980 goes up to almost 60% of all homes in 
the earthquake-prone region of Wellington. At 18. 
237 K Gkatzogias and others Integrated Techniques for the Seismic Strengthening and Energy Efficiency of 
Existing Buildings: Pilot Project Workshop 16-19 November 2020 (Publications Office of the European 
Union, Luxembourg, 2021) at 10. 
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with reinforced concrete were built without seismic design standards, respectively.238 Japan’s 
housing stock more similarly compares to New Zealand’s with half of all residential buildings 
consisting of detached homes, largely made of wood.239 However, many older homes have 
masonry integrated into their construction which make them also more vulnerable to damage. 
One third of all houses in Japan were constructed prior to 1980 and are of particular seismic 
concern, although this number rises to more than 55 percent when considering houses built 
prior to 2000.240 The governments of Japan and Italy both provide various incentives to 
encourage and assist homeowners complete seismic strengthening where homes are understood 
as having inadequate resistance to earthquakes (see Chapter 6). One of the main factors for this 
drive to reduce the seismic risk of residential homes in Italy and Japan is the result of low-
uptake, or the nonexistence, of earthquake insurance amongst homeowners (see Chapter 2.4). 
As a result, the government is increasingly left to foot the expense of helping people with repair 
or reconstruction efforts. The Act Concerning Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of 
Disaster Victims ensures homeowners in Japan are provided with a certain level of public funds 
to compensate for damage or destruction in earthquakes, albeit this is a relatively small amount 
(approximately NZ$26,000 toward the reconstruction of destroyed homes).241 
 
Damage and destruction to residential homes in New Zealand is covered by a 
mandatory national earthquake insurance scheme, EQC.242 This uniquely high penetration of 
insurance against seismic events amongst residential homes in New Zealand provides a layer 
of financial protection against any potential earthquake damage. From a disaster risk reduction 
perspective, however, it appears to be a significant oversight in the seismic risk reduction 
efforts in New Zealand to exclude residential homes from seismic strengthening duties. While 
insurance provides a security net for losses, it does not ultimately promote preventative action 
and risk-adverse behaviour in relation to seismic strengthening. The insurance industry does 
not currently distinguish between seismically resilient buildings and seismically inadequate 
buildings, providing no incentive to reduce such risk (see Chapter 6). As a result, the seismic 
 
238 At 10. 
239 “我が国の住宅ストックをめぐる状況について” (2018) Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism <www.mlit.go.jp> (translation: About the Situation Surrounding Housing Stock in Japan) at 7. 
240 At 9. 
241 Shoichi Ando “Evaluation of the Policies for Seismic Retrofit of Buildings” (2012) 6 Journal of Civil 
Engineering and Architecture 391 at 391. 
242 New Zealand Earthquake Commission <www.eqc.govt.nz>. 
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risk of residential homes in New Zealand is not widely understood nor is it promoted within 
legal frameworks. 
 
3.5 Summary  
 
Typologies are applied within risk reduction frameworks to identify the specific 
buildings in need of risk reduction obligations. Owing to a priority on life-safety, the existing 
buildings targeted within the case study countries primarily concentrate on those which are 
assumed to be most at-risk of potential collapse. As a result, there is a strong focus on 
understanding seismic risk according to building materials and the year of a building’s design. 
It is important that the line drawn between buildings which are and are not subject to risk 
reduction obligations is not so narrow that it ignores a significant amount of potential seismic 
risk. This is particularly relevant in New Zealand where, aside from URM buildings, only 
buildings designed prior to 1976 are treated as potentially earthquake-prone by authorities. By 
omitting the need to confirm the seismic risk of later-designed buildings, risk is purely based 
on the assumption the seismic code they were constructed with provided sufficient resistance 
and the buildings do, in fact, comply with the code. In fact, EPBs represent buildings with the 
greatest assumed risk of collapse but are by no means the only buildings which present a risk. 
Authorities in Japan target existing buildings designed prior to the national seismic code of 
1981, which are believed to pose a low risk of collapse. If a similar approach was taken in New 
Zealand, thousands of post-1976 buildings would be required to confirm their seismic risk. 
Instead, the pre-1976 approach has been adopted to limit the number of buildings subject to 
obligations and, as a result, leaves much ignorance about existing building risk. 
 
Some buildings are also classified as priority buildings, in an attempt to focus on 
seismic risk from a more holistic perspective. These buildings are largely categorised according 
to their essential function or vulnerable occupants, such as hospitals and schools. Nonetheless, 
these buildings also appear to be identified according to their construction materials and design 
years. Once again, assumptions are made about the risk of buildings which would be considered 
priority buildings yet are not targeted for risk reduction, since they sit outside of the typologies 
used within legal frameworks. In New Zealand and Italy, the classification of priority buildings 




Also of relevance within existing building typologies are residential buildings. These 
are largely excluded from risk reduction obligations in New Zealand, compared to both Italy 
and Japan where they are a central aspect of risk reduction. The decision to exclude most 
residential buildings from the EPB framework in New Zealand, again, misses an opportunity 
to promote broader seismic resilience, especially since destroyed housing is likely to 
exacerbate potential disaster. Japan and Italy both target housing for risk reduction measures, 
largely owing to the lack of insurance coverage in these countries and thus the greater reliance 
on government support after damaging earthquakes. Yet, the focus remains relevant even in 
New Zealand, where all residential buildings are covered by a mandatory government 
insurance scheme, since insurance does not ultimately incentivise or encourage risk reduction 
measures to be undertaken. Greater focus should be placed on encouraging home owners in 





















Chapter 4  
Using Seismic Hazard Zones to Manage Risk 
 
A highly vulnerable building in a highly populous but low seismicity region is arguably as 
important, if not more important, than a rarely occupied, earthquake-prone building in a [lesser 
populated region of high seismicity].  
New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering (NZSEE)243 
 
 In countries which are susceptible to strong earthquakes, some regions are more 
seismically-active than others and can therefore expect a greater frequency of strong shaking. 
These regions are often distinguished within building codes and other law by seismic hazard 
zones, which identify regions according to the expected frequency of earthquakes. While 
seismic hazard zones are useful to conceptualise the seismic hazard of different areas, various 
challenges arise in relation to their application within risk reduction frameworks for existing 
buildings. Three challenges in particular are discussed in this chapter.  
  
The first of these challenges relates to a conflation between the concepts of seismic 
hazard and risk, which is of particular relevance in New Zealand. The Building Act defines the 
seismic hazard of different New Zealand regions as areas of “seismic risk”. As explained in 
Chapter One, hazard and risk are conceptually different and it is therefore important to 
differentiate between hazard threat and risk itself. This distinction is important also as seismic 
hazard zones directly influence people’s risk perception about earthquakes, which 
subsequently influences risk reduction behaviour. Since a low seismic hazard simply means 
there is a low frequency of earthquakes within a specific time period, it is important that risk 
reduction obligations in these regions appropriately reflect the potential for such rare events. 
A low seismic hazard does not mean there is no risk, especially since the potential for 
earthquakes is still substantially higher relative to other non-seismically-active countries. 
Indeed, there is still a large amount of uncertainty which surrounds the occurrence of 
earthquakes and seismic hazard zones ultimately reflect seismic knowledge at a particular time. 
Unexpected events can and do occur which is an importance consideration when using seismic 
hazard zones to regulate for the seismic risk of existing buildings. 
 
243 New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering “Oral Submission to Local Government and Environment 
Select Committee on the Building (Earthquake-Prone Buildings) Amendment Bill 2015” at 2. 
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4.1 What are Seismic Hazard Zones? 
 
Before discussing seismic hazard zones, it is first useful to outline specifically what 
they are and how they are created. As mentioned, some regions within earthquake-prone 
countries are understood to be more seismically-active than other regions. Seismic hazard 
zones reflect the probability of an earthquake causing a specific strength of ground shaking to 
be exceeded within a particular period of time.244 These estimations are typically generated 
through the study of known seismic faults and occurrences of historical earthquakes which 
have been generated from these faults, including their estimated frequency and intensity.245 
This data is then formulated by scientists into seismic hazard maps, to visualise and 
communicate the expected danger of earthquakes across a national territory.246 Much like how 
climate and weather maps are used to visualise where particular atmospheric and climatic 
events are expected to occur, seismic maps are a best estimate tool to illustrate the intensity of 
ground shaking which may occur in different regions.247 Of course, as it is not possible to 
predict exactly when and where earthquakes will occur, seismic hazard maps simply provide 
an indication of potential seismic shaking within a specific period of time (Chapter 4.2.2).  
  
Seismic hazard modelling can be difficult for non-experts to interpret or understand, and so 
this is often translated into law as seismic hazard zones. One of the main purposes for this is to 
draw clear boundaries between jurisdictional territories so that different regulation can be 
easily applied according to the likely seismic hazard of regions. For instance, seismic hazard 
zones are often applied within building codes to ensure that buildings constructed in areas with 
a higher frequency of seismic activity are developed to a greater seismic resistance than 
buildings constructed in areas with a lower frequency of seismic activity. Seismic hazard zones 
 
244 Seth Stein and others “Challenges in Assessing Seismic Hazard in Intraplate Europe” in A Landgraf and others 
(eds) Seismicity, Fault Rupture and Earthquake Hazards in Slowly Deforming Regions (2017) 432 Geological 
Society, London, Special Publications 13 at 13. 
245 At 13. 
246 Michele Marti, Michael Stauffacher and Sefan Wiemer “Difficulties in Explaining Complex Issues with Maps. 
Evaluating Seismic Hazard Communication – the Swiss Case” (2019) 19 Natural Hazards and Earth System 
Sciences 2677 at 2677. 
247 At 2677. 
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are also often used to apply different legal obligations within risk reduction frameworks for 
existing buildings, including in both New Zealand and Italy.  
 
In New Zealand, the Building Act divides the national territory into three distinct 
seismic zones of low, medium, and high “seismic risk areas”.248 These areas are determined 
within the Act according to their allocated seismic hazard (Z) factor. Similarly, the national 
territory of Italy is separated into four seismic hazard zones. These zones also ascend 
progressively in relation to earthquake frequency, with zone four having the greatest expected 
seismicity and zone one having the least expected seismicity.249 In contrast to both Italy and 
New Zealand, Japan does not apply seismic hazard zones to inform risk reduction obligations 
for existing buildings and obligations under the APSRB framework are applied equally 
nationwide.250 In complement to this, special planning legislation exists for local governments 
to prioritise risk reduction measures in locations anticipated to be impacted by major 
earthquakes in the foreseeable future, including in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area. This offers a 
unique comparison opportunity as an alternative to seismic hazard zones as a regulatory tool 
for managing existing buildings. 
 
4.1.1 How are hazard maps applied to reduce existing building risk?  
 
The use of seismic hazard zones as a tool for managing the risk reduction of existing 
buildings is ultimately a political decision. The absence of these zones from Japan’s risk 
reduction framework for existing buildings illustrates this. In fact, obligations within the EPB 
framework in New Zealand were originally intended to apply equally across the country 
without discrepancy between hazard zones.251 The integration of seismic hazard zones into the 
framework was a product of political compromise during the design phase in Parliament. This 
is necessary to understand, as it demonstrates that the use of seismic hazard zones within risk 
reduction frameworks for existing buildings does not derive from a normative understanding 
of seismic risk.  
 
248 Section 133AD(1). 
249 “Classificazione Sismica” Dipartimento della Protezione Civile <www.rischi.protezionecivile.gov.it> 
(translation: “Seismic Classification” Department of the Civil Protection). 
250 Preparedness Map for Community Resilience: Earthquake – Experience of Japan (Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery, Government of Japan and The World Bank, 16 December 2016) at 1. 
251 Building (Earthquake-Prone Buildings) Amendment Bill, s 133AO. 
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There are two main functions of seismic hazard zones within the legal frameworks for 
managing existing buildings in both New Zealand and Italy. The first is to form a basis for 
prioritising legal responsibilities for building owners to reduce risk, including through separate 
timeframes for which to achieve these in New Zealand (see Chapter 7). Additionally, seismic 
hazard zones are used within legal frameworks to determine access to various financial 
incentives aimed at assisting building owners achieve their obligations. The objective rationale 
for using seismic hazard zones to determine these factors is to ensure a finite amount of 
resources are prioritised toward areas with the greatest probability of experiencing damaging 
ground shaking in the foreseeable future. As these earthquakes are expected to occur more 
frequently in high hazard zones, reducing the risk of existing buildings in these areas first 
simply makes logical sense. However, this rationale should not mean risk reduction efforts in 
low seismic areas are overlooked or neglected. While low seismic zones are expected to 
experience strong ground shaking less frequently, the potential nonetheless exists and thus so 
too does the underlying seismic risk in these areas. 
 
 Prioritising legal responsibilities according to seismic hazard zones are a central feature 
of the EPB framework in New Zealand, with greater urgency given to risk reduction in high 
seismic regions. This directly influences the type of existing buildings subject to assessment 
and strengthening obligations under the Building Act, the time in which these obligations must 
be completed, and access to financial incentives (see Chapter 6). For instance, priority 
buildings and those which are identified as Category C buildings within the EPB methodology 
(pre-1935 buildings of 1-2 storeys), are subject to risk reduction obligations only in medium 
and high seismic hazard areas (refer to Chapter 3).252 In addition, the time period within which 
potential EPBs must be identified, assessed and, if necessary, strengthened are staggered 
according to hazard zones. Longer time periods are allocated to the remediation of existing 
buildings in low hazard areas compared to those located within medium and high hazard areas, 
while priority buildings must be remediated in half the time of other buildings (see Chapter 
7).253 This is an intentional feature of the EPB framework, to account for perceived urgency of 
risk reduction across the country in relation to seismic hazard threat.254 While such an approach 
 
252 Above n 180, at 1.2.1. 
253 Building Act, s 133AD(1). 
254 (10 May 2016) 713 NZPD 10918. 
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is intended to address seismic risk in areas with the greatest probability of experiencing 
earthquakes, it also assumes that areas of high seismicity are in fact going to experience strong 
shaking prior to other areas. Though statistically more probable, this does not necessarily 
reflect an accurate reality of where strong shaking may next occur. The Canterbury earthquakes 
demonstrated this, which occurred in what was then classified as an area of medium seismic 
hazard (as discussed later in this chapter). 
 
Similar to New Zealand, the Italian State also uses seismic hazard zones to assess and 
strengthen priority buildings. Ordinance 3274 of 2003 directed the owners of all priority 
buildings to seismically assess and, if necessary, strengthen their structure(s), though this only 
applied to buildings within the higher seismic hazard zones one and two. Italy’s national risk 
reduction tax incentive scheme, Sismabonus, also originally applied to existing buildings 
within zones one and two, but was expanded in 2017 to also include zone three.255  
 
4.2 Challenges and Limitations of Seismic Hazard Maps 
 
Communicating seismic danger through hazard maps is complex and many people 
often struggle to correctly understand them, especially non-experts.256 While seismic hazard 
maps may be useful to prioritise risk reduction obligations and resources within legal 
frameworks, they also present challenges which may ultimately hinder people from taking 
appropriate risk reduction measures. Three such challenges are discussed in this section, 
including a terminological conflation of the concepts of hazard and risk, the potential influence 
hazard maps have on public perception for the need to take preventive action against 
earthquakes, and the overall challenge of regulating with limited and evolving scientific 
knowledge. 
 
While each of these examples include their own unique set of circumstances, they each 
demonstrate the difficulty of transferring scientific knowledge into law. While it may not be 
possible to predict exactly where and when earthquakes will occur, or how powerful they may 
be, it is possible to create legal risk reduction frameworks which account for these 
 
255 “Sisma Bonus: Le Detrazioni Per Gli Interventi Antisismici” (2019) L’Agenzia Informa (translation: “Bonus 
Earthquake: Deductions for Anti-Seismic Interventions” The Agency Informs) at 4. 
256 Marti, Stauffacher and Wiemer, above n 246, at 2679. 
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uncertainties. Prioritising obligations toward high and medium hazard areas is both pragmatic 
and logical, yet excluding obligations from lower hazard areas entirely is inappropriate given 
the uncertainty of earthquake activity. The decision to expedite the remediation of priority 
buildings only within higher hazard zones in New Zealand and Italy overlooks risk posed by 
these buildings in low seismic areas, where strong shaking can still be expected albeit on a less 
frequent basis. The omission of Category C buildings located in low hazard regions from the 
EPB framework in New Zealand (see Chapter 3) is similarly concerning, as it overlooks the 
risk of these existing buildings by focusing on the likelihood of certain levels of ground 
shaking. Owing to the uncertainty of potential of seismic hazard, vulnerable existing buildings 
should be targeted for remediation in all regions regardless of seismic hazard zone.  
 
4.2.1 The use and misuse of seismic “hazard” and “risk” 
 
Although the terms hazard and risk represent two different concepts, they appear to be 
conflated within the EPB framework in New Zealand. As mentioned, the Building Act 
establishes low, medium and high seismic hazard zones across New Zealand, which are defined 
as areas of “seismic risk”.257 While the use of risk here is likely intended to represent the threat 
or danger of seismic activity, the correct use of terminology is imperative when applying 
scientific knowledge within law. As discussed in Chapter One, hazards and risk are 
conceptually different and DRR requires them to be clearly distinguished to understand risk as 
the function of hazards intersecting with vulnerability.258 Though such differentiation may 
seem trivial, accurate risk communication directly informs understanding of hazard and 
promotes preventative action.259 This is critical because, as expressed in the NZSEE quote used 
at the beginning of this chapter, just because a region is considered to have a low seismic hazard 
does not mean the risk presented by existing buildings is also low.260 
 
In fact, the legal definition of risk applied within the main legislation for managing 
building safety appears to be used interchangeably with the threat of hazards. The Building Act 
 
257 “How the System for Managing Earthquake-Prone Buildings Works” (24 August 2018) Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment <www.building.govt.nz>. 
258 Above n 74. 
259 Marti, Stauffacher and Wiemer, above n 246, at 2679. 
260 New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, above n 243, at 2. 
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explicitly defines “seismic risk areas” according to the Z factor, or seismic hazard factor, of 
individual regions, which represents the potential frequency of ground shaking.261 The same 
conflation also appears within the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEM), 
which defines risk as “the likelihood and consequences of a hazard”.262 Both of these 
definitions outline risk as the likelihood of, or potential for, a hazard occurring. This 
understanding of seismic risk is inconsistent with that used within the New Zealand 
Government’s 2019 National Resilience Strategy, which outlines the country’s long-term plan 
to manage disaster risk and improve resilience.263 In fact, the strategy adopts the vulnerability-
based definition of risk applied within the Sendai Framework, which clearly distinguishes 
hazards from risk. The use of consistent definitions which recognise risk as the product of 
human decisions is preferable for achieving the overall goal of risk reduction. As noted by the 
New Zealand Seismic Risk Working Group, hazard factor as it is applied within the Building 
Act “[does not] consider other factors influencing the actual risk, including the density of 
buildings, their fragility and occupants’ exposure”.264  
 
Describing regions according to seismic risk mischaracterizes seismic frequency with 
the potential impact of earthquakes, when in fact existing buildings with insufficient structural 
resistance present a risk wherever the potential for earthquakes exists. For instance, although 
the seismic hazard factor of Auckland is low, the potential seismic risk in Auckland is high due 
to factors including a high population density and extreme concentration of national 
commerce.265 This is not obvious when looking at the seismic hazard map, however, which 
describes Auckland as “low seismic risk”. In contrast, although the region of Fiordland is 
considered “high seismic risk”, much of the region is in fact unpopulated and therefore presents 
a far lower risk in relation to vulnerability. Directly conflating seismic risk with the probability 
of a hazard occurring misrepresents the potential impacts of earthquakes and associated 
vulnerability. Italy appropriately defines its regions according to seismic hazard and not by 
seismic risk. It would be appropriate for the terminology within the Building Act in New 
 
261 Section 133AD. 
262 Section 4. 
263 Disaster Resilience Strategy (Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, Wellington, April 2019) 
at 6. 
264 Above n 92, at 22. 
265 David Dempsey and others “Ground Motion Simulation of Hypothetical Earthquakes in the Upper North Island 
of New Zealand” (2020) 63 New Zealand Journal of Geology and Geophysics 1 at 1. 
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Zealand to be changed from seismic risk to seismic hazard, to more accurately represent risk 
from a Sendai Framework perspective. This would more clearly demonstrate that seismic zones 
represent the likelihood of seismic hazard, and not the vulnerability of communities to the 
impact of earthquakes. 
 
4.2.2 Preparing for infrequently-occurring earthquakes? 
 
The seismic hazard factor of particular regions as expressed within legal hazard zones 
is used to illustrate likely seismicity within a relatively short time period and does not account 
for all earthquake activity which may occur. This is important to understand as these zones 
directly influence the hazard perception of those living within them. The geological time scale 
on which earthquakes occur directly conflicts with human perceptions of time, especially as 
some regions may only experience strong earthquakes on time scales of hundreds or even 
thousands of years. To strike a balance between human time scales and long-term planning 
requirements, the most typical form of conveying seismic hazard within building regulation is 
according to ground shaking which is modelled to have a return period of approximately 475 
years.266 The seismic hazard zones used within frameworks for existing buildings in New 
Zealand and Italy both account for shaking on this time period. However, as earthquakes are 
not modelled to occur on regular intervals, using a return period to communicate seismic hazard 
may be misleading and is commonly avoided.267 In fact, a study which examined the use of 
flood hazard maps in Europe found many people struggled to understand the concept of return 
periods in particular.268 Because of this, seismic hazard zones are instead commonly expressed 
using an exceedance probability.269 For seismic hazard zones, this involves a ten percent 
chance of occurring within a 50 year period.270 This is largely used since buildings are typically 
 
266 Marti, Stauffacher and Wiemer, above n 246, at 2682. 
267 “Seismic Hazard Work: Glossary” GNS Science <www.gns.cri.nz>. 
268 Volker Meyer and others “Recommendations for the User-Specific Enhancement of Flood Maps” (2012) 12 
Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences 1701 at 1710. 
269 Mario Andrés Salgado Gálvez “Probabilistic Assessment of Earthquake Losses at Different Scales Considering 
Lost Economic Production Due to Premature Loss of Lives” (PhD Dissertation, Polytechnic University of 
Catalonia, 2016) at 24. 
270 Graeme H McVerry “From Hazard Maps to Code Spectra for New Zealand” (paper presented to Pacific 
Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Christchurch, 2003) at 8. 
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designed to last a minimum of 50 years before repair or maintenance work may be required.271 
Therefore, seismic hazard zones in both New Zealand and Italy represent the ground shaking 
which buildings are estimated to have a 10% chance of experiencing within their typical 
minimum, functional lifetime. 
 
Although seismic modelling based on earthquakes with an expected return period of 
475 years is useful for illustrating the potential for strong shaking in regions of higher 
seismicity, it may misrepresent and underestimate the potential for shaking which occurs on 
longer time periods. This is especially true for areas identified as having a low seismic hazard, 
where the occurrence of strong ground shaking is much rarer. The New Zealand Seismic Risk 
Working Group recently recognised that the application of a seismic hazard model based on a 
10% probability within a 50 year period (or 475-year return period) does not account for 
“variation in the shape of the hazard curve” and therefore may not appropriately appreciate 
potential seismic risk “to the degree that it probably should” in medium and low seismic 
areas.272 In fact, the group highlights that “every city in New Zealand will at some point 
experience strong shaking even if the [return period] is in the [thousands] of years”.273 For 
instance, the ground shaking experienced in the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake had a return 
period equivalent to 10,000 years, or an exceedance probability of approximately 0.5% within 
50 years.274 This level of shaking far exceeds that used to define legal hazard zones within the 
Building Act. Even in Auckland, which has a low seismic hazard factor, earthquakes of up to 
Mw 7.2 are possible within 40km of the central city, albeit these events are only expected to 
occur approximately every 10,000-20,000 years.275 Similarly, Dunedin, which is also located 
in a low seismic area, may expected earthquakes of up to Mw 7.0 on a return period of 
approximately 3,500 years.276 Without overstating the hazard factor, such possibility (despite 
 
271 See: Wendy Saunders How Long is Your Piece of String – Are Current Planning Timeframes for Natural 
Hazards Long Enough (GNS Science, Upper Hutt, 2010). 
272 Above n 92, at 24. 
273 At 41. 
274 Anna Kaiser and others “The Mw 6.2 Christchurch Earthquake of February 2011: Preliminary Report” (2012) 
55 New Zealand Journal of Geology and Geophysics 67 at 87. 
275 WJ Cousins, Mostafa Nayyerloo and Natalia Deligne Estimated Damage and Casualties from Earthquakes 
Affecting Auckland (GNS Science Consultancy Report, February 2014) at 14. 
276 At 35. 
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being extremely low) emphasises the potential seismicity in regions widely understood as 
seismically quiet and therefore the ultimate need to be prepared.277  
 
Understanding the limitations around low-frequency ground shaking events expressed 
within seismic hazard zones is imperative to informing appropriate obligations of risk 
reduction. Where certain regions are identified as having a lower seismic hazard, it may be 
more difficult to engage with or convince people on the need to take preventative measures. 
For instance, a 2011 study evaluated risk perception of stakeholders involved in EPB 
retrofitting practices across New Zealand. It found that persons living in low and medium 
hazard areas had a reduced awareness of the potential for earthquakes and therefore a lower 
perception of seismic risk, compared to those living in high seismic hazard areas.278 In Japan, 
a low overall perception of seismic hazard and risk contributed to the unpreparedness in Kobe 
for the earthquake which devastated the port city in 1995. A government survey conducted in 
1991 found only 8% of people living within the Japanese region where Kobe is located believed 
a significant earthquake could occur there, compared to approximately 23% of people 
nationwide who thought such.279 This low risk perception was correlated to the generally high 
number of existing buildings with inadequate seismic capacity at the time both in Kobe and 
across the country. Interestingly, a recent study in Switzerland, which has a much lower seismic 
hazard factor than New Zealand and Japan, observed a similar outcome. People who perceived 
a “low probability” of destructive earthquakes more likely to underestimate potential impacts 
of such risk and therefore be less convinced to take precautionary action.280 Although the 
 
277 It is noted that the potential risk of buildings constructed in areas of low seismic hazard in New Zealand during 
the late 20th century may be underestimated owing to a lesser seismic building standard used in these areas, 
compared to areas of higher seismicity. At 26. 
278 Temitope Egbelakin and others “Challenges to Successful Seismic Retrofit Implementation: A Socio-
Behavioural Perspective” (2011) 39 Building Research and Information 286 at 293. 
279 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD Studies in Risk Management: Japan 
Earthquakes (OECD Publications, France, 2006) at 16. 
280 Michele Marti and others “Communicating Earthquake Preparedness: The Influence of Induced Mood, 
Perceived Risk, and Gain of Loss Frames on Homeowners’ Attitudes toward General Precautionary Measures 
for Earthquakes” (2017) 38 Risk Analysis 710 at 719. 
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overall seismic hazard in Switzerland is moderate to low, the potential impact of earthquakes 
is nonetheless considered very high.281  
 
While overstating the potential of rare earthquakes with reoccurrence intervals in the 
thousands of years should be avoided, it is nevertheless important for the potential of such 
events to be clearly communicated and understood to appropriately address disaster risk. 
Avoiding ignorance to the potential for such hazards is necessary both to encourage risk 
reduction action amongst the general population and to influence decision-makers to 
implement risk reduction measures. As mentioned, low frequency of seismic hazard does not 
equal low risk.282 This is an essential consideration when applying seismic hazard maps within 
legal risk reduction frameworks. As seismic hazard maps used within frameworks for existing 
building risk reduction do not consider these rare yet substantially more powerful earthquakes, 
caution should be exercised to ensure this is not misunderstood to mean they cannot or will not 
occur. 
 
4.2.3 Accounting for scientific uncertainty in drr regulation 
 
In addition to earthquakes expected to occur on a much longer time frame, it is also 
relevant that there remains much scientific uncertainty about the potential occurrence of 
earthquakes altogether. As Stein and others assert, when it comes to earthquakes often “[the] 
Earth does not behave as expected”.283 This statement encapsulates the notion that there are 
always, ultimately, limitations in human knowledge about the occurrence of earthquakes. 
Scientific knowledge about earthquakes is constantly evolving and, while there have been 
many great advancements made in recent decades, new discoveries are nonetheless made 
regularly.  
 
To accommodate this, it is important that existing legal standards and regulations are 
designed to be flexible and adaptive to newfound information. For instance, the subduction 
 
281 Irina Dallo, Michael Stauffacher and Michèle Marti “What Defines the Success of Maps and Additional 
Information on a Multi-Hazard Platform?” (2020) 49 International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 101716 
at 101716.  
282 New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, above n 243, at 2. 
283 Stein and others, above n 244, at 15. 
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zones which produced the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and 2011 Tohoku Earthquake were 
previously assumed to be capable of producing earthquakes only up to magnitude 8.4, despite 
respectively registering as magnitude 9.1 and 9.0 events.284 Subsequent research determined 
the underestimation of these events was influenced by a limited knowledge of historic 
earthquake patterns in the areas, which subsequently required thinking to accommodate the 
possibility for other similar subduction zones also producing more powerful earthquakes than 
previous estimated.285 In fact, the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake produced ground shaking of 
damage-inducing Shindo Upper 5 across an area ten times larger than had been anticipated.286 
Research off the East Coast of New Zealand is ongoing to learn more about the “poorly 
understood” Hikurangi Subduction Zone, which may be capable of producing “megathrust” 
earthquakes potentially similar to those experienced elsewhere in the world, and certainly 
greater than anything experienced in modern New Zealand history.287  
 
Though not common, earthquakes may also sometimes occur on undiscovered seismic 
faults or in areas previously considered to have a low seismic hazard threat. For instance, the 
2010 Darfield Earthquake (Mw 7.1) and subsequent 2011 Christchurch Earthquake (Mw 6.3) 
ruptured on a series of seismic faults previously undetected by seismologists.288 The occurrence 
of these earthquakes led to a revision of the seismic hazard zones within building regulation. 
Christchurch and the surrounding region was raised from medium seismic hazard to high 
seismic hazard, in part to account for heightened potential aftershock activity.289 The 
unpreparedness for such earthquake and existing seismic risk in this area led to New Zealand’s 
deadliest and most destructive earthquake in 80 years, despite the “very low probability” of the 
 
284 The underestimation of the size of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake resulted in a lack of preparedness for the 
resulting tsunami, see: Chris Goldfinger and others “Superquakes and Supercycles” (2013) 84 Seismological 
Research Letters 24 at 24.  
285 At 30. 
286 Junko Sagara and Keiko Saito Risk Assessment and Hazard Mapping (The World Bank, Washington DC, 
2013) at 5. 
287 “Hikurangi Subduction Earthquakes and Slip Behaviour” (2020) East Coast Lab <www.eastcoastlab.org.nz>. 
288 “The Hidden Fault That Caused the February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake” (2011) GNS Science 
<www.gns.cri.nz>. 
289 William T Holmes, Nicolas Luco, and Fred Turner “Application of the Recommendations of the Canterbury 
Earthquakes Royal Commission to the Design, Construction, and Evaluation of Buildings and Seismic Risk 
Mitigation Policies in the United States” (2014) 30 Earthquake Spectra 427 at 436. 
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Canterbury earthquakes actually occurring.290 In a submission for the EPB framework, former 
NZSEE president, Dr. Quincy Ma, noted:291 
 
We should be reminded that low [hazard] does not equal no risk, and the timing and severity of 
earthquakes cannot be predicted with certainty. Christchurch has reminded us that our seismic 
hazard knowledge is incomplete and earthquakes do not always occur when and where they are 
expected. 
 
Indeed, officials decided it would have been inappropriate to exclude low hazard areas, 
such as Auckland, from obligations under the EPB framework owing to the importance of 
accounting for potential unknown faults in and around these regions.292 This provides a level 
of contingency against events discussed in the previous section which, though of much lower 
probability than those used to define seismic hazard zones, are not impossible and in fact likely 
to occur at some point in the future.293 
 
A similar seismic hazard re-zoning experience also occurred in Italy following the 2002 
Molise Earthquake (Mw 5.8). The earthquake struck an area which had not been assigned within 
a seismic hazard zone at the time.294 Until 2003, Italy was divided into three seismic hazard 
zones with a remaining portion of the country not classified as having a seismic hazard. Despite 
a 1998 government report recommending a re-classification of seismic hazard zones in Italy – 
including to place the Molise region within zone two (a medium seismic hazard) – this was 
implemented only following the 2002 disaster, largely inspired by the national shock expressed 
for the death of multiple school children.295 While the Molise example is primarily an issue 
related to governance and politics, it nonetheless demonstrates the potential shortcomings of 
seismic hazard maps as they are reflected within law and their correlation to seismic risk.296 
 
290 Kaiser and others, above n 274, at 87. 
291 Above n 243, at 2. 
292 Building (Earthquake-Prone Buildings) Amendment Bill 2015 (182-1) (select committee report) at [68] - [69]. 
293 Seismic Risk Working Group, above n 92, at 41. 
294 Luis Decanini and others “Seismic Hazard and Seismic Zonation of the Region Affected by the 2002 Molise, 
Italy, Earthquake” (2004) 20 Earthquake Spectra 131 at 131. 
295 At 134. 
296 A destructive earthquake coincidentally struck the region of Emilia in 2012, which had also not been classified 
within a seismic hazard zone until the changes following the 2002 Molise Earthquake, see: The 29th May 2012 
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Even in Japan, where seismic hazard maps are not used to regulate the risk reduction of existing 
buildings, destructive earthquakes have occurred in regions estimated to have low seismic 
hazard, including two in 2016 which led to widespread building failure and caused more than 
50 deaths.297  
 
4.2.4 Prioritising for anticipated seismic events: an example from Japan 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, Japan is distinguished from New Zealand 
and Italy in the sense that seismic hazard zones are not applied within the country’s framework 
for existing building risk reduction. This highlights an interesting point of comparison and once 
again emphasises the idea that the use of seismic hazard zones to reduce the seismic risk of 
existing buildings is ultimately a decision of political compromise. All relevant existing 
buildings are targeted for risk reduction measures equally across Japan according to the 
APSRB, with no discrepancy between regions according to seismic hazard. However, the 
government has in recent years established plans which prioritise risk reduction and preparation 
in regions known to be at risk of large earthquakes in the future.  
 
Separate Acts govern the preparation efforts for anticipated earthquakes based on 
scientific modelling and forecasting of potential impacts. Primarily examples of these include 
the Special Measures Act on Measures for Nankai Trough Earthquakes and the Act on Special 
Measures against Tokyo Inland Earthquake.298 The Acts designate areas likely to be impacted 
by these anticipated earthquakes (and likely tsunamis) to provide a legal mandate for DRR 
plans and policies to be established, including the establishment of bodies tasked with 
coordinating the implementation of these measures through government and other relevant 
bodies.299 For instance, there is a 70% probability that ground shaking of up to Shindo 7 (the 
highest level of shaking) will occur in the Tokyo Metropolitan area between 2020 and 2050, 
 
Emilia Romagna Earthquake: EPICentre Field Observation Report (University College London, London, 
June 2012) at 8. 
297 Morita and Takayama, above n 223, at 1. 
298 See: Special Measures Act on Measures for Nankai Trough Earthquakes (Act No. 92 of 2002); Act on Special 
Measures against Tokyo Inland Earthquake (Act No. 88 of 2013). 
299 Cabinet Office Japan White Paper on Disaster Management in Japan 2015 (Government of Japan, 2015) at 
88. 
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with “tremendous” damage anticipated to people, property, and economic activity.300 Amongst 
a range of other specific prevention measures, emergency risk reduction targets for existing 
buildings are established and authorities have a mandate to engage with building owners to 
swiftly achieve these targets.301  
 
The pieces of legislation prioritise risk reduction efforts within the wider national 
framework and serve as the closest comparison to the use of seismic hazard zones in New 
Zealand and Italy. A key difference is that obligations are prioritised according to anticipated 
seismic hazard threats, but not excluded. Seismic hazard zones are used to prioritise risk 
reduction within New Zealand and Italy, but they are also applied in a way which exempts 
certain building owners from the need to engage in risk reduction measures. In Japan, existing 
buildings across the entire national territory are subject to obligations under the APSRB and 
the above “special measures” legislation is used to apply urgency to risk reduction efforts as 
an extra layer of preventive action. This provides an interesting model for how risk reduction 
may be prioritised within areas with high seismicity while still supporting efforts in all regions. 
As has been argued throughout this chapter, seismic hazard zones may create a 
misunderstanding of potential seismic risk and the need to engage in DRR in areas considered 
to have low seismicity. Such an approach could also be a useful consideration in New Zealand 
to complement the EPB framework, as a way of encouraging more than simply the bare 
minimum of seismic risk reduction in areas which are anticipated to experience severe 




The use of seismic hazard zones can be useful for requiring a certain degree of seismic 
resistance in the design of new buildings, however there should be more caution when applying 
them within risk reduction frameworks for existing buildings. In particular, their influence on 
 
300 See: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism White Paper on Land, Infrastructure, Transport 
and Tourism in Japan, 2019 (Government of Japan, 2019) at 124; Tokyo Metropolitan Government Disaster 
Prevention Guide Book Tokyo Metropolitan Government (February 2020) at 31. 
301 See Chapter 7 of this research for further discussion on stakeholder engagement in the risk reduction process. 
302 For instance, there is a high likelihood of the Wellington region experiencing strong shaking in the near future, 
as there also is for communities within close proximity to the Alpine Fault, see: “Alpine Fault: Probability of 
Damaging Quake Higher than Previously Thought” (20 April 2021) Radio New Zealand <www.rnz.co.nz>. 
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hazard perceptions and therefore the willingness of persons to engage in risk reduction should 
not be underestimated, especially in areas of lower seismicity. Indeed, the use of “seismic risk” 
to describe the hazard factor of regions across New Zealand does not appropriately align with 
the Sendai understanding of risk and may, in fact, lead to a misunderstanding of potential risk 
in these areas. In New Zealand, the exclusion of priority buildings and Category C buildings 
from the same obligations as are required in areas of high and medium seismic hazard do not 
appropriately reflect the seismic risk in these areas. Although Italy prioritised the risk reduction 
of certain buildings with zones of higher seismicity (namely priority buildings), the EPB 
framework actively excludes the above-mentioned buildings from obligations in low hazard 
areas. This is short-sighted, given that seismic hazard zones do not account for seismic events 
which occur on a longer time period. 
 
Seismic hazard zones ultimately represent expected ground shaking on a return period 
of approximately 475-years. As a result, they inadvertently underestimate the potential for 
seismic events on a much larger return period which are likely to occur in regions which have 
lower seismicity. This is an important consideration when aiming to reduce the seismic risk of 
existing buildings, as seismic hazard maps do not account for such long-range events. In 
addition, there is ultimately much we simply do not know about earthquakes and their 
occurrence. This further emphasises the need to not underestimate or neglect the importance 
of identifying and reducing existing building risk in all regions of the earthquake-prone case 
study countries. Ultimately, the use of seismic hazard zones within risk reduction frameworks 
for existing buildings is a political decision, as exemplified by their absence from the Japanese 
framework. Rather than allocating legal obligations according to seismic hazard zones of the 
country, Japan instead imposes such obligations across the whole country and provides 
additional prioritisation of risk reduction in areas anticipated to be impacted by large 
earthquakes in the near future. This approach would be beneficial to consider in New Zealand, 
as it ensures uniformed risk reduction across the entire country while still mandating more 
comprehensive risk reduction planning measures in regions prone to strong shaking on a more 







Chapter 5  
Seismic Building Assessments 
 
There are plenty of examples showing the due to corruption, indifference, or lack of qualified 
professionals, building codes are not implemented properly, leading to unnecessary loss and 
damage. It is therefore clear that the introduction or reform of building codes is not enough to 
reduce disaster consequences… 
Maria Papathoma-Kohle and Thomas Thaler303 
 
While generalised assumptions are made about seismic risk based upon the 
characteristics (Chapter 3) and location (Chapter 4) of a building, a more detailed 
understanding of risk is achieved through the use of seismic building assessments. Seismic 
assessments establish a specific knowledge about the nature of seismic risk presented by 
individual buildings, therefore helping to determine the danger they are likely to pose in 
earthquakes. The type of seismic assessments examined in this chapter are those which evaluate 
the structural integrity of buildings as part of hazard preparation and risk reduction efforts. 
Improving knowledge about the likely structural integrity of existing buildings enhances the 
understanding of potential risks to decision-makers and the public alike, and this is 
subsequently used to drive relevant risk reduction behaviour. Indeed, the results produced from 
these seismic assessments are used to determine the level of state intervention in relation to 
seismic strengthening obligations of existing buildings. They are not to be confused with rapid 
building safety assessments, which are typically carried out in the aftermath of earthquakes to 
evaluate any sustained building damage. Rapid assessments are designed to evaluate potential 
safety risks in relation to the immediate re-occupation of buildings following an earthquake, 
based upon observed damage. These are therefore designed as a response mechanism, rather 
than a tool for the proactive reduction of risk, as are the structural seismic assessments 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine how seismic building assessments are applied 
within legal frameworks to improve knowledge of seismic risk and enhance resilience. How 
and when these assessments are used is therefore of particular importance. Because seismic 
assessments are fundamental for establishing legal seismic strengthening obligations, it is 
 
303 Above n 112, at 103. 
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crucial to ensure they provide results which are as accurate as possible and that there is 
sufficient oversight to ensure consistency between assessments. In addition, the way in which 
knowledge obtained through these assessments is used to communicate risk to the public is 
also an important consideration. While this can be useful to make the public more aware of 
potential risk, it is also important that the exact nature of this risk is properly understood. 
Finally, the instances in which seismic assessments are used to identify seismic risk is also 
relevant when considering ways in which to enhance resilience against earthquakes. Legal 
frameworks largely apply seismic assessments in a limited style, as a one-off requirement to 
confirm the structural integrity of buildings targeted by authorities. Two further instances are 
considered for more regular use of these assessments to improve long-term resilience, 
including on a periodic basis as a means of building maintenance and following strong 
earthquakes regardless of whether any observed damage has been sustained. The former would 
provide greater flexibility for changes to building assessment methods and would identify any 
potential building deformations over time. The latter instance, following strong earthquakes, 
would also help to better understand potential hidden changes in a building’s seismic capacity 
given that buildings are designed to withstand a particular level of shaking from individual 
events. Though such consideration is more response-based, its discussion is nonetheless 
relevant for preventative risk reduction as it would help identify risk which may otherwise go 
unnoticed. 
 
5.1 Providing Assessments with Accuracy and Oversight 
 
Simplified seismic assessment methods allow for the seismic risk of large numbers of 
existing buildings to be easily and efficiently evaluated.304 There appears to be a strong reliance 
on the use of simplified seismic assessment methods in New Zealand, however, without 
appropriate and strict oversight mechanisms to manage the consistency and reliability of 
assessment results. Two standardised procedures were developed to assess existing buildings 
across New Zealand: the Initial Seismic Assessment (ISA), designed as a simplified, qualitative 
assessment which considers generic building characteristics, to estimate likely seismic 
resistance, such as age and materials; and the Detailed Seismic Assessment (DSA), designed 
as a comparatively more comprehensive, quantitative assessment of existing buildings, which 
 
304 Consenza and others, above n 123, at 5918. 
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provides a more reliable estimation of seismic resistance.305 The ISA is intended to be a low-
resource and low-cost alternative to the DSA, with an external building evaluation the only 
recommended feature requiring an in-person visit to a building itself.306 In practice, however, 
the ISA has become the standard seismic assessment used by building owners across New 
Zealand, due to significantly lower costs and minor invasiveness of the assessment method. 
The decision regarding whether an ISA is insufficient to determine the earthquake-prone status 
of a building and a DSA is thus needed, is entirely left to the discretion of the engineer who 
undertakes the seismic assessment.307As Ferner has noted, the ISA has evolved from an “initial 
screening tool” for existing buildings” into a frequently-used process to “provide a rating upon 
which significant financial decisions are being made”.308 Officially, the ISA is regarded as 
reliable for TAs to make determinations on whether an existing building meets the legal 
definition of earthquake-prone. However, the unintended dependence on this simplified 
seismic assessment method to make such decisions means a very limited standard of 
knowledge is actively being applied make determinations about seismic risk and the need for 
risk reduction measures for existing buildings in New Zealand. The recent vacation of staff 
from the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) building in Wellington illustrates the difference in 
knowledge about seismic risk between an ISA and DSA. The decision was made to obtain a 
DSA as part of the IRD’s lease renewal, which found the building to have greater safety 
concerns than had been previously understood.309  
  
Simplified seismic assessment methods are also used to examine existing buildings in 
Italy and Japan, although there appears to be measures to mitigate potential issues of accuracy. 
In Italy, a simplified method and more detailed conventional method were designed for the 
assessment of existing buildings.310 Much like the ISA in New Zealand, the simplified 
assessment method in Italy is intended to act as a preliminary evaluation using macro 
characteristics such as a building’s age and materials. To account for this, building owners 
which use this assessment method are only permitted to improve their building by one seismic 
 
305 New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, above n 111, at A3-2, A7.7.2. 
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307 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, above n 180, at 2.3. 
308 Above n 140, at 3-3-6. 
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Home” (14 July 2021) Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>. 
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risk class when accessing the Sismabonus seismic strengthening incentive scheme (Chapter 
6).311 The conventional assessment method, which provides a more detailed building 
evaluation, permits for the improvement of more than one seismic risk class. Similarly, it 
appears that simplified seismic assessment methods in Japan cannot be used to determine the 
likely seismic resistance of existing buildings if a buildings’ design documents are not 
accessible to the professional undertaking the assessment. In such an instance, a detailed 
assessment is required to make any decisions around whether or not the buildings should be 
targeted for strengthening interventions by authorities.312 It is notable that, while these 
measures exist in Italy and Japan to mitigate accuracy levels of seismic assessments, no 
mandatory strengthening obligations ultimately exist in these countries. With mandatory 
strengthening required for EPBs in New Zealand, reliance on the simplified ISA crucially risks 
missing or incorrectly assessing buildings which would otherwise be considered earthquake-
prone. 
 
 The accuracy of knowledge obtained from seismic assessments is also crucial to 
promote consistency between assessments, and to communicate seismic risk to relevant 
stakeholders. Contradictory assessment methods have previously impacted the seismic 
assessments of hospitals in Italy, with contradictory seismic resistance evaluations illustrating 
the need for more harmonised assessment methods needed to control the potential for such 
discrepancies.313 Standardised seismic assessment methods for existing buildings with 
regulatory authority to promote consistency was a recommendation of the Canterbury 
Earthquake Royal Commission implemented into the EPB framework with the ISA and DSA 
assessment methods.314 Yet, despite the standardised methods, it remains possible (and even 
anticipated) that equally-qualified engineers will determine different earthquake ratings when 
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undertaking an ISA.315 Though potential inconsistencies may be mitigated by a secondary 
review of the assessment results, the EPB framework allows seismic assessments to be 
conducted by a single qualified engineer and offers no requirement for peer-review or 
oversight.316 In other words, despite the real potential for fluctuating assessment results, there 
is no mechanism used as a backstop to promote greater consistency from the widely-used ISA. 
This could likely cause issues when engineers are pressured to complete multiple assessments 
for buildings identified by TAs as potentially earthquake-prone, where the incentive is to 
complete many assessments as quickly as possible. There is also a danger that this potential 
discrepancy between assessment results is not communicated effectively to relevant 
stakeholders.317 These issues with the accuracy of the ISA is something which needs to be 
properly understood by building owners and the general public to allow informed decisions 
about risk reduction to be made.  
 
Ensuring consistent and reliable risk assessments is also important for maintaining 
public trust in the engineering profession. A scandal emerged in Japan during 2005 when it 
was reported that several high-risk buildings constructed between the 1990s and early 2000s 
had been constructed with insufficient seismic resistance due to a falsification of data and a 
lack of subsequent administrative oversight to detect this.318 The revelations significantly 
impacted the public trust in the construction industry and those authorities responsible for 
ensuring buildings are safe to use.319 In fact, trust toward the industry was found to be a major 
deterrent for persons undertaking seismic risk reduction for existing buildings in a survey of 
homeowners in Japan, demonstrating the long term impact of the scandal.320 While this is an 
extreme example of failed oversight, and concerned building construction rather than the 
seismic assessment of existing buildings, it nonetheless stands as an important lesson about the 
value of ensuring effective oversight for the best possible accuracy. This is a crucial 
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consideration for the EPB framework in New Zealand where, in practice, the difference 
between mandatory strengthening and no risk reduction measures for existing buildings 
currently depends upon the judgement exercised by individual engineers when completing 
seismic assessments. 
 
5.2 Raising Awareness through the Publication of Seismic Building Risk  
 
When seismic assessments are completed for potentially earthquake-prone buildings in 
New Zealand, the subsequent results are publicised to further promote risk reduction and 
encourage an awareness of seismic risk. In particular, seismic risk is required to be published 
for existing buildings which authorities determine to be earthquake-prone. The aim of 
publicising such information is primarily to produce a market-based demand for seismic 
strengthening amongst existing buildings, by creating a distinction between existing buildings 
considered to present a significant seismic risk and those which comply with relevant legal 
standards of risk. In addition, the publication of seismic risk information about existing 
buildings also helps to increase the understanding and awareness of such risk to the general 
public. Publishing seismic risk is also a feature of the legal framework for existing building 
risk reduction in Japan. No similar scheme appears to exist in Italy, with information related to 
the seismic risk of existing buildings remaining between building owners and the national civil 
protection department.321 
  
While New Zealand requires public notice to be given for all existing buildings 
determined as earthquake-prone, the publication of seismic risk information is limited in Japan 
to large-scale priority buildings identified in Chapter 3. Under the EPB framework in New 
Zealand, local authorities must register EPBs on an online public national database and 
building owners must also display an EPB notice on or near their building to indicate the 
relevant seismic risk.322 The publication of this information includes the particular earthquake 
rating (%NBS) of each building and the deadline building owners are required to remediate the 
seismic risk within.323 There is some evidence to suggest that the publication of EPBs has 
enhanced awareness of seismic risk and contributed to a market demand for seismic 
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strengthening amongst existing buildings, especially in Wellington city.324 In comparison, 
Japan requires the seismic risk of large-scale priority buildings to be published online only. 
The online publication of seismic assessment results for these existing buildings was made 
compulsory under the 2013 amendment to the APSRB, after many of these buildings suffered 
non-structural damage in the 2011 Tohoku earthquake.325  
 
The requirement in Japan differs from that in New Zealand as all relevant buildings are 
required to have their seismic assessment results publicised, rather than simply those which are 
non-compliant. Approximately 15,697 large-scale buildings were required to obtain a seismic 
assessment and have the results publicised by the end of 2015, with one quarter of these 
buildings subsequently found to have insufficient seismic resistance.326 In addition, building 
owners are able to obtain a certificate of seismic compliance to publicly display for buildings 
which meet legal requirements.327 Although not much information about this initiative is 
available, it appears to be an optional tool for individual building owners who desire to display 
such information on their building and is not automatically issued. The publicly-available 
information about the seismic risk of these buildings and optional compliance certificates are 
designed to incentivise seismic strengthening amongst owners in the absence of mandatory 
strengthening requirements in Japan.  
 
 One of the challenges of publicising the seismic risk of existing buildings is ensuring 
that building users and owners properly understand the associated risks. In New Zealand, the 
requirement to display a building’s EPB status for building users indicates the intention of 
authorities to improve the risk perception of EPBs amongst the general public. There are real 
concerns that an EPB status is conflated with building safety, therefore leading to an 
interpretation that buildings not earthquake-prone are “safe”.328 As explained in Chapter 3, an 
EPB status refers only to potential danger to life safety. In fact, the seismic risk of buildings is 
completely probabilistic and so any assumption of complete safety or protection in earthquakes 
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is misplaced, even amongst buildings considered to have greater seismic resistance. This is a 
potential challenge in Japan, where seismic compliance certificates are available for buildings 
which comply with the minimum seismic standard. It is ultimately important for people to not 
misinterpret compliance with minimum seismic requirements as meaning guaranteed safety or 
freedom from building damage. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, EPBs are considered to present the highest danger of 
collapse in moderate earthquakes but those with an earthquake rating of between 34-66%NBS 
are still considered to present a medium risk. This has been observed in the market, with many 
tenants and owners alike opting for seismic strengthening of 67%NBS or greater since the 
potential for building failure is considered low.329 From the perspective of building users, 
however, the absence of any public notice about the seismic resistance of buildings other than 
EPBs may inadvertently create a misunderstanding of potential seismic risk of existing 
buildings in New Zealand. Indeed, the lack of requirement for seismic assessment results to be 
published for buildings not determined to be earthquake-prone inherently creates the 
perception that no risk should be expected from these buildings. The requirement in Japan to 
publicise the seismic assessment results for all priority buildings and not simply those which 
fall below the legal minimum standard of risk arguably allows for a better risk perception of 
existing buildings amongst building users. 
 
 
5.3 Integrating Seismic Assessments into Building Safety 
 
Relevant also to the effectiveness of seismic building assessments to help improve 
resilience is the instances when they are used. There is a clear tendency for seismic assessments 
to be utilised in a way which understands risk as something which is fixed in time. Each of the 
case study countries use these assessments to confirm the likely risk of certain existing 
buildings in one moment of time and, depending on assessment results, manage the risk in that 
moment. While this approach assists with risk reduction of existing buildings at the time, it 
ignores the potential for risk to change over time. Indeed, risk is not stationary and will continue 
to evolve with new technology, scientific discoveries, and changes to the make-up of society 
itself.330 To deal with the constantly changing nature of risk, the Sendai Framework highlights 
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the importance of periodicity when it comes to assessing and understanding risk.331 Tracking 
the evolution of seismic risk amongst existing buildings, and adapting to manage and reduce 
it, will be a critical aspect for improving resilience to earthquakes, and seismic building 
assessments are an important part of this process. As one of the best tools for understanding 
how well existing buildings are likely to resist earthquakes, it is argued that seismic building 
assessments can be better integrated into risk reduction frameworks to understand potential 
changes in seismic risk over time. There are two instances in particular where seismic 
assessments are largely missing from frameworks currently, and where more regular use would 
help to enhance resilience. This includes the use of seismic assessments as part of the regular 
building maintenance practices, which would account both for building decay and for any 
developments in scientific knowledge about earthquake risk. Additionally, clearer legal 
structures to provide for the use of seismic assessments in the aftermath of strong earthquakes 
would assist with indicating any potential building deformations as a result of seismic shaking. 
 
5.3.1 Seismic assessments as a function of regular building maintenance and inspections  
 
While regular maintenance is a common feature for many buildings to ensure safe 
continued occupation, seismic risk is not a typical consideration made when completing such 
maintenance. It is inevitable that buildings will degrade as they age, owing to the natural decay 
of building materials and through exposure to external forces over time.332 In theory, the older 
a building becomes the greater maintenance will be required to ensure it can be safely used, 
sometimes well beyond its design lifetime. Additionally, new developments in seismic science 
and technology are inevitable across the lifetime of a building, directly impacting and shifting 
the legally-acceptable standard of seismic risk for existing buildings. Integrating these 
considerations of seismic risk into regular building maintenance is therefore critical for 
promoting long-term resilience. The Royal Commission into the Canterbury Earthquakes 
highlighted this in its 2012 report, recommending the continued active monitoring of existing 
buildings in New Zealand beyond the deadlines established within the EPB framework to 
account for “the deterioration of buildings with the passage of time”.333 As previously 
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mentioned in Chapter 2, seismic assessments are typically required to confirm the seismic 
resistance of buildings when owners intend to complete major alterations or change the use of 
their building. Though this promotes an understanding of seismic risk amongst existing 
buildings over time, it depends entirely on the intentions of building owners and not as an 
integrated feature of periodic maintenance.  
 
 Periodic building maintenance for existing buildings in New Zealand currently focuses 
on the functionality of building operation systems rather than the actual buildings. A building 
warrant of fitness (BWoF) is legally required every 12 months for buildings with specified 
services to inspect their operability.334 Relevant services include the operability of features 
such as emergency building evacuation and lighting systems, elevators, and fire-prevention 
controls such as sprinkler systems.335 These inspections are carried out by “independently 
qualified” persons, certified by local authorities to perform BWoF inspections, and are 
designed to ensure the relevant listed systems are operable, not to inspect the physical condition 
of the buildings.336 Authorities have separate powers to impose safety measures on buildings 
if they appear deteriorated to the point they are considered to pose a potential danger to public 
safety and property, although this does not explicitly reference the ability to compel seismic 
assessments.337 Indeed, for existing buildings which do not fit the profile categories of 
potentially earthquake-prone buildings, it appears unlikely that local authorities would request 
a seismic assessment. Similar requirements exist in Italy, with a requirement for existing 
buildings to undergo seismic assessment to evaluate life safety considerations when there are 
evident structural deformations or material degradation, in addition to a proposed change of 
use or significant building alterations.338 While this requirement is more assertive than it is in 
New Zealand in relation to the explicit need for a seismic assessment, it nonetheless remains 
reactive to observed building deterioration.  
 
 Japan appears to have the most preventative-based approach to monitoring the 
structural integrity of existing buildings over time of all three case study countries, though this 
 
334 Building Act, s 108. 
335 “Buildings with Compliance Schedules for Specified Systems” (15 March 2016) Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment <www.building.govt.nz>. 
336 Building Act, s 108(3)(c). 
337 Subpart 6. 
338 NTC 2008, above n 144, at [8.3] 
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is also not entirely focused on seismic safety. Similar to the annual BWoF inspections in New 
Zealand, “special buildings” in Japan have been subject to periodic inspections since 2008.339 
This includes buildings of greater than five storeys and a total floor area of 1,000m2 or greater, 
and “special buildings” with a total floor area of 100m2 or greater, such as schools, hospitals, 
apartment buildings, and other high-use public facilities.340 Unlike BWoF inspections, which 
focus on essential building systems, these inspections also include the evaluation of building 
features including finishing materials, external walls, foundations, and stairwells.341 These 
inspections are required to be completed between every six months to three years, depending 
on the specific building.342 Although these inspections are not specifically seismic assessments, 
they certainly provide for greater attention to be made toward structural and non-structural 
features of buildings on a regular basis, enhancing the potential for identifying any potential 
distortions. It should be pointed out that no equivalent requirement exists for buildings in Italy. 
However, there are examples in other parts of Asia where periodic building assessments are 
legally required, albeit unrelated to seismic risk. 
 
For instance, a mandatory building inspection scheme was implemented in Hong Kong 
during 2012, to address concerns about the jurisdictions’ aging and quickly deteriorating 
existing building stock.343 Inspections are completed every ten years for all buildings greater 
than three storeys in height which are 30 years old or above.344 Similarly, in Singapore, section 
28 of the Building Control Act imposes requirements for periodic structural inspections to be 
completed for existing buildings every ten years for multi-storey residential buildings, and 
every five years for all other existing buildings.345 Building owners are obligated to remediate 
 
339 Building Standards Act (Act No. 201 of 1945), art 12. 
340 Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Guidebook for Earthquake Protection for 
Nonstructural Members of School Facilities, Revised Edition: Protecting Children from Falling and Tumbling 
Objects Due to an Earthquake – Implementing Earthquake Resistance Inspection (Government of Japan, 
revised in March 2015) at 12. 
341 At 12. 
342 At 12. 
343 Daniel Chan and others “Overview of the Development and Implementation of the Mandatory Building 
Inspection Scheme (MBIS) in Hong Kong” (2014) 4 Built Environment Project and Asset Management 71 at 
72. 
344 At 76. 
345 “Periodic Structural Inspection of Buildings” (22 September 2017) Building and Construction Authority 
<www.bca.gov.sg>. 
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any deficiencies which, such as through building strengthening measures.346 Much like Hong 
Kong, these inspections are designed to identify structural deficiencies in existing buildings 
owing to poor maintenance and general wear and tear over time.  
 
The periodic building inspections in Japan, as well as those in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, are not designed to account for seismic safety, yet ultimately illustrate how regular 
monitoring of structural and non-structural building features may be integrated into routine 
maintenance for long-term resilience. Each represent a preventative approach to understanding 
potential risk for existing buildings as it evolves over time. Integrating seismic assessments 
into routine building maintenance would not only help to improve the resilience of existing 
building stocks over time in seismically-active countries, but it would also enable a smoother 
process for building inspections when and if legal seismic standards change in light of new 
research. While building owners want certainty over their obligations and expectations for 
seismic strengthening, this must be balanced against the evolving nature of risk and objectives 
of risk reduction. Risk reduction demands an explicit understanding that building ownership 
comes with a responsibility to ensure continued safety and resilience – including the need to 
be adaptable, when necessary, to identify and reduce new standards of risk as it emerges. 
 
5.3.2 Inspecting buildings in the aftermath of earthquakes  
 
In addition to routine inspections, resilience would also be improved by mandating 
structural seismic assessments for buildings following earthquakes. In the aftermath of 
earthquakes which generate particularly significant ground shaking and which some damage is 
observed, it is standard practice to carry out rapid building assessments to evaluate individual 
buildings and identify any indicators of damage. These assessments are designed to quickly 
(typically within hours or days) identify potential damage and make determinations about 
whether or not it is safe for immediate re-entry into buildings.347 While these rapid assessments 
are designed to protect the public from danger, they are designed to address immediate risk and 
do not typically consider the viability for long-term occupancy of buildings. More detailed 
 
346 Building and Construction Authority Owner’s Guide to Periodic Inspection of Buildings (Government of 
Singapore, July 2016) at A1. 
347 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Field Guide: Rapid Post Disaster Building Usability 
Assessment – Earthquakes (Wellington, May 2014) at [5]. 
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seismic assessments are required to make such decisions, though there appears to be limited 
legal mandates to ensure these assessments are, in fact, carried out. Consequently, for buildings 
which suffer minimal or no observable damage after strong earthquakes and which are deemed 
safe to immediately re-occupy, potential reductions in seismic resistance may therefore go 
unobserved.  
 
Buildings are designed with “ultimate limit states” in mind to resist individual seismic 
events of particular strength. Existing buildings may therefore perform as expected in 
earthquakes and avoid collapse or sustaining any damage at all, but nonetheless have endured 
a substantial volume of their ultimate limit state. As a result, these buildings may be weakened 
and, ultimately be more susceptible, to future shaking, including potential aftershock events. 
This was observed amongst many buildings in Christchurch, which suffered substantial 
damage or total collapse in the 2011 earthquake, but not in the 2010 Darfield Earthquake five 
months prior.348 The Royal Commission into the Canterbury Earthquakes noted, that following 
the 2010 event: 
 
…subsequent superficial examination of URM buildings resulted in many being classified as 
having minimal obvious damage and reoccupation was permitted. Several of those buildings 
were further damaged in February 2011, and the failure of some caused death. 
 
The 2010 earthquake produced ground shaking at the 475-year design level standard within the 
current building code and, while many existing buildings performed reasonably well 
considering (and thus were re-occupied), the 2011 event caused shaking of up to double that 
of the design standard and resulted in a high level of damage and collapse.349 In 2016, the 
Kaikōura Earthquake caused particularly severe damage to various multi-storey buildings 
within the Wellington CDB. In response, full structural building assessments were mandated 
only for buildings which had observable damage owing to concerns from central government 
about potential disruption to government functions within Wellington city.350 No equivalent 
mandate was issued to evaluate the structural capacity of seemingly un-damaged buildings, 
meaning that it is not currently known whether the seismic resistance of existing buildings in 
 
348 Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission, above n 146, at 166. 
349 At 209. 
350 Simon Fleisher “Wellington City’s Emergency Management Response to the November 2016 Kaikōura 
Earthquake” (2019) 23 Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies 91 at 93. 
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Wellington was in fact reduced as a result of the event. This is of particular relevance 
considering that Wellington has a high danger of being subjected to strong shaking in the near 
future, which could cause these potentially already-weakened buildings to fail. 
 
It is for this reason that rapid seismic assessments used in Japan following damaging 
earthquakes are designed to not only identify potential building damage for the sake of short 
term re-occupation, but also for their long-term use.351 Even for buildings which appear to have 
no damage and are deemed safe to re-occupy, more detailed assessments are completed to 
determine whether the buildings have sustained a reduction in their structural capacity.352 
Requiring structural building assessments in these instances better reflects an approach to 
understanding risk beyond simply responding to individual events and toward long-term 
resilience. In New Zealand, changes to the Building Act in 2019 provided authorities with the 
power to request structural building assessments from building owners regardless of whether 
or not there has been a declared civil defence emergency.353 While this increased the 
circumstances within which authorities may legally require building owners to produce seismic 
assessments, it appears that these powers are reactive for managing buildings which sustain 
visible damage in earthquakes.354 Of course, relying on buildings to sustain damage for 
obtaining a structural assessment is counter-intuitive to the preventative objective of risk 
reduction. Accounting for potential shifts with the vulnerability of existing buildings in the 
aftermath of strong earthquakes is imperative for both long-term occupation and the resilience 
of communities. As Borri and Corradi note, in relation to building deformation from previous 
earthquakes, “the principle of older construction [equals] good construction is again challenged 
by the inevitable march of time”.355 A standard of regular monitoring for potential deficiencies 
is appropriate to account for such risk. 
 
351 Agostino Goretti and Giacomo Di Pasquale “An Overview of Post-Earthquake Damage Assessment in Italy” 
(paper presented to Eeri Invitational Workshop, Pasadena, September 2002) at 3. 
352 Masaki Maeda, Hamood Alwashali and Kazuto Matsukawa “An Overview of Post-Earthquake Damage and 
Residual Capacity Evaluation for Reinforced Concrete Buildings in Japan” (paper presented to 7th ECCOMAS 
Thematic Conference on Computational Methods in Structural Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering, 24-26 
June 2019) at 932. 
353 Subpart 6B. 
354 (11 September 2018) 723 NZPD 6519. 
355 Antonio Borri and Marco Corradi “Architectural Heritage: A Discussion on Conservation and Safety” (2019) 
2 Heritage 631 at 633. 
 103 
 
5.4 Summary  
 
Seismic building assessments are particularly useful tools for understanding the 
specific nature of seismic risk amongst existing buildings. Simplified methods have been 
developed for the purposes of efficiency, however there are insufficient structures within the 
EPB framework in New Zealand to ensure the accuracy of assessment results. An over-
dependence from building owners on the cheaper ISA and the absence of a requirement for 
peer-review of assessments completed by individual engineers has created an environment 
where seismic assessments may not provide a particularly accurate or thorough understanding 
of seismic risk. While simplified assessment methods are also applied within Italy and Japan, 
more restrictions on the ability to complete seismic strengthening exist to manage potential 
issues of accuracy. In addition, both New Zealand and Japan publicise the seismic assessment 
results of particular buildings to promote a better understanding of seismic risk. New Zealand 
requires the earthquake-prone status of buildings to be publicised both on the physical 
buildings and on an online register, while Japan requires the online publication of seismic risk 
for large-scale priority buildings subject to mandatory assessment requirements in 2013. Both 
illustrate useful means of communicating potential seismic risk to the public and fostering a 
greater awareness for risk reduction. 
 
Seismic assessments also play a largely restricted role in each of the case study 
countries, as a one-off obligation. This approach limits the ability of authorities to have an 
understanding of potential changes or deformations to existing buildings over time, thus 
limiting the ability to ensure long-term resilience. While buildings are subject to regular 
maintenance obligations, Japan is the only case study country which requires periodic 
structural inspections to be carried out, for special buildings such as schools, hospitals, and 
other large buildings used by the general public. These periodic structural inspections, which 
are replicated in the legal systems of both Hong Kong and Singapore, are critical for the long-
term resilience of existing buildings. Integrating these assessments into New Zealand’s 
building framework should be considered. This includes stronger requirements for seemingly 
un-damaged buildings to be structurally-assessed following strong earthquakes, rather than 
leaving it to the discretion of individual building owners to do so. Structural assessments are 
pertinent for ensuring the safe long-term occupation of buildings and more frequent use of 
them would help to improve resilience. 
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Part C 
Key Mechanisms for Enforcing Legal Obligations 
 
Part B of this research examined key operational features applied within risk reduction 
frameworks, including the methods used to identify relevant existing buildings, the application 
of seismic hazard zones to impose risk reduction obligations, and the use of seismic building 
assessments to understand risk and improve resilience. With these features in mind, Part C 
moves to explore key mechanisms within risk reduction frameworks which influence the 
enforcement of legal obligations amongst building owners. Enforcing the risk reduction 
obligations of building owners is crucial for achieving risk reduction itself, and largely rests 
upon strong governance and thorough investment in resilience, as per priorities two and three 
of the Sendai Framework.356  
  
Chapter 6 compares the use of financial incentives in each of the case study countries 
to incentivise building owners for completing seismic strengthening. The notable lack of 
financial support for building owners in New Zealand is highlighted, in comparison to the more 
prevalent use of such incentives in both Japan and Italy. Chapter 7 examines the use of 
timeframes within risk reduction frameworks as a mechanism for enforcing obligations and the 
structures in place for authorities to both monitor the progress of and engage with building 
owners to ensure obligations are achieved within relevant timeframes. Finally, Chapter 8 
details the role of relevant duties of care, owed by building owners to ensure the safety of 
building users and passersby. These are explored as potential, indirect means of imposing and 






356 Above n 7, at [20]. 
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Chapter 6  
Supporting the Cost of Risk Reduction with Financial Incentives 
 
While there is some difficulty predicting the remediation costs [for earthquake-prone buildings] 
at this early stage of the system, early evidence indicates the estimated costs of remediating 
through [seismic] strengthening… may not be economically feasible for many owners. 
 
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment357 
 
 
Incentives are considered fundamental for encouraging compliance with and 
empowering stakeholders and communities to engage in risk-adverse behaviour.358 Because 
States have the primary responsibility to promote DRR, government-led incentives are 
considered essential for supporting relevant practices and obligations.359 From the perspective 
of DRR, incentives can be understood as “tipping points for behavioural change towards 
prospective disaster risk management and risk-sensitive choices at a significant scale”.360 In 
relation to the seismic risk reduction of existing buildings, incentives may help to encourage 
and empower building owners both to better understand the seismic risk of their buildings and 
to subsequently take appropriate measures to reduce this risk. While there are a variety of 
existing and potential incentives for reducing the seismic risk of existing buildings, this chapter 
focuses on the existence of financial incentives used to support building owners to assess and 
strengthen their existing structures.  
 
High-upfront costs associated with seismic assessments and strengthening work, and a 
lack of perception regarding the benefits of investing in these measures, are often observed as 
deterrents for building owners to take appropriate preventative action.361 An obvious potential 
solution to this challenge is through the use of financial incentives to encourage relevant risk 
reduction measures. Indeed, a lack of incentives to encourage private investment in DRR has 
 
357 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Early Insights – Initial Evaluation of the Earthquake-Prone 
Building System (March 2021) at 4. 
358 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, above n 7, at [19(f)].  
359 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, above n 103, at 348. 
360 Melanie Gall, Susan L Cutter, and Khai Hoan Nguyen Incentives for Disaster Risk Management (United 
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Beijing, 2014) at 4. 
361 Yao and others, above n 35, at 811. 
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been highlighted as one of the core drivers of disaster risk itself.362 Enhanced investment is 
therefore viewed as a necessary component for states to achieve commitments to DRR within 
the Sendai Framework. This chapter argues that authorities need to consider the expenditure 
associated with seismic risk reduction not as unaffordable costs, but rather as necessary and 
strategic investments for the future. Access to public financial incentives should be made 
available to help building owners assess and strengthen their buildings as necessary within 
frameworks, and this should be available to everyone who is subject to risk reduction 
obligations. It should be mentioned that the purpose of this chapter is not to evaluate the 
economics or effectiveness of individual financial incentive schemes. Instead, what is 
evaluated is the existence of such schemes and their availability to building owners who are 
legally required to undertake relevant seismic risk reduction measures.  
 
6.1 Investing in Risk Reduction as a Public Good 
 
A historically dominant focus on economic investments for short-term benefits has 
often led to under-investment in long-term measures for resilience.363 In fact, for countries 
which are considered wealthy and therefore in a position to make such long-term investments, 
failure to do so is related to a combination of risk perception and priority areas of individual 
governments.364 Achieving a substantial reduction in disaster risk and improving resilience – 
which all countries have committed to achieving through their endorsement of the Sendai 
Framework – requires a substantial shift in thinking by states away from short-term economic 
considerations. Instead of investment in preventative DRR measures being a burdensome or 
unaffordable cost, it should instead be understood as a wise and beneficial long-term 
investment to improve resilience. The Sendai Framework offers an opportunity to convince 
decision-makers to make such long-term investments, through its focus on the proactive 
reduction of risk rather than simply aiming to minimise losses and reacting as necessary 
following hazardous events.365 Indeed, as governments increasingly become the “insurer of last 
resort” for the impacts of earthquakes and other hazards, greater financial incentives in DRR 
 
362 Above n 7, at [6]. 
363 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, above n 103, at 350. 
364 At 350. 
365 At 166. 
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measures are considered essential to improving resilience.366 Providing financial incentives and 
assistance to achieve this outcome is therefore considered a necessity for the overall public 
good. In relation to existing buildings, the benefits to public safety and improvement in 
resilience against the disruption of earthquakes justify public investment in risk reduction 
measures, including seismic assessments and strengthening.367 The seismic vulnerability of 
existing buildings today is through no fault of building owners themselves, but instead a 
reflection of modern legal expectations for seismic risk.  
 
 There is a lack of willingness to make long-term investments to reduce seismic risk in 
New Zealand, as evidenced by the limited and restricted financial incentives available to EPB 
owners. It appears the Government’s focus is the use of mandatory strengthening obligations 
to achieve risk reduction within the EPB framework. Legislative records related to the design 
of the EPB framework clearly indicate it was Parliament’s intention that building owners 
should bear the expense of remediation work for EPBs.368 Since the national EPB framework 
first came into force in 2017, only two financial assistance schemes have been developed by 
the state. The Heritage EQUIP scheme was established in 2017 and provides financial grants 
to assist heritage EPB owners with costs of strengthening and expert consultation for 
establishing seismic strengthening plans.369 Additionally, the Residential EPB Financial 
Assistance scheme was established in 2020, which offers low-interest government loans to 
owner-occupiers of earthquake-prone residential units within multi-unit or multi-storey 
buildings.370 It is also worth mentioning that a financial grant scheme was established by the 
central government to assist the owners of URM buildings remediate dangerous facades and 
other parts of these buildings, under the 2017 Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Recovery 
(Unreinforced Masonry Buildings) Order. However, this applied only in four regions and for 
buildings located along streets pre-determined within the order.371 The Heritage EQUIP and 
Residential EPB schemes are very restrictive in relation to who can access them. For instance, 
 
366 Jaffee and Russell, above 173, at 470. 
367 Filippova and others, above n 168, at 721. 
368 NZPD, above n 254, at 10918. 
369 Heritage EQUIP Earthquake Upgrade Incentive Programme (2021) <www.heritageequip.govt.nz>. 
370 “Residential Earthquake-Prone Building Financial Assistance Scheme” (2020) Kāinga Ora 
<www.kaingaora.govt.nz>. 
371 The Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Recovery (Unreinforced Masonry Buildings) Order 2017 is discussed 
further in Chapter 7. 
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Heritage EQUIP grants are allocated in a lottery-style manner and priority is given to heritage 
buildings which have a higher protection status (i.e. Category 1 heritage buildings).372 It should 
be noted that, as of June 2021, the Heritage EQUIP grant scheme has been indefinitely 
suspended, having provided funding for approximately 80 heritage buildings over five years. 
The government loans for residential EPB units are available only to owner-occupiers who can 
prove financial hardship, including being unable to obtain a regular bank loan without resulting 
in such hardship.373 The scheme is designed to provide at least 40 loans, despite more than 
1,000 earthquake-prone residential units believed to exist in Wellington alone.374 Limiting the 
types of existing buildings eligible for financial assistance treats all building owners as 
homogenous, which ultimately advances real issues of equity in regard to expectations of risk 
reduction. After all, the owners of large earthquake-prone commercial buildings in major 
centres are likely to have greater access to resources and capital for achieving their obligations 
than do private owners of smaller earthquake-prone buildings.375 Financial incentives should 
be offered to building owners, regardless of building type, as the overall objective of risk 
reduction is to improve public safety and societal resilience to earthquakes. 
 
 Financial assistance and incentives are far more prevalent within the risk reduction 
frameworks for existing buildings in Japan and Italy. In Japan, public funding to reduce the 
seismic risk of existing buildings is perceived as a key tool for enhancing resilience and 
safety.376 For this reason, Japan provides the broadest range of financial assistance of each case 
study country to incentivise compliance, with an assortment of subsidies, grants, low-interest 
government loans and tax relief for residential property owners.377 All pre-1981 buildings in 
need of risk assessment and, if necessary, strengthening work, are entitled to subsidies and 
grants for both. For instance, central and local governments generally subsidise the cost of 
seismic assessments by 66% and the cost of seismic strengthening by 23%, with the potential 
 
372 Heritage EQUIP (2021) <www.heritageequip.govt.nz>. 
373 “Residential Earthquake-Prone Building Financial Assistance Scheme” (22 October 2020) Kāinga Ora 
<www.kaingaora.govt.nz>. 
374 Up to 20% of these owners are assumed to face financial hardship for seismic strengthening, translating to 
approximately 250 units, see: Cabinet Office Circular “Residential Earthquake-Prone Building Financial 
Assistance Scheme” (17 February 2020) CAB at 3. 
375 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, above n 357, at 19. 
376 Ando, above n 241, at 392. 
377 Moullier and Sakoda, above n 120, at 48. 
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for this to increase or decrease depending on potential limited-time offers.378 Originally 
available only for non-residential buildings, these subsidies were expanded in 2002 to include 
standalone residential homes.379 In Italy, the State allocated more than €1.1 billion between 
2003 and 2016 toward the seismic assessment and strengthening of (mainly public) existing 
buildings.380 This was distributed proportionately between regions according to seismic hazard 
zones.381 Efforts to more broadly incentivise risk reduction amongst existing building owners 
have been made with the ‘Sismabonus’ tax deduction scheme, first introduced in 2013 and 
expanded in both 2016 and 2020. Sismabonus is designed to provide existing building owners 
with tax deductions from costs incurred as a result of completing strengthening work.382 The 
deduction available is related to the level of strengthening work completed, with a greater 
percentage offered where more extensive risk reduction measures are completed. A standard 
rate of 80% is offered for a maximum of €96,000 per building unit.383 In response to the 
economic challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the Italian State temporarily 
increased Sismabonus to a maximum deductibility of 110% for seismic strengthening work 
amongst residential buildings, to attempt at incentivising greater compliance.384 As noted by 
Taffoni, Sismabonus means that “for the first time, voluntary action with strong state incentives 
for seismic prevention on existing buildings can be implemented on a large scale and without 
[barriers according to the type of building]”.385 Though no data currently exists to indicate the 
uptake of the Sismabonus scheme, Paleari does indicate that the aggregate expenditure on 
 
378 See: Kenji Okazaki Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2011 – Incentives for Safer 
Buildings: Lessons from Japan (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2010) at 4; Moullier and 
Sakoda, above n 120, at 48. 
379 Okazaki, at 4. 
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securing all seismically-vulnerable homes across Italy could total at least €93 billion, see: Verso un Piano 
Nazionale per la Messa in Sicurezza delle Abitazioni e Dei Territori dal Rischio Sismico e Idrogeologico, 
above n 30, at 3. 
381 Paleari, above n 158, at 679. 
382 Consenza and others, above n 123, at 5908. 
383 At 5908. 
384 “SuperBonus 2020” Eco Sisma Bonus <www.ecosismabonus.it>. 
385 Giorgio Taffoni “Applicazione Del Sisma Bonus Alle Strutture In Calcestruzzo Armato” (Corso Di Laurea 
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building renovations in Italy (including seismic strengthening) doubled between 2011 and 2016 
alone.386  
 
It is clear that both Japan and Italy have sought to provide a more extensive range of 
financial incentives to building owners than New Zealand. While both countries do rely more 
heavily on financial incentives to encourage compliance in their largely voluntary-based risk 
reduction frameworks, relying on compliance through mandatory obligations with heavily 
restricted financial support is less likely to provide for a desirable outcome of risk reduction.387 
Indeed, this has been recognised and while further public financial incentives have previously 
been considered to assist EPB building owners in New Zealand, none have thus far been 
implemented. For instance, a tax deduction scheme was also originally considered to assist 
with seismic strengthening of EPBs, however this was not picked up by the government of the 
day and has not been adopted since.388 As a result, building owners cannot claim tax deduction 
on seismic assessments or strengthening work required to comply with the law, though may do 
so if their building is badly damaged or suffers collapse in an earthquake.389 This exposes a 
current inequity in the ability to comply with risk reduction obligations and, in the absence of 
wider financial assistance, does nothing to incentivise preventative, risk-adverse behaviour. 
Tax deductibility for building depreciation was recommended by the recent tax working group 
in New Zealand as a way of incentivising greater compliance with seismic strengthening for 
existing buildings.390 While the ability to claim tax from building depreciation was in fact 
reintroduced in 2021 as part of the economic response to COVID-19, this was not specifically 
targeted at seismic assessments and strengthening and it therefore remains uncertain whether 
it will have any impact on incentivising such action.391  
 
Financial incentives are not only relevant for EPB strengthening requirements, but also 
for driving risk reduction action amongst owners of earthquake-vulnerable buildings not 
captured by the statutory mandate. The provision of financial assistance and incentives for all 
 
386 Above n 158, at 679. 
387 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, above n 357, at 4. 
388 NZPD, above n 254, at 10918. 
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390 Tax Working Group Future of Tax: Final Report Volume I, Recommendations (New Zealand Government, 
Wellington, 21 February 2019) at 77. 
391 “COVID-19 Depreciation and Low-Value Assets” Inland Revenue <www.ird.govt.nz>. 
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owners of buildings in need of seismic strengthening in Japan and Italy align better with the 
objectives of the Sendai Framework and is something New Zealand should also seek to 
establish, to encourage more than simply the bare minimum. Fiscal restrictions of local 
governments in New Zealand restrict the financial incentives which may be provided locally 
and, therefore, assistance from the state is necessary to support seismic risk reduction efforts.392 
In fact, it has been acknowledged that relying on individual TAs to administer their own 
financial incentive schemes would be impractical and that centralised schemes are likely to be 
more efficient.393 Although local incentives are more common in Italy and Japan, schemes led 
by the central government are still prominent within their risk reduction frameworks. In 
addition, local and regional governments in Italy and Japan enjoy greater financial powers and 
autonomy required to generate revenue to implement incentives of particular significance. In 
fact, almost 90% of revenue and expenditure in New Zealand is controlled by central 
government, making local governments of the least financially-autonomous in the OECD.394  
 
 It should also be noted that even in New Zealand, where residential earthquake 
insurance is near universal, it does not encourage risk reduction. Proposals have been made for 
different risk classes to be created for insurance purposes to distinguish those which have been 
seismically strengthened and those which have not. This is itself a wider issue which affects 
all existing buildings as, financially, there is currently no differentiation in the insurance market 
between existing buildings which have been seismically strengthened and those which have 
not.395 For instance, a distinguishment of insurance premiums between strengthened and non-
strengthened buildings may help to further incentivise people to undertake risk reduction 
measures. 
 
6.1.1 Prioritising financial assistance according to seismic hazard zones 
 
Aside from the mere existence of public investments in seismic risk reduction for 
existing buildings, relevant financial assistance and incentives should be available to building 
 
392 Filippova and Noy, above n 167, at 182 
393 Cabinet Office Circular, above n 374, at 11. 
394 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Government at a Glance 2017 (OECD Publishing, 
Paris, 2017) at 73-81. 
395 Temitope Egbelakin and others “Incentives and Motivators for Improving Building Resilience to Earthquake 
Disaster” (2017) 18 Natural Hazards Review 04017008-1 at 04017008-10. 
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owners in all areas where action is necessary or desired. Financial assistance schemes in New 
Zealand and Italy are both currently restricted according to particular hazard zones established 
under seismic hazard maps (see Chapter 4). For instance, the residential EPB loan scheme in 
New Zealand is available only to relevant building owners located in areas of high seismic 
hazard.396 While the Heritage EQUIP grant scheme was technically available to heritage 
buildings across the entire country, priority of funding was largely oriented toward buildings 
in high and medium hazard zones.397 Interestingly, two of the country’s largest urban centres, 
and in fact the majority of estimated EPBs across the country, are believed to be located within 
low hazard areas where there is currently little-to-no financial incentives available.398 In Italy, 
the Sismabonus scheme was originally available only to building owners located within seismic 
hazard zones 1 and 2 (regions with the highest seismicity), although this was extended in 2017 
to also include zone 3.399 With approximately two thirds of Italy’s 60 million people residing 
within zones 3 and 4, the expansion of Sismabonus to zone 3 has increased those eligible but 
still leaves it unavailable to approximately one-third of the population.400 In comparison to both 
Italy and New Zealand, access to financial incentives in Japan is made available across the 
entire country in recognition of the importance of achieving seismic risk reduction amongst 
existing buildings everywhere. If the ultimate goal is, in fact, risk reduction in all regions, more 
consideration needs to be provided to nationwide financial incentive schemes rather than in 
regions of more frequent seismicity. Vulnerable existing buildings present a risk regardless of 
their location and access to financial incentives should ultimately reflect this, especially where 
obligations to reduce risk exist in all regions (as explored in Chapter 4). 
 
While the decision to restrict financial incentive schemes according to seismic hazard 
areas in Italy and New Zealand is clearly intended to prioritise risk reduction in areas presumed 
to have a greater relative threat of earthquakes, it ultimately does little to encourage the need 
for risk reduction in presumed low seismic areas. It is of course possible that assistance will be 
made available to EPB owners in low seismic areas at a later date, in relation to the staggered 
deadlines between regions for achieving obligations (see Chapter 2). However, the goal should 
 
396 Kāinga Ora, above n 373. 
397 Heritage EQUIP, above n 372. 
398 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Progress toward Identifying Potentially Earthquake-Prone 
Buildings 2019 (Wellington, November 2019) at 19. 
399 Above n 255, at 4. 
400 Above n 30, at 1. 
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be to encourage and incentivise building owners to complete risk reduction measures as soon 
as reasonably practical. Obligations are ultimately required for all buildings, regardless of 
seismic hazard zone, and therefore it does not make sense to delay access to the very assistance 
designed to help achieve efficient risk reduction. It makes more sense to invest in risk reduction 




Investing in DRR is a key priority highlighted within the Sendai Framework. When 
considering the risk reduction of existing buildings, this requires states to consider making 
long-term investments to improve resilience, rather than simply consider short-term costs 
associated with seismic assessments and strengthening. While financial incentives are not a 
silver bullet for achieving risk reduction amongst existing buildings, they are ultimately a 
useful tool within risk reduction frameworks for assisting building owners. The EPB 
framework in New Zealand places burdensome mandatory requirements on EPB owners to 
strengthen their buildings, but does not provide any consideration to the financial challenges 
many building owners are likely to face in achieving these obligations. Indeed, it appears that 
an over-reliance has been placed on the mandatory obligations for achieving risk reduction, 
and has overlooked the very real potential for many building owners to be unable to do so 
without greater financial assistance.  
 
Government financial incentives are more prominent in Japan and Italy, where they are 
used to encourage uptake in the voluntary-based seismic strengthening frameworks. Similar 
incentive schemes have been previously considered in New Zealand, though none have since 
eventuated. It is clear that a greater investment from the state is required, both to achieve DRR 
and to promote equity within the EPB framework. This includes providing such incentives to 
building owners in all regions where risk reduction is required or encouraged. While Japan 
offers financial incentives across the country, both New Zealand and Italy currently restrict 
access to incentives for building owners in areas of higher seismicity only. Such an approach 
may lead to stalled progress towards DRR and drag it out for longer than it may otherwise need 






Chapter 7  
Timeframes and Monitoring the Progress of Building Owners Across Time 
 
…it is important that normative instruments provide for the monitoring of progress and the 
verification of compliance… [to] provide important information on compliance and necessary 
corrective and pre-emptive measures to adopt. 
 
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction401 
 
The success of risk reduction obligations is largely dependent upon the long-term 
strategies and planning undertaken by authorities. The Sendai Framework highlights the 
establishment of clear DRR targets and deadlines as an effective means of strengthening 
disaster risk governance.402 Implementing timeframes for achieving DRR obligations and goals 
is a particularly useful tool for reducing the seismic risk of existing building, given the length 
of time taken to identify vulnerable buildings and subsequently plan for appropriate 
intervention. In fact, deadlines for authorities to identify potential EPBs and for the owners of 
EPBs to subsequently strengthen or demolish the structure are a central feature of the EPB 
framework in New Zealand.  
 
This chapter explores the use of timeframes in planning to achieve the risk reduction of 
existing buildings and argues that regulation alone should not be relied upon for success. In 
particular, there is a significant reliance in New Zealand on achieving the risk reduction of 
EPBs within relevant deadlines by deterring building owners against non-compliance with the 
threat of formal sanctions. It is argued that this primary reliance on deterring building owners 
into compliance is not the most effective means of achieving risk reduction and greater 
assistance should instead be provided by authorities. This includes better use of compliance 
monitoring to ensure authorities understand progress made by building owners relative to their 
deadlines. Additionally, greater engagement to assist building owners navigate the process of 
seismic risk reduction is also important for increasing the chance obligations will be met. 
Examples from Japan and Italy are explored to provide perspective for integrating these into 
New Zealand’s legal framework.  
 
401 Above n 51, at [119]. 
402 Above n 7, at [27(b)]. 
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7.1 Timeframes as an Enforcement Mechanism within Risk Reduction Frameworks 
 
The use of timeframes within legal frameworks helps to provide certainty and guide the 
completion of risk reduction obligations within a particular period of time. Timeframes for the 
risk reduction of existing buildings are prominent features in the frameworks of both New 
Zealand and Japan, albeit with very different purposes. In New Zealand, the Building Act sets 
out statutory deadlines for TAs to identify potentially earthquake-prone buildings and for 
relevant owners to strengthen their buildings if they are found to be earthquake-prone.403 Time 
periods provided for these deadlines are progressively staggered between seismic hazard zones, 
with the longest deadlines in low seismic zones and shortest deadlines in high seismic zones. 
These range anywhere between ten years for priority buildings in high seismic zones, to more 
than 50 years for buildings in low seismic hazard zones. While timeframes are also a prominent 
feature for reducing the seismic risk of existing buildings in Japan, they are instead used to 
outline government targets for risk reduction since mandatory strengthening obligations do not 
exist. In accordance with plans set by central and local governments under the APSRB, 
percentile targets are set within timeframes of approximately five-year periods for the sought 
number of strengthened existing buildings.404 Periodic surveys monitor the actual progress of 
seismic strengthening in relation to these goals, and policy is adjusted or updated where 
necessary if the actual rate of strengthening is below the target rate.405  
 
In comparison to both Japan and New Zealand, timeframes do not appear to be a feature 
for reducing the seismic risk of existing buildings in Italy. The exception to this was a five-
year deadline introduced under Ordinance 3274 of 2003 to complete seismic assessments of all 
priority buildings within seismic hazard zones one and two.406 The deadline, which was 
subsequently extended multiple times beyond the initial five year period, appears to be the only 
experience of timeframes within Italy for reducing risk of existing buildings.407 This lack of 
timeframes or goals largely reflects the comparatively hands-off approach of the Italian state 
 
403 Section 133AG; s 133AM. 
404 Act on Promotion of Seismic Repair of Buildings, art. 4. 
405 Moullier and Sakoda, above n 120, at 51. 
406 Mazzoni and others, above n 26, at 1676. 
407 Fabio Casciati and Sara Casciati “Amelioration and Retrofitting of Educational Buildings” (2018) 17 
Earthquake Engineering and Engineering Vibration 47 at 48. 
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to reducing seismic risk existing buildings. The number of existing buildings understood to 
require seismic strengthening in Italy is substantially greater than in New Zealand and Japan, 
totally more than 60% of the building stock. This scale of vulnerable buildings may therefore 
be a contributing factor as to why no national timeframe exists for completing this risk 
reduction. 
 
7.2 The Challenge of Relying on Deterrence to Achieve Risk Reduction  
 
There appears to be an over-reliance on the use of formal sanctions for achieving 
obligations within the EPB framework in New Zealand. Formal sanctions are integrated into 
the framework owing to the existence of mandatory requirements for EPBs to be strengthened 
or demolished. This compares to Italy and Japan, where there is no compulsory requirement 
for vulnerable existing buildings to undergo remediation work. Formal sanctions (which 
include financial penalties and the ability for TAs to seek application to act on the behalf of 
building owners) enable authorities to respond to instances of non-compliance when they arise, 
but are ultimately not preventative in nature.408 There is a danger in solely relying on formal 
sanctions to achieve risk reduction of existing buildings, principally that many owners may fail 
to comply within relevant deadlines. Penalties and formal sanctions should be a secondary 
measure to hold accountable stakeholders who willingly refuse to comply, while more effort 
should be made to assist building owners to achieve their obligations in the first instance. 
 
Moreover, there is a degree of ambiguity in relation to how the risk of EPBs will be 
remediated if building owners fail to comply within relevant deadlines, especially if there are 
multiple buildings involved. TAs in New Zealand may apply to the District Court for an order 
to carry out strengthening work on behalf and at the expense of building owners if they fail to 
comply with, or are “not proceeding with reasonable speed in light of” relevant deadlines.409 
What would constitute a “reasonable speed” is largely ambiguous, with no relevant guidance 
provided by Parliament nor interpretation from the courts. Indeed, the power itself would rely 
upon a currently non-existent system of compliance monitoring, making it unlikely to be 
utilised. Experience with such applications indicates a reluctance from the courts to grant 
orders for generic work, instead favouring plans which outline the specific work which TAs 
 
408 Building Act, s 133AR-133AU. 
409 Section 133AS(1). 
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propose to do with relevant buildings.410 In Wellington City Council v Lakhi Maa, the District 
Court recognised the significant variability in the type of work which may be completed to 
reduce the seismic risk of existing buildings (including strengthening, demolition, or a 
combination of both).411 Citing previous cases, the court noted that the court has a precedent 
to consider “expert evidence and, where appropriate, [granting] orders for specific work to be 
conducted”, rather than simply permitting TAs to make such decisions after a court order has 
been made.412 Developing specific plans for seismic work, including gathering expert evidence 
and consultation, would be a heavy workload for authorities, especially in a situation where 
risk is needed to be remediated for multiple buildings at once. Generally speaking, TAs in New 
Zealand undertake court action as a “last resort” owing to insufficient finances and resources, 
with a greater incentive to deal with issues of non-compliance through less resource-intensive 
means.413 In fact, the Wellington City Council recently expressed concern to MBIE around the 
authorities’ “ability to use [its] enforcement powers effectively and efficiently, given the cost 
and resource required to go through the District Court”.414 It would be reasonable to assume 
that similar concerns exist amongst other TAs, especially those which are smaller and have 
substantially fewer resources.  
 
An additional consideration to this remedial power is that TAs “may” apply for a court 
order, implying the power itself is discretionary. Additional powers to impose safety 
requirements on non-complying buildings may be a preferred alternative for TAs, including 
the erection of safety barriers around a buildings’ perimeter or issuing restrictions on access to 
the building.415 While this may increase the safety of building users and passersby in the short-
term, it does not ultimately reduce the overall existence of disaster risk. Where an application 
for a court order is made, it remains uncertain whether or not the court has discretionary power 
to refuse such an order.416 There is a precedent for intrusions upon private property rights to be 
 
410 Wellington City Council v Lakhi Maa Ltd [2020] NZDC 26755. 
411 At [6]. 
412 At [30]. 
413 Mark Wright “When Crime Pays: ‘Environmental Civil Prosecutions’ and the Resource Management Act 
1991” (PhD Dissertation, University of Canterbury, 2020) at 118. 
414 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, above n 357, at 20. 
415 Building Act, s133AR(1). 
416 Wellington City Council v Lakhi Maa Ltd, above n 410, at [19]. 
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as reasonably minimal as possible “to satisfy some overriding objective”.417 While the 
overriding objective in relation to the EPB framework is to protect public safety, it is difficult 
to determine what may be considered “reasonable” in the absence of a TA having a specific 
vision for what it intends to carry out on the relevant building. Such a scenario connects back 
to the above argument considering the apparent reluctance of courts to grant generic orders to 
TAs, requiring a more resource-intensive role from authorities. 
 
 The uncertainty around the effectiveness and efficiency of formal sanctions to achieve 
risk reduction for existing buildings highlights the important role of central and local 
governments in assisting and incentivising building owners to comply with relevant deadlines. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, incentivising compliance is central to risk 
reduction and a sole reliance on formal sanctions does not align with the principle of shared 
responsibility as outlined in the Sendai Framework.418 This is not to say that formal sanctions 
are not necessary to address non-compliance, but rather that they should be applied as a final 
backstop and not as the primary tool for promoting risk reduction obligations. As has been 
discussed thus far in the current chapter, the EPB framework in New Zealand places an 
inequitable responsibility on building owners to achieve risk reduction within the statutory 
deadlines and may, consequently, result in challenges if formal sanctions are relied upon to 
remediate seismic risk at the end of these deadlines. Building owners should be supported to 
achieve their obligations in advance of authorities using powers to sanction non-compliance. 
 
7.3 Monitoring the Compliance of Building Owners across Time 
 
Monitoring the long-term progress of building owners to reduce the seismic risk of 
existing buildings is relatively straightforward yet incredibly beneficial for understanding the 
likelihood of achieving targets. Compliance monitoring informs authorities about trends in risk 
reduction and enables them to proactively adapt approaches if necessary to stay on track.  As 
mentioned, Priority Two of the Sendai Framework encourages regular monitoring of 
obligations and the use of progress reports as a means of promoting strong disaster risk 
governance.419 This enables authorities to maintain an updated awareness of how building 
 
417 Grubmayr v Bloxham [2004] NZAR 577 at [23]. 
418 Above n 51, at [44]. 
419 Above n 7, at [27(e)]. 
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owners are progressing with meeting their relevant obligations. It also provides authorities with 
knowledge about whether or not it appears likely that obligations will be achieved within 
relevant timeframes or in relation to the targets sought.  
 
Although statutory deadlines are a central feature of achieving risk reduction within the 
EPB framework in New Zealand, there is no structure for monitoring the progress of building 
owners. This is an oversight which may lead to a reactive situation outlined in the previous 
section, where multiple owners fail to comply within relevant deadlines and where authorities 
are left to respond at the time. The oversight is especially interesting, given there is an 
equivalent duty for monitoring the progress of TAs. Under the Building Act, TAs must 
periodically report the progress they have made in identifying potentially earthquake-prone 
buildings to the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 
(MBIE).420 This is a feature to promote compliance amongst authorities and has thus far been 
recognised as essential for helping authorities stay on track with finding EPBs. In fact, a 2021 
national progress report from MBIE stated that the information to be provided from TAs in 
upcoming progress reports will be essential for identifying the TAs most at risk of failing to 
identify EPBs within the deadlines.421 It was noted that this information would be used to 
“provide support” to ensure TAs were able to meet their obligations on time.422 Despite the 
noted importance of compliance monitoring and progress reports for TAs, there is no 
equivalent requirement for monitoring the progress of building owners in relation to seismic 
strengthening obligations. The current structure of the framework effectively transfers all 
responsibility for risk reduction to owners once an EPB is identified, with no obvious structure 
to ensure authorities maintain an ongoing understanding of how building owners are tracking 
to meet their deadlines.  
 
The framework for reducing the risk of existing buildings in Japan illustrates that 
regulation alone is insufficient for ensuring compliance amongst building owners and that 
tracking long-term progress is essential.423  Regular monitoring, complemented by progress 
 
420 Section 133AG(2). 
421 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Progress Toward Identifying Potentially Earthquake-Prone 
Buildings 2020 (Wellington, March 2021) at 14. 
422 At 14. 
423 Moullier and Sakoda, above n 120, at 58. 
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reporting, is crucial for informing any potential changes which may be required to ensure 
targets can in fact be met. This includes establishing new incentives or addressing potential 
issues such as shortages in professionals to complete strengthening work.424 As previously 
mentioned, owing to an absence of mandatory legal strengthening requirements in Japan, 
timeframes are instead used within a broader long-term strategy to meet government-set targets 
aimed at incrementally increasing the number of existing buildings with adequate seismic 
resistance.425 Routine surveys commissioned by government departments are used to update 
authorities on the estimated number of existing buildings which have in fact completed or are 
in the process of completing seismic strengthening. For instance, a 2% gap was identified in 
2008 between the target number and actual number of strengthened existing buildings in Japan, 
which resulted in renewed financial incentives to promote the closure of this gap.426 Such an 
approach is likely to be required again, with data from 2018 indicating seismic strengthening 
to be slightly short of the 90% target by 2015.427 By integrating routine monitoring into the 
national risk reduction framework for existing buildings, Japan has been able to maintain a 
clear long-term strategy for increasing the number of seismically-resistant existing buildings, 
while remaining flexible to regulatory or policy changes where compliance appears off-track. 
The absence of similar compliance monitoring of building owners’ progress within New 
Zealand reflects the more static nature of the EPB framework and restricts the capacity for 
making efficient targeted changes to enable building owners to meet their statutory deadlines. 
This fundamentally relies on building owners being deterred from non-compliance through the 
existence of these compulsory deadlines alone, without any additional widespread support from 
authorities. 
 
7.3.1 Monitoring risk reduction across lengthy time periods 
 
The argument for integrating stronger compliance monitoring amongst building owners 
in New Zealand is further emphasised by the particularly lengthy time periods provided within 
 
424 At 58. 
425 Figures on the progress made with the seismic strengthening of existing buildings in accordance with 
government targets are provided by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, see: “住宅・
建築物の耐震化について” Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism <www.mlit.go.jp> 
(translation: “Architecture: Earthquake Resistance of Houses and Buildings”). 
426 Moullier and Sakoda, above n 120, at 51. 
427 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, above n 425. 
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the Building Act, which increases the potential for deadlines to be missed. Depending on the 
seismic hazard area and whether or not a building is considered a priority building, the 
deadlines for identifying, assessing, and strengthening EPBs in New Zealand range from 
approximately ten years to more than 50 years, as shown below in Table A.  
 




































































 n/a 50 
years 
*An additional strengthening extension of up to ten years may be granted for certain heritage buildings 
 
The lack of compliance monitoring across lengthy time periods highlights the over-
dependence on achieving obligations through regulation and deterrence alone. Permitting 
remediation deadlines which span decades, in the absence of any wider obligations to track 
progress, absolves too much responsibility from authorities in the effort to ensure targets are 
achieved. Omitting a requirement for TAs to monitor the compliance of building owners 
essentially leaves them, and central government, ignorant to the progress of EPB remediation 
over time. The New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering (NZSEE) has previously 
voiced its objection to the lengthy deadlines, stating they effectively amount to “a dismissive 
requirement”.428 In many instances, it is likely that the responsibility for seismic strengthening 
will have long passed on from current building owners by the time the deadlines require action 
 
428 New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering “Supplementary Submission to Local Government and 
Environment Select Committee on the Building (Earthquake-Prone Building) Amendment Bill 2015” at 3. 
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to be completed. In Japan, at least 33% of existing buildings were estimated to have inadequate 
seismic resistance as of 2005, approximately ten years after the APSRB was enacted in 1995.429 
In 2018, this number was believed to be approximately 13% amongst residential buildings and 
11% amongst non-residential buildings, against targets of 10% by 2015, 5% by 2020, and 
effectively zero by 2025.430 As mentioned above, progress monitored over the past three 
decades has allowed the government to stay on top of risk reduction efforts and react 
appropriately if they appeared to stagnate. This is not the case in New Zealand, where the multi-
decade effort to remediate EPBs is set to be undertaken with no such monitoring. The estimated 
number of EPBs across New Zealand is between 15,000 and 25,000, representing 
approximately 8-13% of the total building stock (excluding most residential homes).431 More 
than 80% of these buildings are believed to be located within areas of medium and low seismic 
hazard, where statutory deadlines range from approximately 17.5 years to more than 50 
years.432 This is a significant period of time for there to be no requirement for authorities 
maintain a record of progress made, and reduces the ability to proactively respond in the event 
compliance is lower than that which is sought. 
 
In the absence of obligations to monitor and report progress of building owners, 
timeframes spanning multiple decades also decreases the perceived urgency to reduce seismic 
risk. The median time for identifying and remediating EPBs under the current national 
framework is approximately 27 years. This represents an almost negligible difference in 
comparison to the average of 28 years taken to identify and remediate EPBs under the previous, 
de-centralised system, which the current EPB framework was designed to speed up.433 It also 
far exceeds the 15-year period initially recommended by the Royal Commission into the 
Canterbury Earthquakes, and that which was proposed in the initial draft bill of the EPB 
framework.434 This would have provided a five-year period for TAs to identify all potential 
 
429 National Report of Japan on Disaster Reduction for the World Conference on Disaster Reduction (Government 
of Japan, Kobe-Hyogo, 18-22 January 2005) at [1.5]. 
430 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, above n 425.  
431 These numbers are based on estimates from 2012 and therefore may change as more regions begin the process 
of identifying potentially earthquake-prone buildings, see: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 
above n 220, at 9. 
432 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, above n 398, at 11. 
433 Building (Earthquake-Prone Buildings) Amendment Bill (select committee report), above n 292, at [108]. 
434 Above n 146, at 210. 
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EPBs and a further ten-year period for EPB owners to complete strengthening obligations. In 
fact, the average time period of 27 years is similar in practice to the non-enforceable timeframes 
applied to incremental risk reduction targets for existing buildings in Japan. There, the current 
target is to have effectively all existing pre-1981 buildings seismically strengthened by the year 
2025, or 30 years since the APSRB framework was first implemented.435 Of course, as 
discussed above, there is a far greater effort made to monitor the progress of building owners 
in Japan across this time period to ensure targets are met.  
 
7.4 Engaging with Stakeholders 
 
While compliance monitoring provides authorities with a holistic overview of risk 
reduction progress, it is also important that authorities develop a strong partnership and 
engagement with building owners to assist them in achieving their obligations. Kohiyama 
suggests that a strong exchange of information and interaction between building owners and 
authorities would incentivise greater compliance with seismic strengthening.436 Navigating 
seismic risk reduction for existing buildings is likely to be unfamiliar territory for many, and 
some may not fully appreciate legal requirements or lack knowledge about how to manage 
seismic assessment and strengthening work. For instance, the owners of private residential 
units under a body corporate arrangement have expressed greater challenges and uncertainty 
in relation to engaging with seismic strengthening requirements than have owners of large 
commercial buildings in New Zealand.437 Other factors, including language barriers, are also 
relevant considerations which can challenge or stall compliance.438 Relying on formal 
sanctions and regulation alone to achieve risk reduction homogenises building owners and 
these potential barriers for complying with relevant obligations. Ensuring a strong level of 
engagement and sharing of information between building owners, authorities, and the 
professionals involved in seismic assessments and strengthening, would contribute to a 
smoother overall risk reduction process by addressing individual needs or issues. 
  
Despite understanding the importance of bridging information gaps to achieve risk 
reduction, current frameworks for reducing the seismic risk of existing buildings tend to place 
 
435 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, above n 425.  
436 Kohiyama and others, above n 320, at 177. 
437 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, above n 357, at 19. 
438 Independent Review Team, above n 201, at 31. 
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most responsibility on building owners to self-navigate planning and consulting with 
engineering professionals and accessing specific information relevant to their obligations. In 
Italy, the onus for understanding the seismic risk of existing buildings is entirely dependent 
upon the voluntary willingness of building owners to engage with professionals.439 The 
Sismabonus tax incentive scheme discussed in Chapter 6 attempts to incentivise greater uptake 
by building owners with seismic strengthening, yet it ultimately lacks a significant motivating 
factor to assist building owners to take action in the first instance.440 The circumstance is 
slightly different in Japan and New Zealand, where authorities have attempted to bridge this 
gap by identifying existing buildings in need of seismic risk reduction and directly contacting 
the owners of relevant buildings to advise them on their obligations. Beyond this initial contact, 
however, engagement remains similarly low during the assessment and strengthening 
processes. A survey of homeowners in Japan highlighted common deterrents for undertaking 
seismic strengthening, including a lack of trust toward relevant contractors and insufficient 
knowledge about the process itself.441  
 
Recent experience in New Zealand demonstrates the importance of having an active 
engagement between stakeholders to achieve risk reduction targets within designated 
timeframes. Issued a few months after the 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake (Mw 7.8), the 
Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Recovery (URM Building) Order 2017 required dangerous 
parts of certain URM buildings across the jurisdiction of four TAs to be identified and 
strengthened or removed within 12 months, though this was subsequently extended by six 
months.442 A subsequent review into the order indicated that the key influence for its overall 
success was owed to the high-engagement case management approach taken between 
authorities, engineers and building owners. The authors noted:443 
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The close working relationship between [TAs] and MBIE was one of the key factors in making 
the project successful. It enabled the policy to be responsive to new information and issues 
during the project. 
 
A slow initial response from building owners in relation to issued strengthening notices 
from authorities raised concerns that the statutory deadline of 12 months would not be met. 
This led authorities to adopt a more active engagement approach for the process.444 A chain of 
engagement was created between stakeholders to achieve the order’s public safety objective.445 
TAs regularly engaged with building owners to monitor progress made and the overall 
confidence of owners in their ability to complete their obligations on time. This progress was 
updated fortnightly and reported to central government, alongside any potential issues 
identified or concerns raised directly by building owners or engineers. This was then 
periodically reviewed by the Minister to make any necessary changes to the order. The authors 
of the report noted that the regulatory deadline and associated financial assistance provided to 
building owners were “insufficient alone” to achieve obligations and, in fact, the close 
engagement and responsiveness to queries or practical concerns was “crucial” for completing 
the strengthening work.446 This experience provides important insights which may be 
applicable to the completion of obligations under the EPB framework, especially considering 
the current lack of compliance monitoring requirements. It is possible that the subsequent 6-
month extension granted to complete obligations could have been avoided had this engagement 
model and compliance monitoring been adopted by authorities from the beginning of the 
order’s effect. 
  
Improving the responsiveness of authorities to the questions and concerns from 
building owners would significantly assist the process of seismic assessments and 
strengthening. Such an operation exists in Japan, known as the Seismic Repair Support Centre 
(SRSC). In 2006, the SRSC was designated by the Japanese government as national 
organisation designed to provide information and technical support to building owners for 
seismic assessment and strengthening.447 The centre has a dedicated website with a range of 
relevant information, from knowledge about financial incentives and lists of approved 
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businesses able to conduct assessments and strengthening within each prefecture, to more 
general educational brochures explaining legal obligations.448 The novelty of the SRSC is the 
consolidation of necessary information and the organisation’s sole mandate to support building 
owners through the seismic assessment and strengthening process. More accessible 
information and a dedicated entity to coordinate and respond to inquiries from building owners 
has been recommended for the EPB framework in New Zealand.449 MBIE is currently 
responsible for managing the EPB framework on the national level, which has no centre or 
team that deals exclusively with EPBs. Similarly, there is no dedicated national entity designed 
to engage with building owners for risk reduction in Italy. The Italian earthquake engineering 
professional interviewed for this researched stated that access to relevant information and 
support in Italy is very much a self-led process, noting building owners largely “have to go and 
do the looking”.450 Such an entity seems worthwhile for improving the capacity of building 
owners to engage with risk reduction obligations and better enable them to directly raise any 




Timeframes help to provide coherence and clarity of obligations within risk reduction 
frameworks. Though not generally used in Italy, timeframes are key components of 
frameworks in both New Zealand and Japan for reducing the seismic risk of existing buildings. 
In New Zealand, deadlines are included within the Building Act to enforce formal sanctions 
against EPB owners who fail to comply with mandatory remediation obligations on time. In 
comparison, authorities in Japan use timeframes to set long-term goals for risk reduction, which 
are measured approximately every five years. The structure of the EPB framework in New 
Zealand appears to place significant reliance on achieving risk reduction through deterrence, 
with the threat of penalties. Though necessary to enforce the deadlines, there is a danger of 
failing to remediate EPBs on time by relying on formal sanctions alone. Though New Zealand 
places more reliance on achieving risk reduction through statutorily-enforceable deadlines, it 
is within the best interests of authorities to ensure that reliance on remediating the risk of EPBs 
is not placed upon formal sanctions. Such a process would likely be lengthy, expensive, and 
 
448 “耐震改修支援センター” (2020) Japan Building Disaster Prevention Association <www.kenchiku-
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ultimately uncertain in relation to its impact on reducing seismic risk, and therefore formal 
sanctions should only be an option of final resort. 
 
 Achieving risk reduction within relevant timeframes is likely to be more assured 
through a greater partnership between authorities and building owners. This includes better use 
of compliance monitoring by authorities, to track to the progress of seismic strengthening 
across long periods of time. Experience in Japan illustrates how routine monitoring can be 
effective for identifying potential shortcomings in achieving remediation targets and therefore 
adapting strategies to address this. The EPB framework does not provide a mechanism for such 
monitoring of strengthening obligations amongst building owners, despite routine monitoring 
for the efforts of TAs in identifying potentially earthquake-prone buildings being crucial for 
authorities in achieving their statutory deadlines. Authorities are therefore less informed about 
the progress made by building owners within these timeframes and therefore increase the 
potential for reactive responses at the end of deadlines, especially considering many deadlines 
span multiple decades.  
 
In addition to regular compliance monitoring, a higher level of engagement between 
building owners and authorities is also important for assisting compliance. Lack of experience 
or knowledge are just some relevant factors which may prevent or stall building owners from 
completing seismic risk reduction. Despite this, the frameworks of each case study country still 
appear to place a great responsibility on building owners to self-navigate the process. 
Experience in New Zealand with a 2017 URM remediation order demonstrated the importance 
of engagement between authorities and building owners, to enable any queries or concerns to 
be efficiently heard and responded to. Japan has attempted somewhat to bridge this gap by 
designating the online Seismic Repair Support Centre, which provides a range of relevant 
sources and information within a single platform. New Zealand may benefit by requiring 
authorities to take a more active engagement with building owners in helping them achieve 
their obligations, rather than leaving owners to their own doing. This approach would be more 







Chapter 8  
A Duty of Care to Protect the Public from Vulnerable Buildings 
 
 If something goes wrong, and harm occurs, then the issues become [health and safety] issues, 
capable of investigation and prosecution by WorkSafe. The effect of this approach is that 
WorkSafe is under no obligation to take any action until harm has actually been suffered. In 
other words, WorkSafe has no role in providing any sort of safety net regarding the hazards 
contained in defectively constructed buildings. 
John Goddard451 
 
With the Sendai Framework understanding risk as the function of hazards intersecting 
with vulnerability, the concept of accountability is a central underlying theme of DRR.452 The 
perception of disasters as social phenomena has fundamental implications for the 
responsibility, accountability and liability for harms or losses resulting from hazards.453 Indeed, 
the Sendai Framework alludes to enforcement of DRR through this area of law in its emphasis 
on strengthening disaster risk governance, including through health and safety obligations.454 
In a multi-country report which analysed DRR practices within different legal systems, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) highlighted the potential for legal liability 
to support the enforcement of DRR practices. In particular, the report noted “civil liability… 
may be useful to address the misconception that natural hazards unavoidably cause disasters, 
and could help to increase government accountability for the risks that authorities either create 
or allow to accumulate”.455 While an important consideration, the report did ultimately 
highlight the significant uncertainty which currently exists in this area of law and cautioned 
that more comprehensive research is necessary to understand the potential impacts of legal 
liability as a means of enforcing DRR.456  
 
 
451 John Goddard “Adopting a Health and Safety Framework for the Assessment and Remediation of Earthquake-
Prone Buildings” (2018) 43 NZJER 18 at 30. 
452 Above n 51, at [80]. 
453 See: Lauta, above n 37. 
454 Above n 7, at [27(d)]. 
455 Picard, above n 36, at 78.  
456 At 78. 
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Nonetheless, there are relevant considerations necessary to highlight within this 
research which relate directly to the management of seismic risk for existing buildings. These 
are important considerations in relation to risk reduction obligations for existing buildings, 
when examining legal duties of care to protect people from harm and ensure public safety. As 
the seismic risk reduction of existing buildings has become more widely mandated and actively 
sought within the case study countries, very real legal questions have arisen in relation to these 
duties of care and their relationship to the enforcement of seismic risk reduction obligations. 
This primarily concerns the legal responsibility of building owners or managers to ensure their 
buildings do not cause harm to occupants or passersby. In particular, it is arguable that these 
duties have expanded into a broader, yet perhaps unintended, responsibility for building owners 
to also manage the seismic risk of their buildings. Consideration to this argument is heavily 
entrenched within each of three priority areas of the Sendai Framework examined within this 
research. In particular, an increased understanding of seismic risk (such as through the use of 
seismic building assessments) arguably increases the duty of building owners to take actionable 
measures to reduce this risk. This is regardless of whether such obligations are compulsory 
within formal risk reduction frameworks. This raises two key challenges in particular. The first 
is the expectation of building owners to both share and act upon seismic risk they become 
aware of. The second is the need to provide greater clarity for exactly what action is required 
from building owners to comply with their duty of care. Both are increasingly essential 
considerations and ones which have a substantial impact on structures within disaster risk 
governance and on the enforcement of risk reduction obligations.  
 
It should be mentioned that this is an incredibly complex and uncertain area of law, 
which deals with various aspects of tort and criminal law in each of the case study countries. 
Discussion of the topic within this chapter is therefore not intended to be comprehensive. 
Instead, the intention is to identify and allude to relevant challenges which arise in relation to 
the seismic risk reduction of existing buildings. Having an understanding of these issues is 
important given the impact of duties of care as a driving force for risk reduction of existing 
buildings. 
 
8.1 A Duty of Care to Protect Building Users and the Public 
 
Each of the case study countries have relevant public safety duties of care which interact 
with obligations of existing building owners to reduce seismic risk. In New Zealand, the Health 
 130 
and Safety at Work Act 2015 (HSWA) requires persons conducting a business or undertaking 
(a PCBU), or officers of a PCBU, to manage workplace safety in order to protect persons from 
harm, which extends to ensuring their buildings are safe.457 The HSWA is especially relevant 
to the enforcement of risk reduction obligations owing to the unique Accident Compensation 
Corporation (ACC) scheme in New Zealand, which removes liability for personal injury as a 
trade-off for providing universal compensation. Equivalent duties of care also exist within the 
civil and criminal legal systems of Japan and Italy. These duties, which comparably under 
private law, require building owners or occupiers to protect public safety by preventing harm 
arising from any “defect” in the construction or maintenance of a building.458 While only 
building owners are responsible for this duty in Italy, building owners in Japan have secondary 
liability if the building occupier has in fact “used necessary care” to prevent relevant damages 
arising.459 As is discussed, this conflicts with seismic strengthening duties given that such a 
responsibility is required from building owners, not tenants. It is significant that each of these 
duties in the case study countries were not originally conceived with the intention to influence 
seismic risk reduction for existing buildings, but have since become increasingly important for 
such in light of the increasing pursuance of prevention-based risk reduction frameworks. 
 
8.2 Coming into Knowledge of Seismic Building Risk 
 
The effort to reduce the seismic risk of existing buildings appears to have created a 
paradox. As building owners become more aware of the potential seismic risk of their 
structures owing to relevant assessment obligations, so too, in effect, does the duty for them to 
respond appropriately and reduce this risk.460 A key consideration of this paradox is the duty 
of building owners to communicate this knowledge of risk when they become aware of it, in 
 
457 For purposes of clarity, a PCBU or officer of a PCBU includes both the owner and occupier of a building, 
whether commercial, industrial, residential, or otherwise. For a detailed explanation of persons who have 
obligations under HSWA, see: Tracy Hatton and others Leveraging the Health and Safety at Work Act (2015) 
for Disaster Risk Reduction (Resilient Organisations, 2021) at 4. 
458 Civil Code of Japan (Act No. 89 of 1896), art 717(1); Civil Code of Italy (Royal Decree No. 262 of 16 March 
1942), art 2053; Criminal Code of Italy (Royal Decree No. 1398 of 19 October 1930), art 434 (Collapse of 
Buildings or Other Wilful Disasters) and art 677 (Omission of Work in Buildings or Constructions that 
Threaten Ruin). 
459 Civil Code of Japan, art 717(1). 
460 Mythen, above n 104, at 45. 
 131 
order to take all reasonable steps to protect persons both within and nearby their building(s). 
The importance of communicating and acting upon known seismic risk has been explored in 
each of the case study countries. 
  
In New Zealand, the Real Estates Agent Disciplinary Tribunal heard such a case in 
2018. A tattoo parlor in Christchurch – which had been previously damaged in the 2010 
Darfield Earthquake – partially collapsed in the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake, killing one 
tenant and injuring another. The building was managed on behalf of its owner by a real estate 
agent, who had failed to disclose relevant information to the tenants about the structural 
integrity of the building following the 2010 earthquake. In particular, the agent was aware that 
the building was deemed “structurally unsafe to occupy” by engineers and would require 
seismic strengthening to allow occupancy to continue.461 This was not, however, passed onto 
the building tenants, despite them raising multiple concerns and requests for the agent to 
disclose information about the building’s safety.462 In addition, the agent did not communicate 
to the building owner any concerns in relation to the safe continued occupancy of the building, 
despite being privy to knowledge indicating otherwise.463 In its finding the agent did not meet 
the relevant standards expected from the real estate industry, the tribunal noted in particular 
that important health and safety information should be passed onto tenants and that this should 
not be reliant on the owner’s approval, as the agent had argued.464 In a 2016 High Court 
decision, where the legal basis for tribunal charges against the agent were considered, the court 
agreed that “failing to disclose information as to the integrity and safety of the building” may 
amount to “disgraceful conduct” of a real estate agent acting as a building manager.465 
Significantly, the circumstances of this case pre-dated the HSWA. Under the Act, PCBUs are 
required to stay updated with new information related to potential risk, which includes new 
information about risk posed by buildings themselves.466 It is likely that similar matters related 
to the disclosure of building safety information today could fall within the jurisdiction of this 
 
461 C v Real Estate Agents Authority [2016] NZHC 414 at [13]. 
462 CAC 304 v Chapman [2018] NZREADT 6 at [97]. 
463 At [100]. 
464 At [97]. 
465 C v Real Estate Agents Authority, above n 461, at [39]. 
466 Hatton and others, above n 457, at 6. 
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legislation, primarily through the duty to keep updated with relevant information and manage 
all known risks as far as reasonably practicable.467 
  
A comparable situation played out before the Kobe District court in Japan, against the 
owner of a 1950s-apartment building in 1999. The building partially collapsed in the 1995 
Kobe Earthquake and caused the death and injury of multiple tenants on the first floor.468 The 
court found that the building had not been designed in compliance with the technical 
requirements in force at the time of its construction and this was a contributing factor to its 
ultimate collapse in the 1995 earthquake. However, despite this defect in installation, the owner 
at the time of the earthquake was not found in violation of their duty of care to protect the 
building users. The court reasoned that the owner could not have been reasonably expected to 
know about the defect, owing to a lack of structural drawings at the time of purchase and being 
under no legal obligation at the time to examine the structural capacity of the building. Since 
this case concerned a building which collapsed before the modern APSRB framework had been 
enacted, it is interesting to consider how it may have been decided now in light of seismic 
assessment expectations for existing buildings under the APSRB. Indeed, it would likely be 
more difficult to be ignorant to seismic risk given the obligations for building owners to 
undertake seismic assessments. 
 
A similar point of law was also addressed by the Supreme Court of Italy in 2016. There, 
the director of a boarding house in L’Aquila was convicted for failing to adopt appropriate risk 
reduction measures in light of known information about the seismic inadequacy of the 
building.469  The building partially collapsed during the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake and killed 
some of the occupants. Despite being privy to long-term maintenance observations and an 
engineering report which had highlighted multiple risks in relation to the building’s seismic 
capacity, the court found the director to have been negligent, among other factors, in failing to 
ensure the safety of the students within the boarding house. The court made it clear that the 
 
467 For instance, the HSWA requires multiple PCBUs who have a shared duty under the Act to consult, co-operate 
and co-ordinate with each other when responding to relevant risks, see: Health and Safety at Work Act 2015, 
s 34. 
468 See: Ueshima v Masuda (Kobe Dist. Ct., No. Hei 8 (Wa), No. 1533, September 20, 1999) (accessed at 
<www.atlaslaw.net>).  
469 Cassazione Penale, Sez. 4, 21 Gennaio 2016, n. 2536 (translation: Italian Supreme Court of Criminal Cassation, 
Section 4, 21 January 2016, n.2536) (accessed at: <www.olympus.uniurb.it>).  
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director’s failure to act in light of his knowledge about the buildings’ seismic risk was 
unacceptable. For instance, some students had expressed safety concerns about the building in 
a foreshock that had struck the city prior to the main earthquake which led to the building’s 
collapse. Regardless, the director chose not to evacuate the building despite his prior 
knowledge about its seismic shortcomings. The level of knowledge understood by the director 
was therefore considered a significant factor in the negligence to reduce the risk, and is a 
relevant consideration in relation to the duty of care. It should be noted that this case was 
decided upon the basis that the boarding school director had an obligation to reduce the seismic 
risk under an agreement previously made with the provincial government to improve the 
building’s structural capacity. 
  
Although the law is not particularly extensive in this area, the three cases highlighted 
within this section each point to the underlying significance around the disclosure of risk 
information and taking appropriate action to reduce this risk. As DRR becomes more integrated 
into governance and building regulation in particular, these duties of care to protect public 
safety are likely to have an increasingly profound impact on seismic risk reduction. Whereas 
previously the circumstances where building owners were required to assess the seismic 
capacity of their buildings, modern seismic risk reduction frameworks change such dynamic. 
In this sense, the requirement for seismic assessments, for instance, may be useful to 
inadvertently nudge building owners toward risk reduction measures to comply with their duty 
of care to take reasonable steps to protect persons from harm. 
 
8.3 Clarifying the Requirements of Building Owners to Reduce Seismic Risk 
 
Despite the need for building owners to respond appropriately to knowledge about 
seismic risk, what constitutes an appropriate response is itself ambiguous. This ambiguity 
currently leaves the relevant duties of care as tools for responding when harm has already 
occurred. Greater clarity should be provided in order for these duties to operate in a more 
preventative manner, as a means of encouraging proactive risk reduction. This is a challenge 
especially where there are no clear mandatory obligations to reduce risk. In New Zealand, this 
is a significant consideration in relation to existing buildings which are not considered 
earthquake-prone by the legal definition, but nonetheless present a seismic risk. For instance, 
new information has emerged in recent years concerning the potential danger of buildings with 
hollow core concrete floors, exemplified by the partial collapse of multiple modern high-rise 
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buildings in Wellington during the 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake (refer to Chapter 3). Although a 
revision to the technical guidelines used for assessing potentially earthquake-prone buildings 
was made in 2018 to include consideration of this, the EPB framework has not yet been 
amended to capture these buildings.470 Additionally, most of these buildings were constructed 
after 1976 and so are not actively targeted by authorities to complete seismic assessments under 
the EPB framework. This leaves building owners in a position where they are required to 
understand seismic risk but have no particular clarity around what steps are expected to be 
taken in response.  
 
In addition, existing buildings in New Zealand which have an earthquake rating of 
between 34-66%NBS are still considered earthquake-vulnerable (refer to Chapter 3). Building 
owners who become aware of this through seismic assessments (or who should be expected to 
know this risk through their obligation to keep up with relevant knowledge) therefore have a 
health and safety duty to manage this risk. While WorkSafe has issued a policy-statement 
advising that building owners are not required to take any further action than what is required 
within the Building Act (i.e. strengthening EPBs to greater than 33%NBS), the known potential 
seismic risk of these buildings make this argument less convincing and even potentially 
ignorant to such risks.471 The potential challenge may become increasingly relevant in the 
instance where a building user, such as a tenant or an employee, raises valid concerns or queries 
owing to a building’s seismic safety. Building owners have a responsibility to manage risk they 
become aware of to protect building users and passersby, even if they are permitted multiple 
decades to comply with their strengthening obligations. 
  
A similar paradox has also recently been highlighted in Japan. There, a 2013 
amendment to the APSRB made it mandatory for the seismic assessment results for certain 
large buildings to be made public (refer to Chapter 3). Tomita argues that in the absence of a 
mandatory obligation to complete seismic strengthening in Japan, the requirement to publish 
the seismic capacity of buildings causes direct conflict with the legal duty of care to ensure 
 
470 Hatton and others, above n 457, at 25. 
471 WorkSafe, above n 126. 
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public safety through the preservation and maintenance of buildings.472 As mentioned, a breach 
of this public safety duty of care in Japan relies upon harm being caused owing to a “defect” 
either from a building’s construction or maintenance. In 1981 the Sendai District Court heard 
a case which concerned an unreinforced concrete block wall which had caused a death when it 
overturned in the 1978 Miyagi Earthquake (Mw 7.4). The court held that because the wall had 
been built in compliance with legal standards in effect at the time of its construction, it could 
not be considered to have had a “defect” in preservation owing to the absence of a legal 
requirement to complete seismic strengthening.473 Therefore, despite the wall being below the 
seismic standard required by the building code in force at the time of the earthquake, the owner 
was found not to have breached their public safety duty of care.  
 
Today, in relation to obligations for seismic assessments to be undertaken and the 
results publicised, Tomita contends that the very nature of buildings being assessed as 
seismically vulnerable warrants an interpretation that buildings do indeed have a “defect in 
preservation” in relation to the duty of care. To insist otherwise would, ultimately, result in no 
one being responsible for reducing the risk. It is difficult to imagine the government would 
have intended for building owners to identify seismic risk but not have any duty whatsoever to 
take steps to protect public safety. Tomita argues that the government either needs to introduce 
a legal requirement for building owners to seismically strengthen vulnerable buildings or to 
explicitly clarify that the public safety duty of care does not apply for existing buildings 
subsequently found to be seismically-vulnerable. Indeed, with the increased focus on public 
safety and the urgency of reducing the seismic risk of existing buildings, it is difficult to accept 
the notion that building owners should be under no obligation to remediate known risks. This 
same principle can be applied to the health and safety obligations of PCBUs in New Zealand, 





472 Hiroshi Tomita “耐震改修促進法改正の問題点と工作物責任” (2013) 27 Journal of Japan Real Estate 
Association 74 (translation: “Problems of Revisions of the Seismic Repair Promotion Law and Responsibility 
for Workplaces”) (accessed from <www.jstage.jst.go.jp>) at 75. 
473 At 76  
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8.4 Making a Reasonable Effort to Comply with Risk Reduction Obligations 
 
The health and safety duties of building owners in New Zealand also relate to actions 
taken, or lack of actions, within the timeframes discussed in the previous chapter. While 
building owners are legally permitted the length of relevant deadlines to remediate the risk of 
their buildings, there is arguably an expectation nonetheless for reasonable action to be taken 
toward achieving these minimum obligations within this period as soon as reasonably 
practicable. This is especially relevant when from the time building owners become aware of 
the risk their building presents based on seismic assessment results. The implied expectation 
to mitigate potential risk as soon as reasonably practicable aligns with the overall objective of 
improving public safety and, therefore, aligns with the obligations of building owners under 
the HSWA. 
 
The idea of such an expectation relative to achieving seismic risk reduction of existing 
buildings within a legal deadline was explored in the United States case of Myrick v Mastagni 
in 2010. The case concerned an appeal by building owners against a conviction for the wrongful 
death of two employees who were killed in a 2003 earthquake when part of their 19th century 
URM office building collapsed onto them. The building had been subject to a seismic 
strengthening notice under a 1992 ordinance. The ordinance had required all URM buildings 
in the city of Paso Robles to be seismically strengthened within 15 years, though an amendment 
was made in 1998 which subsequently extended this deadline until the year 2018.474 At the 
time of the earthquake, the building owners had delayed the completion of strengthening work 
owing to this extension. The building owners argued on appeal that the jury had been 
improperly directed to consider their omission to complete seismic strengthening by the time 
of the earthquake in relation to negligence, instead of the deadline outlined within the 
ordinance.475 In discussing expectations of action associated with legal standards, the court 
stated:476 
 
A statute, ordinance or regulation ordinarily defines a minimum standard of conduct. A 
minimum standard of conduct does not preclude a finding that a reasonable person would have 
taken additional precautions under the circumstances. 
 
474 Myrick v Mastagni (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1082 at [1085]. 
475 At [1087]. 
476 At [1087]. 
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The court went on to note that the overriding purpose of the strengthening mandate was 
not to promote the interests of building owners, but to improve public safety. An interpretation 
that building owners had no duty to act to reduce risk so long as the deadline still applied 
“would frustrate the very [public safety] policy that the ordinance was designed to promote”.477 
Legal deadlines for compliance with strengthening obligations are designed to provide building 
owners with a reasonable period to plan measures to reduce risk, and not simply to delay action 
to a later date. Such consideration is relevant for building owners in New Zealand who have 
been issued with an EPB notice and are expected to carry out seismic strengthening (or 
demolition) within the deadlines listed in the Building Act.  
 
The Building Act states EPB owners are required to complete seismic strengthening 
“on or before” relevant statutory deadlines.478 This implies that Parliament intended for 
building owners to have a grace period to organise and make plans for strengthening work or 
demolition, while simultaneously encouraging such work to be completed prior to the legal 
deadline. It would be inappropriate to interpret this differently given the multi-decade deadlines 
allocated within the EPB framework, as discussed in Chapter 7. Much like the purpose of the 
seismic strengthening ordinance discussed in the United States case of Myrick, the fundamental 
purpose of the EPB framework in New Zealand is public safety. The requirement for EPBs to 
be strengthened above 33%NBS represents a minimum standard of conduct, and therefore the 
need to take meaningful steps to manage this risk arguably begins from when owners become 
aware. Though EPB owners are compliant with their obligations under the Building Act so 
long as relevant work is completed on time, there is uncertainty about how this translates to 
building owners’ meeting health and safety obligations. Goddard argues that once buildings 
have been identified as earthquake-prone and become subject to relevant risk reduction 
obligations, “the timeframes for addressing critical structural weaknesses mean that most of 
the health and safety risks are borne by employers and workers”.479 It is imaginable that, as in 
Myrick, harm caused from an EPB as a result of an earthquake during relevant deadline periods 
may subsequently result in health and safety consequences. Although this would depend upon 
particular circumstances, including whether or not building owners had taken any reasonable 
 
477 At [1090]. 
478 Section 133AM(1). 
479 Goddard, above n 451, at 31. 
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steps to develop strengthening plans, it nevertheless stands to reason as an important 
consideration for building owners. A reasonable move may be to make it clear that building 
owners must take actionable measures to plan and reduce risk from as soon as their buildings 
are identified as earthquake-prone, while still allowing the deadline people to complete actual 
remediation work. This would prevent instances where building owners sit on EPB notices for 




Legal duties of care to ensure public safety within each of the case study countries play 
a significant, yet currently ambiguous, role in seismic risk reduction frameworks for existing 
buildings. Of course, this is an incredibly complex and uncertain area of law, but is nonetheless 
important to understand in the context of risk reduction for existing buildings. As legal 
frameworks require an increasing number of building owners to assess their buildings and 
therefore better understand potential seismic risk, the influence of such duties on risk reduction 
arguably increases. Whereas once building owners may not have been aware of the seismic 
risk presented by their buildings, today the claim of ignorance is less convincing.  
 
It is clear that building owners have a responsibility to consider the potential seismic 
risk their buildings pose and, in the instance that such knowledge is understood, for appropriate 
measures be taken to manage and reduce the risk. Exactly what is considered an appropriate 
response, however, needs to be better clarified by officials to allow building owners to more 
confidently fulfill their duty of care. These duties of care were not considered when developing 
legal frameworks for reducing the seismic risk of existing buildings, but have now come to be 
sufficiently interconnected. Moving forward, it is clear that such duties will be influential in 
helping to guide risk reduction behaviour beyond minimum expectations set out within statutes 
or regulation. As DRR is further integrated into legal frameworks, and indeed the importance 
of reducing seismic risk amongst existing buildings is increasingly brought into the public 
arena, conversations around accountability and acceptable risk will undoubtedly involve public 
safety duties of care for building owners. Their ability to drive preventative action will require 




Chapter 9  
Conclusion 
 
There is a widespread misconception that earthquakes and disasters are synonymous 
with one another, and that the latter is unavoidable when a strong earthquake impacts a 
community. While earthquakes can and do have serious impacts, a disaster arises only when 
the affected community is unprepared to anticipate and cope with such event. Disasters are 
therefore the product of human choices and, in particular, the failure to reduce the vulnerability 
and risk of communities in advance of hazards occurring. Just as disasters occur as a result of 
failing to address underlying risk, they can equally be avoided by making decisions to actively 
reduce risk and, therefore, improve the resilience of communities and systems to hazards. This 
research has emphasised the importance of taking preventative action to reduce the risk 
associated with earthquakes, in relation to that presented by existing buildings. 
 
Active intervention to reduce the seismic risk of existing buildings is critical for 
improving the resilience of communities against earthquakes. Not only is building failure one 
of the leading causes of death and injury in earthquakes, widespread damage and destruction 
to buildings also creates long-term disruption to livelihoods and the everyday functioning of 
communities. Existing buildings constructed before the introduction of modern seismic design 
regulations present the greatest risk as they were not designed to sufficiently withstand seismic 
shaking, and are therefore of particular interest for risk reduction efforts. Far from unique to 
New Zealand, this a challenge shared by many seismically-active countries around the world. 
This research examined the national legal approaches taken by New Zealand, Italy and Japan 
to reduce the risk of existing buildings. Each have sought to address the challenge with an 
increased sense of urgency, by adopting legal frameworks which promote obligations for 
identifying and remediating the risk of vulnerable buildings. Not only is preventative action 
more cost-effective than reacting to hazards as they occur, it is also essential for minimising 
the potential for disasters to transpire. The case study countries have obligations to plan and 
implement risk reduction strategies under the Sendai Framework, with each adopting the 
principles and priorities of Sendai into their national frameworks. 
 
Looking outward to other countries to understand alternative strategies for reducing 
existing building risk was useful to provide insight into how New Zealand may seek to improve 
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its current EPB system. Indeed, compared to the legal frameworks of Italy and Japan, New 
Zealand’s EPB framework is unique in its strong regulation-based approach. This is seen 
through compulsory requirements for TAs to identify all potential EPBs within their 
jurisdictions and for owners to thereafter complete a seismic assessment of their building and, 
if necessary, carry out strengthening work or demolition. In contrast, Italy and Japan have opted 
for more incentive-based frameworks for risk reduction, stopping short of imposing mandatory 
strengthening requirements. In Japan, the national APSRB framework provides a long-term 
strategy to remediate existing buildings and, like New Zealand, requires authorities to actively 
notify building owners who need to complete a seismic assessment. the long-term stopping 
short of imposing mandatory requirements for seismic strengthening. There is a comparably 
less-structured legal framework in Italy. For buildings not understood as having priority status, 
reducing risk is largely relied upon through the will of individual building owners aided by 
financial incentives. On the one hand, imposing compulsory obligations to remediate buildings 
identified as below the minimum legal standard provides clear expectations around the action 
required and the ability of authorities to enforce such obligations. On the other hand, regulation 
itself is likely insufficient to ensure building owners successfully reduce existing building risk. 
Lessons from the case study countries provide insight into the mixture of strategies used. 
 
9.1 Broadening the Focus of Risk Reduction Efforts 
 
There is a narrow focus of risk reduction efforts in relation to the type of buildings 
targeted. The primary focus of existing building frameworks in each case study country is to 
protect the life safety of building users and passersby. As a result, the buildings targeted for 
risk reduction measures are those which are assumed to have the greatest chance of collapse in 
a strong earthquake. Though life safety is a crucial element of risk reduction, this focus restricts 
overall knowledge of seismic risk and thus limits the ability to improve resilience against 
earthquakes. For instance, targeting only post-1976 and post-1981 buildings in New Zealand 
and Japan, respectively, limits knowledge of seismic risk and relies on assumptions about the 
safety of later-designed buildings. It also means that risk reduction is perceived from a purely 
life safety perspective and does not include wider considerations such as damage limitation 
and building functionality. Wider efforts should be made by authorities to promote risk 
reduction amongst these later-designed buildings, to ensure risk reduction is not confined only 
to buildings with the greatest presumed risk of collapse. 
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This narrow focus on risk is further exacerbated in New Zealand and Italy, where legal 
obligations are delegated according to seismic hazard zones. As discussed in Chapter 4, these 
hazard zones assume potential ground shaking of different areas according to a return period 
of approximately 500 years and therefore underestimate seismic risk in regions which 
experience strong ground shaking on a much longer return period. Restricting obligations to 
identify and reduce seismic risk according to these zones represents political decisions to limit 
the scope of legal frameworks according to areas with more frequent seismicity. Though 
important to address risk in these areas promptly, it is also important to not misrepresent the 
potential for strong shaking in areas considered to have a low hazard factor. In fact, the 
characterisation of regions in New Zealand according to “seismic risk” is in and of itself 
misleading, since risk and hazard represent two separate concepts. This is something which 
should addressed in order to establish a greater awareness of seismic risk and the importance 
of engaging in risk reduction measures.  
 
9.2 A More Proactive Approach to Monitoring Risk Reduction 
 
Efforts within legal frameworks to remediate existing buildings also requires strategic 
long-term planning and management from authorities, in order to support the process across 
extended periods of time. Although statutory deadlines in New Zealand provide clarity for 
when risk reduction obligations are required to be achieved, there is a clear reliance on 
compliance being achieve through the threat of formal sanctions, as discussed in Chapter 7. 
Once buildings have been identified as earthquake-prone, the onus of remediating them is 
entirely shifted to building owners with little to no duty for authorities to continue monitoring 
progress to understand the likelihood of deadlines being achieved. Japan offers a slightly 
different approach, where compliance monitoring of building owners is an integral aspect of 
ensuring long-term goals of seismic strengthening are achieved within government timeframes. 
Whereas the Italian framework does not apply any general timeframes for building owners to 
achieve risk reduction within, the Japanese framework highlights the importance of active 
monitoring by authorities across time. This approach appears to be more responsive to the 
potential challenges and needs of building owners when aiming to achieve obligations. 
Compliance monitoring provides information useful for avoiding situations where authorities 
have to react at the end of timeframes if building owners have failed to comply.  
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As recommended in Chapter 7, a duty for authorities to monitor the compliance of 
building owners, and periodically report this information back to central government, should 
be considered in New Zealand. Such a duty would be akin to the requirement for TAs to report 
their progress in identifying potential EPBs to MBIE. This would enable a more proactive 
approach with assisting building owners across relevant deadlines, as it would allow the 
government to make targeted interventions in a similar way to what is done in Japan. As the 
framework currently stands, multiple decades will pass without any assurance that TAs have 
maintained an understanding of remediation progress. It would be within the best interest of 
authorities to stay engaged with the process and seek to assist building owners achieve their 
obligations.  
 
9.3 Supporting the Enforcement of Risk Reduction for Existing Buildings 
 
A disengagement from authorities is also apparent from the general lack of assistance 
provided to support building owners achieve their obligations. For many building owners, 
seismic risk reduction is likely to be one of the most significant undertakings of their lives. 
Nonetheless, the general structure of legal frameworks examined within this research appears 
to place a similar expectation on building owners to self-navigate and engage in the process. 
As was also discussed in Chapter 7, this homogenises building owners and fails to consider the 
different barriers faced in completing such measures.  
 
Consideration should be given to authorities more closely working with building 
owners, to support them and actively respond to any potential issues or challenges faced. This 
would also help to personalise the entire process and potentially garner a greater level of trust 
between stakeholders. None of the case study countries appeared to operate under such a 
model, with the closest example being that experienced under the 2017 Hurunui/Kaikōura 
Earthquakes Recovery Order in New Zealand, as detailed in Chapter 7. The Seismic Repair 
Support Centre in Japan does provide an example of attempting to bridge the information gap 
between authorities and building owners. It operates as a designated government support centre 
with the sole mandate of assisting building owners navigate the risk reduction process.  
 
Of course, there is also a clear difference between the frameworks in relation to the way 
financial assistance is provided to building owners. Japan and Italy heavily depend upon 
financial assistance as a means of incentivising risk reduction, since there are no mandatory 
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seismic strengthening requirements. In contrast, almost all EPB owners in New Zealand are 
expected to bear the cost of remediation with the exception of a few restricted schemes to 
support heritage buildings and residential units in apartment blocks. When combined with the 
lack of compliance monitoring and engagement by authorities, the lack of financial support 
further increases the potential that some owners will fail to meet their obligations on time. This 
approach places significantly onerous responsibilities on building owners, while 
simultaneously minimising the responsibilities of government in overseeing and helping to 
achieve risk reduction. As was argued in Chapter 6, there is a legitimate argument for public 
funding to support the remediation of existing buildings given the wider public safety benefits. 
Greater access to financial assistance for building owners in New Zealand should be 
considered. Schemes similar to those used in Japan and Italy, including tax incentives, have 
been previously debated in Parliament and should be revisited with relative urgency in relation 
to statutory deadlines. 
 
9.4 Moving Away from a Linear Understanding of Risk 
  
A key takeaway from this research is that the frameworks in each country primarily 
treat the seismic risk of existing buildings as static. Obligations to identify and remediate 
buildings considered most vulnerable to collapse in earthquakes are one-off, meaning no 
consideration is provided to the long-term management of risk. The requirement to verify the 
life safety index of existing buildings once, with no further obligation to monitor potential 
changes in risk, is a significant gap within legal frameworks in the ability to improve resilience. 
Risk posed by buildings is not linear but instead constantly changing over time. Since buildings 
are likely to deform as they age (owing either to the natural passage of time or from the impact 
of external forces), there is a need for a sustained practice of risk management.  
 
One of the principal ways to improve the long-term resilience of buildings against 
earthquakes would be to create a legal requirement for periodic building assessments, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. This is akin to the requirement in Japan for “special” buildings to be 
assessed for safety approximately every three years, as is required for multi-storey buildings in 
Singapore and Hong Kong between every five and 30 years respectively. These practices are 
designed to monitor buildings over time and capture any physical changes which may pose a 
danger. Such a requirement in New Zealand would provide authorities with a greater 
understanding of risk amongst the building stock and improve the ability to take preventative 
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action if and when necessary. Indeed, this requirement could be similar to the current building 
warrant of fitness scheme, which requires the annual inspection of emergency operation 
systems in buildings across New Zealand. Such a scheme would also help to ensure that risk 
management is practiced for all buildings and not simply those currently targeted under the 
EPB framework. This would provide a more comprehensive picture of the potential risk posed 
by a wider range of buildings and, therefore, improve the capacity for targeted interventions.   
 
A requirement for periodic building assessments would also help to promote a shift in 
expectations amongst building owners in relation to the management of seismic risk. As DRR 
increases the focus on proactive intervention to reduce risk, the responsibility of building 
owners in this process needs to be made much clearer. This involves making clear that, as 
stated above, risk is something which needs to be managed over time rather than as a one-off 
obligation. Indeed, as the ability to understand and reduce seismic risk improves, and 
commitments to doing so increases (including under the Sendai Framework), it is necessary to 
expect long-term maintenance not to be an exceptional or selective requirement, but a natural 
obligation of building ownership. This shift in responsibility is already being observed to an 
extent in relation to duties of care owed by building owners, as discussed in Chapter 8. 
Requirements for building owners to be aware of potential seismic risk and take appropriate 
action to manage and reduce this risk is perhaps greater than what has been expected in the 
past, as DRR increases the potential for liability where this is not followed.  
 
Though the occurrence of earthquakes may be rare, the need to be prepared is evident 
and building owners should therefore be expected to incorporate this into the long-term 
management of buildings. It is up to authorities to implement legal frameworks which guide 
such behaviour and manage expectations. As knowledge about earthquakes and engineering 
technology evolves over time to provide a greater understanding of seismic risk, it is likely that 
so too will risk tolerances and therefore national conversations about acceptable legal minimum 
standards. Disrupting the concept of risk being linear is key for supporting the ongoing 
management of this risk. In fact, this shift in thinking is necessary to better prepare and 





9.5 Limitations and Areas for Future Research 
 
This research has focused primarily on the legal management of physical remediation 
approaches to existing buildings, including seismic assessments and strengthening methods. 
Of course, as discussed in Chapter 1, engineering and technology-based approaches to risk 
reduction are merely one consideration relevant for improving resilience. It would therefore be 
beneficial for future research to examine the legal frameworks of other relevant systems which 
directly relate to the seismic resilience of communities. 
 
For instance, improving the resilience of infrastructure which delivers essential services 
to buildings (such as water and power) is an equally important consideration for the continued 
function and occupation of buildings in the aftermath of earthquakes. A building which sustains 
no serious damage in an earthquake may nonetheless be unable to be used if essential services 
are not able to be maintained. In this sense, the seismic risk of buildings should be considered 
in coordination with the seismic risk of infrastructure services, not separate from one another. 
This would provide a more holistic representation of seismic risk within communities. 
 
Additionally, this research could be expanded upon by examining a broader range of 
“soft” considerations related to the overall resilience of building stocks. This may include 
factors such as the legal frameworks for providing social safety nets and business continuity 
plans. These are both examples of how the potential disruptions of earthquakes may be softened 
in the event that buildings become unusable or unable to be occupied for a certain period of 
time. Planning ahead for these sorts of measures is an important component of improving 
resilience, since the complete physical protection of buildings from earthquakes cannot, 
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